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Abstract 
In this dissertation we formulate a short-term electricity market-clearing problem with sto-
chastic security criteria. The proposed stochastic security criteria make use of probabilistic 
measures of the expected load not served or of the loss-of-load probability associated with 
the random failures of pre-selected sets of generators, lines as well as load disturbances. We 
show that by economically penalizing the operation of the market through the associated 
demand-side costs of involuntary load shedding, the reserve service requiremellts are deter-
mincd implicitly, tlms removing the needs for specifying any (L pTioTi reserve requirements. 
Vnder this approach, the market-clearing problem gains in flexibility as it can balance the 
respective expected costs of: (i) the pre-contingenc:y preventive security control actions 
that include unit commitment, generation and load dispatch as weIl as reserve schedul-
ing; (ii) the post-contingency corrective actions that deploy reserves through further unit 
commitment decisions and load and generation re-dispatch; and, (iii) any post-contingency 
involuntary load shedding decisions. Case studies illustrate that electricity market-clearing 
with stochastic security leads to non-negligible economic savings for society, while it can 
still ensure that consumers benefit from a sec:ure supply of electricity given how they value 
load shedding. 
'vVe derive theoretical results pertaining to the priees of energy and security correspond-
ing to the optimal schedules of the market-clearing pro cess. The key 1'esult of this analysis 
establishes that involuntary load shedding is used after a contingency if and only if the 
expected ma,1'ginal costs of scheduling reserves and deploying them are greater than the 
expccted marginal costs of load shedding. 
'vVe thell (~xtend the model of electricity market-clearing with stochastic security by 
proposing a short-tenu elcctricity market-clearing formulation capable of accounting for 
non-dispatchable and intermittent power gene1'ation sources like wind power.We show 
how the electricity market-clearing mode! can take into account uncertainties in the next 
day Ihours wind power generation predictions as well as those of the demand. AIso, wc 
clernonstrate how the market-clearing formulation can integrate the scheduling of a large-
seale centralized energy storage infrastructure. 
Finally, we define rigorously the concept of the set of umbrella contingencies for security-
constrained optimal power fiow problems, a class of power system scheduling problerns 
t.o which market-clearing with stochastic security belongs. 'vVe propose an identification 
Il 
methocl to identify the members of this set by making use of the vector norms of the 
Lagrange multipliers nssociated with the post-contingency power balance relations. vVe 
snggest a lwuristic contingency ranking rule based on those vector norms, and vve argue that 
the proposed identification rule and ranking method ca.n be of use to system operators wh en 
specifying reduced sets of contingencies for security-constrained market-clearing problems. 
III 
RésUlné 
Cette dissertation développe la formulation d'un problème d'ordonnancement à court terme 
d'un marché d'électricité soumis à des critères de sécurité stochastiques basés sur des 
mesures probabilistes connne, pal' exemple, la probabilité de délestage postcontingence 
ou la valeur probable de la grandeur de celui-ci. Ici, les mesures probabilistes sont calculées 
pour des ensembles de contingences présélectionnées pouvant inclure des défaillances aléa-
toires des groupes de production, des lignes de transport ainsi qu'à d'importantes déviations 
de la demande pa.r rapport à sa. prévision. Nous démontrons qu'en pénalisant économique-
rnent la valeur probable du délestage postcontingence, il est possible d'imposer des critères 
de réserves opérationnelles basés sur le risque économique de délestage en lieu et place des 
critères de réserves empiriques utilisés par l'industrie. Le processus d'ordonnancement op-
timal du marché d'électricité gagne donc en flexibilité, car il est ainsi possible de balancer 
les valeurs probables des coùts correspondants: (i) aux actions préventives associées au 
rnode d'opération en précontingence spécifiant les décisions relatives à la synchronisation 
et aux points de consigne des groupes de production, l'ordonnancement de la demande, ainsi 
qu'aux niveaux des réserves opérationnelles; (ii) aux corrections postcontingences pouvant 
inclure des changements d'état de synchronisation et de points de consigne des groupes 
de production; et (iii) au délestage postcontingence qu'il soit volontaire ou involontaire. 
Des études de cas démontrent que la méthode d'ordonnancement stochastique proposée 
permet de réduire de manière non négligeable les cmlts sociaux reliés à la production et au 
transport de l'électricité, tout en permettant aux consommateurs de continuer de jouir d'un 
approvisionnement électrique fiable en fonction des coùts sociaux associés aux événements 
de délestage. 
Nous démontrons ensuite UIle série de résultats théoriques reliés aux prix de l'énergie 
et de la sécurité associés à l'ordonnancement optimal d'un marché d'électricité soumis à 
lm critère de sécurité stochastique. Un des résultats clés de cette analyse établit que des 
actions de délestage involontaires sont utilisées si et seulement si la valeur probable des coûts 
marginaux associés à l'ordonnancement et au déploiement des réserves opérationnelles est 
supérieure à celle des coûts marginaux de ces actions de délestage. 
La formulation du problème d'ordonnancement stochastique à court terme est étendue 
afin d'accommoder le traitement de l'incertitude dans les prévisions de sources d'énergie 
électrique intermittentes, et pour lesquelles il est pratiquement impossible de spécifier un 
iv 
point de consigne de production, comme l'énergie provenant d'éoliennes. Nous démontrons 
cornrnent modéliser l'incertitude dans les prévisions de production éolienne et de celle de 
la. demande afin de pouvoir adapter la formulation déjà développée à ce type d'incertitude. 
De plus, nous indiquons comment cette nouvelle mouture du problème d'ordonnancement 
stochastique peut facilement intégrer des systèmes de stockage d'énergie à grande échelle. 
En dernier lieu, nous définissons de manière rigoureuse la notion de contingence para-
pluie dans le contexte d'un problème général d'écoulement de puissance optimal avec con-
traintes de sécurité, où, de fait, les problèmes d'ordonnancement définis dans cette disser-
tation forment une sous-classe. ~ous proposons une règle servant à identifier ces contin-
gences parapluie cl. partir des normes vectorielles des multiplicateurs de Lagrange associés 
aux contraintes nodales d'équilibre de puissance postcontingence. De plus, nous suggérons 
une règle de classement de ces contingences. Ces règles pourraient constituer les bases d'un 
outil utile aux opérateurs de réseaux afin de réduire le nombre de contingences devant être 
traitées au moment d'évaluer la sécurité d'un réseau. 
v 
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Il n'y a pas de honte à préférer le bonheur. 
Albert Camv,s, 1.9181960 
Chapter 1 
I11troduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Schweppe's vision 
1 
They also serve who ollly stand and wait. 
On His Blindncs8 
John Milton, 16081674 
In the aftermath of the 1977 blackout that had left New York City in the dark for almost a 
clay, Fred C. Sdrweppe published his famous IEEE Spectr-um article: "Power Systems '2000': 
Hierarehical Control Strategies" [1]. In this paper, and in a follow-up article published in 
1982 with his lVlIT colleagues Tabors and Kirtley [2J, he envisioned the evolution of the 
electric power system operational paradigm from the centralized "commancl-ancl-control" 
approach, that had clriven the industry since its beginnings, towards one which would be 
more decentraUzed and where the lightly-coordinated self-regulating actions of local devices 
would he sufficient to keep the overall system in a, secure and balanced state. 
A COl1crete consequence of this proposed paradigrn was that the then current business 
mode! of the electric utility----grouping together the generation, transmission and distrib-
ution business functions--would 10se its appeal. As consumers and generators would be 
able to self-coordinate through sorne common communication channels without significant 
needs for centralized cont1'Ols, the tightly-regulated vertically-integrated utility structure 
would no longer be required. In fact, power systems in the year 2000 would self-regulate 
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through the straightforward priee signaIs broadcasted minute-by-minute over those com-
mon communication channels so to precisely mediate thü baIancü of supply and dümand 
for electricity. In other words, an electricity market would do the job the utilities had donc 
for nearly a century. The concept of spot pr'iâng of electricity [3] was born. 
During the 1980's, the worlel political scene, in the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom most notably, fostered the restructuring of traditiona.lly state-regulated 
industries, airlines and telecommunications being the best examples, through the introduc-
tion of competition. The electric industry was not neglected in this restructuring wave 
as sorne of the pl'inciples behind spot pricing of electricity were introduced in the early 
elcctricity pool markets fonned in Chile (1982), England andWales (1990) and :.Jorway 
(19911992) [4]. Likewise, technological innovations in the fields of microelectronics, com-
puting, telecommunications and electricity generation--especially with the appearance of 
the highly flexible and efficient commercial-grade combustion turbines combined with the 
soaring fuel priees in the late 1970's and early 1980's~gave further credence to the intro-
duction of competition in the electricity industry. 
Restructuring in the United States of America 
In 1992, with the passing into law of the Energy Policy Act, the United States of America 
ernba.rked the electricity restructuring train. The issuing in April 1996 of Orden:î 888 and 
889 [5,6] by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) officialized the move that 
would shake up the North American electric industry like it had never been before. 
The legislators of the energy-hungry state of California were among the first to see in the 
introduction of competition a possible way to improve the economic efficiency of its electric-
ity sect or [7]. The stakeholders there agreecl on a somewhat p'Ure market model [41 where 
a variety of generation companies, marketers, load serving entities and power exchanges 
would interact in a highly decentralized way with the least centralized intervention of the 
grid operator----the California Independent System Operator (ISO). Under this operational 
paradigm, the generation and consumption schedules are obtained through prior contract 
negotiations or through energy-only market-c1earing pro cesses run by separate power ex-
changes. Tt is only after the energy schedules have been set that the ISO has to ousure, 
with as littlo schodule manipulations as possible, the integrity of grid operation. However, 
many Hawed market rules combined with a variety of factors 18]led to (i) several episodes 
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of state-wide rolling blaekouts; (ii) many days during whieh the grid was operated below 
the preseribed reliability standards; and, (iii) the bankruptey of the largest investor-owned 
utility in the United States (Pacifie Gas and Electric Company). 
In other parts of the United States, the transition operated a bit more smoothly espe-
cially in are as where there were already existing regional eleetricity pooling structures prior 
to l'estructuring [for example, in New York, New England and the Pennsylvania-New .lersey-
Maryland Intereonnection (P .lM)]. The operational models followed in these markets were 
much doser to the "command-and-control" approach assoeiated with the old regime. These 
regional markets were set up under what is known as the "pool" model [4, 9-11] wherein 
generation a,nd demand are centrally schecluled by the ISO based on economic offers for the 
production of energy and bids for the consumption of that energy. Moreover, un cler these 
market structures, the ISO schedules the electrieity market with the objective of meeting 
a Humber of system secllrity requirements like transmission line fiow limits, bus voltage 
lirnits and so on [9]. The ISO also has responsibilities in balancing supply and demancl 
in l'cal time and has to calculate locational (nodal) marginal priees to be llsed later for 
finallcial settlement purposes. This operational model came to be the template for what 
bceamc known as Standard Market Design [12, 1~1], an initiative launched in 2002 by FERC 
in respOllse to the California debacle. In Ju1y of 2005, this initiative was terminated as a 
result of voluntary measures fostering improved reliability adopted across the illdustry. 
Restructuring in Canada 
In Canada, Alberta (in 20(0) and Ontario (in 20(2) are the only provinces that have truly 
introduced competition in the wholesale electricity sect or following the divesture of their 
state-owned generation capacity. In Alberta, the industry reforms led to an improvement of 
the province's generation mix through a number of capacity additions mostly as gas-fired 
cogeneration facilities. In Ontario, however, the opening of the market came at a time 
of tight capacity margins, which drove priees charged to end-consumers to unprecedented 
levels. Public pressure eventually forced the Conservative government in Queen's Park to 
adopt the Electricity Supply, Pricing and Conservation Act in November 2002. The Act 
holds a series of initiatives geared to proteet residential, small business consumers as weIl 
as farmers from the high priees of electricity. 
Nonetheless, in the provinces massively exporting electricity to the United States---
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Québec, Manitoba and British Columbia, for the most part---, some level of restructuring 
of the local state-owned utilities was neeessary in the wake of restrncturing south of the 
border. To be able to keep on selling in the American markets, the Canadian utilities had 
to reciprocally open their grids and allow trading activities between any qualifying gen-
erating and load-serving entity irrespective of their location. For example, in the case of 
Hydro-Québec, this led to the breakup in 1997 of its vertically-integrated corporate struc-
ture into three separate and functionally independent entities: Hydro-Québec Production 
(generation), Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie (transmission) and Hydro-Québec Distribution 
(distribution and retail). 
The competitive utopia 
With hindsight, the electricity industry has changed significantly since Schweppe's 1irst pa-
pel'. However, it has not evolved truly in the direction envisioned. The CUlTent operational 
paradigm of electricity markets is still far from the deeentralized operational ideal put 
forward neady 30 years ago. Indeecl, in most markets the proeess that was onee termed 
"deregulation" has often turned into an explosion in the amount of new "regulation" so 
clesperately needed to keep the lights on as weIl as those computers running our digital 
society. 
The reasons why Schweppe's idea is still a utopia today a.re surely many. In our opinion, 
however, the l'oot cause lies essentially in the impossibility for consurners to respond in a 
timcly fashion to the changing conditions of the market consiclering that: (i) it is necessary 
to minutely balance supply and demand second-by-second since electricity is generally not 
storable: (ii) there cannot be real-time response of consumers to electricity priees sinee there 
are still no truly effective common communication channels linking generators and loads; 
and to exacerbate these problems even more, (iii) electrical energy is poody substitutable 
V'is-à-'uù; other sources of energy. As Joskow and Tirole [14] put it, in sueh a. market, 
controls based on priees only are nOt fast enough nor suffieient; therefore, it remains that 
demand-side rationing, in the form of load shedding (i. e. blackouts), a.re inevitable. 
1.1.2 :From blackout to blackout 
Sincc grids opened up to accommodate competition, the volume of electricity trades has 
increased significantly at the same tirne as trading structures became ever more complex, 
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especially \vith the increasing distances associated with power injection and delivery points. 
For instance, there were increases in power flows scheduled on inter-control area tie lines 
whichwere originally designed to serve system reliability purposes as emergency power 
rnakeshifts. Likewise, as electricity flows according to Kirchoff's Laws and Ohrn's Law, the 
undesirable phenomenon of loop fiows from neighboring systems has rendered the reliability 
enforcement tasks of 180s even more eomplicated. 
Notwithstanding the steady increase in the complexity of the reliability enforcement 
tasks faced by the 180s, over the 1ast 10 years very litt1e research and development efforts 
were devoted to power system reliability in a market environment. In fact, it took yet 
a110ther major blackout, that of August 14th, 2003, which left in the dark millions of 
consumers in Ontario, New York, the Midwest and parts of New England [15], to persuade 
the industry, governments and the academic community to address power system reliability 
in market contexts. This wake up call repeated itself shortly after with blackouts that 
affeded major areas in several European countries [16~191. 
This research work constitutes a direct response to those costly failures as we examine 
and propose novel and improved tools for the secure scheduling of power systems in a 
market context. It is worthy to note that among the 46 reeommendations of the joint Task 
Force set up by the United 8tates Department of Energy (DOE) and Natural Resources 
Canada to investigate the August 14th, 2003 blackout [15], the research work reported in 
this dissertation directly addresses: 
Recommendation 9: Integrate a "reliability impact" consideration into the regula-
tory decision-making process. 
Recommendation 13: DOE should exp and its research programs on reliahility-related 
too1s and technologies. 
Recommendation 22: Evaluate and adopt better real-time tools for operators and 
reliability coordinators. 
Recommendation 30: Clarify criteria for identification of operationally critical fa-
cilities, and improve dissemination of updated information on 
unplanned outages. 
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1.1.3 Power system operations planning timeline 
It is instructive to examine the chronology of steps involved with power system operations 
planning as illustrated in Fig. 1.1. 
Generation & transmission planning 
Years before delivery 
Long-term forward contracting 
'Years to days before 
delivery 
Short-tecru forward spot markets 
One day to one hour before 
delivery 
Real-time market 
Actual delivery: physical 
generation & consumption 
Fig. 1.1 Power system operations planning timeline 
Generation and transmission capacity planning 
The generation and transmission capacity planning stage does not truly belong in the 
operations planning chronology. However, it represents a critical stage that cannot be 
ignored because it greatly influences the viability of a power system in the future. It is 
weIl understood that under-investment in gClleratioll and transmission capacity can have 
dramatic impacts on society through higher prices and reduced reliability. The opposite 
situation, whereby there is over-investment in new capacity, may be clamaging to society 
too as it may prove to be rnore difficult for generation and transmission owners to recover 
their investments. ln fact, the central issue of power system planning--both in competitive 
and rcgulated settingswill always remain the difficulty in trying to smooth out those 
"boom and bu st" investment cycles [10]. 
Long-term forward contracting 
With the introduction of competition in the electricity business, wholly new opportunities 
for electricity trading have arisen. Stalldardized forward and futures contracts for electricity 
are now widely available,l while a variety of electricity-based derivative products [20] are 
now available through specialized brokers and marketers. Likewise, traditional bilateral 
contracts negotiated privately between consumers and generators are commonplace. 
These contractual arrangements constitute a critical part of any good risk management 
pra.ctice for a generator or a load-serving entity. 1<'01' generators, fOl'Ward contracts provide 
l For example, a for ward electricity contract specifies a quantity of energy to he cleliverecl at a given 
location and time for sorne priee. 
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sure future eash infiows. On the other hand, ,vith theses eontraets eonsumers ean loek in a 
good part of their predicted load at a fixed priee. The more exotic instruments like options 
offe1' othe1' useful hedging prope1'ties, but at a generally higher tra,nsaction cost. 
Short-term forward market-clearing 
As the time to delivery approaehes (24 to one hour before delivery), consumers can better 
predict how much energy they willlikely consume on top of or under their previous forward 
contracting agreements. This is why in many systems short-term forward electricity markets 
have been set up [4,10]. These markets are centrally-run by the system operator that 
schedules the generato1's and consumers based on their respective offers and bids through 
an eleciT-lcity nWTket-clearing procedure [11]. Next, we discuss the two fiavors under which 
these markets are found: day-ahead (DA) and houT-ahead (HA) markets [10,11]. 
Day-o.head market-clearing 
Fig. 1.2 shows the general DA market chronology. First, given the information previously 
broadeasted by the system operator about the predicted pmver system conditions, the 
generators and the consumers prepare and submit their offerings and bids for the next 
day. Depending on the degree of modeling involved in the market-clearing procedure, 
the complexity of those offerings and bids will vary. Generation offerings can include 
incremental energy co st curves, startup costs, ramping and generation capacity limits, 
reserve offering rates and limits and so on. Demand-side bids can be made up of incremental 
energy benefit curves and elasticity limits. Likewise, when possible, voluntary reserve 
offerings can be ma,de by the consumers [21]. 
Submission of DA market bids & offers 
24 hours before the next day 
DA market-clearing 
24-12 hours before the next 
day 
DA operations schedule 
At least 12 hours before the 
next day 
Fig. 1.2 Day-ahead market tirneline 
Next up, the system operator l'uns the market-clearing procedure. In North America, 
and in other parts of the world (notably New Zealand and Spain), DA electricity market-
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clearing is based on a security-constrained unit commit ment [22---31]. Specifically, security-
constrained unit commitment-based DA markets determine for the next day the hourly: 
• Generator on/off status and power output levels; 
• Demand consumption levels; and, 
• Generator- and demalld-side reserve supplies. 
The CUITent DA market-clearing procedures are run with the objective of maximizing 
the net social welfare (or equally minimizing the net social cost) associated with the gener-
atioll and the consumption of energy diminished by the costs of scheduling reserves needed 
to respond to unpredictable contingencies like gelleration failures. The market-clearing 
problems have as their main constraint the requirement that the supply and the demand 
match at each node (bus) of the grid for each of the 24 hours of the next day, while aIl 
transmission line flows are within acceptable limits. The other constraints of DA electricity 
market-clearing problems generally include the tecllllological limits of the generators and 
the consumers. 
Market-clearing problems are therefore large-scale mathematieal programmillg problems 
solved on high-end computation servers running custom-purpose software tools. The speed 
of computation is generally an issue as there are strict time limits under whieh the system 
operator must clear the market. Likewise, the relative optimality of the schedules obtained 
is critical because very important sums of money are at stake. In addition to the generatioll 
and dema,nd scheclules, the DA market-clearing pro duces sets of bus marginal priees [10] 
that indicate the marginal value of clectricity at each bus for each hour of the next clay. 
Fillally, once the market schedules and priees have been obtained, they are sent back 
to the respective generators and demands. 
II o1LT-ahead maTket-cleaTing 
Getting even doser to the actual electricity delivery time, in sorne power systems it may 
be possible to adjust schedules through an hour-ahead market. The HA markets generally 
work on the same principles as the DA markets but generally without unit commitment. 
As Fig. 1.3 illustrates, the sequence applying to DA markets is still valicl-that is offering 
and bidding, market-clearing then followed by the final operation and pricing schedules 
transmission to generators and demallds. 
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Submission of HA market bids & offers 
1-2 hours before the next hour 
HA market-clearing 
1 hour before the next hour 
HA operations schedule 
At least 30 minutes before the 
next hour 
Fig. 1.3 Hour-ahead market timelille 
Real-time market 
9 
As its name implies, the real-time market carries the function of balancing electricity supply 
and demand minute-by-minute. The basic assumption here is that the real-time market is 
a "deviations" market that makes up for the differences between the actual generation and 
consumptioll and the set points scheduled in the previously-cleared DA and HA markets. 
Economic dispatch and secondary regulation 
Economie dispatch (ED) [11,32] forms the core of the real-time market. At regular time 
intervals (every five minutes in P ,lM, for instance), an ED is run to update the set points of 
the generators and those of the loads that are dispatchable. The results of the ED are based 
on the ecollomic merit of adjustrnent offers and bids reflecting the costE> and/or benefits 
associated with the deviations. Like the DA and HA markets, the real-time market der ives 
bus marginal prices of electricity, which are used to remunerate the generators and charge 
the demands. 
In between ED runs, automatic generation control (AGe) [32---34], a180 known under the 
name of secondary regulation, keeps the power system balanced as it automatically orders a 
subset of the synchronized generators to modify their generation set points proportionally 
to some participation factors. These control orders follow the slowly-varying changes in 
the demand with the goal of returning the area control error to zero [:32, :3~~, 35]. The 
control actions associated with AGe typically involve time constants of the order of several 
rninutes. 
Oper'CIJion muleT contingencies 
However, during real-time operation, the controls based on ED and AGe are usually over-
ridden in the event that a contingency occurs. In this dissertation, a contingency is defined 
as: 
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Definition 1.1 (Contingency). A coni'ingcncy is an unexpected mitage of a one or more 
pieces of equipment, such as generators and lin es , as wen as large, nnexpected load varia-
tions. 
In the afterrnath of contingencies, other load-generation control rnechanisms, primary 
and tcrtiary regulation, are calleel in through automatic or manual deployment of 'J'e8CTve 
Definition 1.2 (Reserve service). A TC8CTVC 8CTV~CC or sim ply TC8CTVC is the capability 
above or belO\v the pre-contingency production or consumption set point available to re-
spond voluntarily to contingencies within a given time frame. 
Definition 1.3 (Reserve deployment). Reserve dcployment is the set of post-contingellcy 
actions through which reserve services are converted into actual energy production or con-
sumption. 
Next, we describe briefly the control objectives that correspond to the primary and 
tertiary regulation intervals and their associated reserve deployment actions. 
Immcdiatc Tcsponsc: primaTy Tegulalion 
At the initiating instant of a contingency, power imbalances are created across the grid. 
If persistent, such power imbalances eventually lead to deviations in the frequency of the 
spinning generators. During the primary regulation interval, spinning generators adjust 
their power output automatically in response to deviations from the nominal system fre-
quency [32,36]. Such reserve deployment actions are fast and serve to keep the system 
frequency from going adrift within 5 to 10 seconds of a contingency. In cases when this 
fails to happen or the frequency excursion goes beyond the narrow band centered about 
the nominal frequency, autornatic load shedding and/or generation rejection rnay follow. 
One should note that loads too respond to changes in frequency; therefore, the con-
surners end up participating during the primary regulation interval. However, they usually 
do so without knowing and unintentionally [32]. In most systems, this demand-side contri-
bution is entirely ignored. 
Fig. 1.4 shows a typical contillgency recovery pro cess happening in real time. In this 
example, an ED is run every 10 minutes "vhile AGC follows the 10ad variations in between 
the ED mns. At sorne time between t = 0 and t = 10 minutes a contingency oeeurs 
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(marked by the X on the timeline in Fig. 1.4:). In the initiating instants ofthe contingency, 
primary regulation actions are deployed to keep the frequency of the system from drifting 
outside its allowed range. 
Contingency 
t = 0 
1 
~ t=1O t=20 
~nUllljJU)utttLlLUltlilttmtlmmUtUtltlilftfllltIRlJ • 
\ ED (bypassed) \ ED (bypassed) Time (minutes) ED 
Primary reserve Tertiary reserve 
deployment deployment 
Fig. 1.4 COlltingency recovery process in the real-time market 
Steady-sfate recovery' tertiary Tegulation 
\iVithin 10 to 20 minutes artel' the initiating moment of a contingency, at the end of the 
tertiary regulation intcrval, gcneration and demand levels have becn adjusted through 
appropriate reserve deployment actions to ensure that (i) power balances at every lletwork 
bus; (ii) a11 transmission line flows are within their prescribed limits;2 (iii) the area cont.rol 
error has been nullified; and, (iv) a11 generators and demands operate within their feasible 
technicallimits. In other words, the reserve deployment actions steer the power system back 
into a "steady-state" mode of operation wherein a11 steady-state operational constraints are 
met. We point out t.hat the tert.iary regulation int.erval, because of its longer range of 
action, a110ws for a broader involvement of demand-side and non-spinning generation-side 
reserve resources. 
Coming back to the example in Fig. 1.4, we see that the tertiary regulation actions 
st art their deployment artel' the primary regulation actions stabilized the system frequency. 
Thus, during the next 15 minutes, the generators and demands providing tertiary reserve 
services rnodify their set points as instruct.ed by the system operator, while those not 
providing reserve services are asked to return to their pre-contingency schedules. During 
2\Ve note here that restrictions O!l transmission line flows are not strictly ellforced during the prirnary 
regulation interval unlike during the tertiary interval. This is so for two reasons: (i) lines can be slightly 
overloaded for short periods without significant risk; and, (ii) the controls associated with the primary 
regulation intE'rval cannot enforce the line limits hecause they do not have sufficient degrees of freedom. 
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that interval, the ED and the secondal'Y l'egulation functions are bypassed until the end of 
the deployment of the appropriate reserves. 
One should note that, in the aftermath of a contingency that leads to the deployment 
of some reserve services, the system operator has to evaluate whether it is necessary to 
scheclulc more rcserves services and/or to distribute them differently arnong the gellerators 
and demands. Of course, this evaluatioll is conducted with the objective of ensuring the 
security of the system if another contingency were to happen at a later time. 
As a final note of caution, we point out that in this dissertation, we do not adh.el'e strictly 
to the definitions of reserves put forward by the North American Electric Reliability Council 
(NETlC) [35], which classifies reserves as either spinning or 8upplernental. In :NERC's 
definition, spinning reserves are provided by online generators all'eady synchronized to 
the grid. They (i) respond automatically to major contillgencies to keep the system in 
balance-that is, they provide primary regulation-; and, (ii) they l'eact to the normalload 
variations through AGC-that is, they provide secondary regulation. On the oUler hand, 
the supply of supplement al reserves is not rcstricted to synchronized (spinning) generators 
only. Supplcmelltal reserves are used to respond to contingeneies over longer time horizons 
of tens of lllinutes-that is, they provide tertiary regulation. 
Here, in our definition of reserve (recall Definition 1. 2), we do not pre-suppose any 
synchronization state for the generators and loads that provide the services. In faet, we 
adopt the philosophy laid down in [34] under which the reserves a,re classified by their 
rcspOllse tirne delay rather thall by the synchronization status of those providillg them.;j 
1.2 Problem Identification 
Hobbs et al. in [37] report that, accordillg to a panel of leading industry and academie 
experts, fundamental research is required towards the treatrnent and the inclusion of un-
certainty factors within short-tenn market-based power system scheduling problems (i. e. 
DA and HA markets). Also, according to the same panel, issues pertaining to the relia-
aFrom a practical point of view, however, both the NERe definitions and those of [34] could be consid-
ered to be equivalent sinee it is practically impossible for a non-spinning generator to respond to di st ur-
bances within the time frames of the prirnary and seeonda.ry regulation intervals. 
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bility4 enforcement tasks of system opera.tors constitute important aspects of short-term 
scheduling that have been neglected thus far. 
Furthermore, as we Just saw in Section 1.1, in the aftermath of the August 14th, 2003 
blackout, the worldwide power systems operations planning community truly came to re-
alize that system operators lacked the proper tools to address the risks associated with 
uncertainty and their impacts on system security and economics. The research work 1'e-
ported in this dissertation constitutes a step forward in the development of such tools. The 
gist of the work here is an investigation of the pertinence of making use of stochastie rnea-
sures in formulating security criteria for short-term electricity market-clearing problems. 
A Humber of other related subproblems are also investigated; we introduce each of them in 
the following subsections. 
1.2.1 Short-terrn security-constrained electricity market-clearing 
Reserve-constrained electricity market-clearing 
The requirements for tertiary reserve services5 in short-term reserve-constrained electricity 
markets are generally set using deterministic rule-of-thumb type criteria. For instance, it is 
commonplace in the industry to require that enough reserve is available so to coyer the loss 
of the largest generator--best known as the N -1 criterion---as in case of the Southern Zone 
of PJlVI [:~9]. Another common reserve criterion demands that the system operator schedules 
an amount of reserves greater than or equal to a fraction of the daily or hourly demand; 
in PJM again, the reserve requirement of its Western Zone is determined that way [39]. 
Others, like the Spanish system [40], use a hybrid approach whereby the required amount 
of tertiary reserve must be equal to the largest online generator plus two percent of the 
hourly predicted demand. VVe note, however, that such preventive security measures [41] do 
not take into consideration the probability of occurrence of the contingencies they need to 
4Tn t.he power systems context, reliability is an umbreUa term comprising two basic functional aspects: 
adeqlwcy and secuTûY [38]. Adequacy refers to the ability of the power system to properly serve its load 
throllgh enough supplies of generation and transmission. Security, on the other hand, which coulcl be aiso 
called "short-tenn reliability" [38], is the ability of the power system to withstancl disturbances in the course 
of its operation. As this dissertation is concel'ned essentially with short-tenu power system opel'ational 
issues, we use the word sec'IlT'ity when referring to the notion of reliability. 
5Everywhere in this dissertation, unless it is stated otherwise, when using the word "reserve" or the 
expressioll "reserve service" we refer to reserves that can be deployed during the tertiary regulation interval 
following a contingency. 
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coyer. If these probabilities are sufficiently low, on the average, over-seheduling of reserve 
may result. On the other hand, if the probabilitiŒ of occurrence are high, the reserve 
requirernents may not be sufIicient. 
Towards stochastic reserve criteria 
Kirschen in [42] advocates that power system security assessment methocls should be ca-
pable of appraising the "credibility" of outages as weIl as their "expected" effects through 
probabilistic means. It is generally weIl understood, however, that such stochastic secu-
rit y analysis methocls are computationally costly because they l'equire the evaluation of 
the probabiLities and of the consequences of a large number of possible failure events. For 
reserve-constrained unit cormnitment and short-terrn electricity market-clearing pl'oblems, 
this combinatorial aspect represents the main restricting factor to their widespreacl use; 
this is "vell recognizecl in many contributions found in the literature [43-50]. In addition to 
the complicating computational aspect of probabilistic methocls, often there are significant 
uncertainties associated with the statistical failure data available necessary to compute 
outage probabilities. 
It is important to note that the idea behind using stochastic reserve criteria for short-
tenn operations planning purposes is not entirely new. For instance, back in 196:3 the 
authors of [43] defined the notion of unit cornrnitrnent risk which was later form1'1lized by 
Billinton and Allan [46]. This risk is a measure representing the probability of not meet-
ing the predicted load. In this so-called P lM method, generating units are committed 
:-;equentially according to a pre-esta.blished priority list until the unit commitment risk is 
below sorne threshold. Guy in 1971 [44] went on to formulate a reserve-constrained unit 
eommitment problem using the concept of a security .function. Like the unit commitment 
risk, the security function evalua.tes the probability that a power system may be incapable 
of meeting its forecasted load. There, the reserve criterion is imposed by bounding from 
above the magnitude of the security function as part of an optimization problem. Dillon et 
al. [45] were the first to truly formulate a unit commitment problem with an its intricacies 
and a stoehastie reserve criterion. However, beeause of its cornplexity, a significant number 
of implernentation problems were left pending. Gooi et al. [47] went on to propose an iter-
ative approach based on Lagrangian relaxation, while Flynn et al. [48] proposed a solution 
method that made use of neural networks and an a.ugmented Lagrangian solution technique. 
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Chattopadhyay and Baldick in [49] correctly pointed out that aH the methods proposed 
so far cannot represent efI-iciently the probability distribution of the discrete capacity out-
ages, the capacity outage probability table [46], directly in terms of the unit commitment 
variables. These authors overcame this difficulty by proposing to approximate the dis crete 
out age probability distribution by a continuous function of the unit commit ment variables. 
Deterministie / probabilistie approaeh 
In light of the diHiculties brought about by the computational burden and the ullcertainties 
in the failure data, some authors have proposed to use hybrid deterrninisticjprobabilistic 
security analysis methods rather than purely stochastic ones that require the full enumera-
tion of the possible system states [50-52]. In those hybrid methods, rather than evaluating 
the probabilities and the expected outcomes of all possible failure modes, only limited sets 
of a priori-defined (mtage events are used to estimate those probabilities and expected 
outcomes. 
For a civil engineering structural design problem, Castillo et al. [51] used a hybrid 
mcthod to deal with the uncertainty in the failure probabilities (due to the lack of historical 
failure data) as well as to reduce the complex computational facets of stochastic structural 
failure metrics. Billinton and Mo in [52] proposed to use a determillisticjprobabilistic 
approach for power system planning purposes. In their work, the authors attempted to 
evaluate the system-wide and local effects of a pre-specified set of failures affecting major 
power system components. 
A detenninisticjprobabilistic approach for network-free single-period reserve-constrained 
unit commitment is proposed by Bouffard and Galiana in [50] (and is further extended with 
Conejo in [5:3,54]). In [50], a stochastic reserve criterion is imposed by bounding from above 
a deterministicjprobabilistic security metric. As this proposaI forms the preliminary basis 
of the investigation reported in this dissertation and in [53,54], we examine it in details 
next. 
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SeC'u:rity metrics as e:Eplic'd fnnctians of unit cam:m'dment variables 
The proposed approach in [50] assumes that the i = 1, ... , 1 generating units in the power 
system can be scheduled on or off by selecting the value of the variables 'Ui E Iffi = {O, 1} 
if on, (1.1 ) 
otherwise. 
Independently of their schedllling status, the availability of the i = 1, ... ,1 generators 
varies randomly and may be modeled using Bernoulli random variables (RV) Çi E lE 
_ {1 if available, Ç,.i -
° otherwise, 
(1.2) 
where, as discussed in Appendix A.l, the probabilities associated "vith the two possible 
statesG of the RVs Çi can be computed from historical data; see, for instance, the generation 
and line outage data collected by the Canadian Electricity Association sinee 1977 [55,56]. 
Given the commit ment status of generators and their random availability, the probabi-
lities of new RVs rPi = '/LiÇi, for i = 1, ... ,l, satisfy the conditions 
(1.:3) 
and 
(lA) 
where Ui is the foreed-outage rate [46] of generator i. In plain words, (1.3) indicates that the 
probability that a generator i is available when scheduled on equals 1-Ui , while (1.4) shows 
that the probability that generator i is unavailable when it is scheduled on is Ui . It is clcar 
here that these relationships provide an explicit way to model the mItage probabilities of the 
generators in terms of the unit commit ment variables, '/Li' With these indiviclual generator 
probabilities, it is possible to calculate the probability of any combinat ion of generator 
(; Availability models based on multiple derated states are also possible [46]. However, for simplicity here 
we use a two-state model only. 
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mItages C ç {l, ... ,I}a.ssuming independent failures-from the expression 
p(C) = P [{ Qi ?::: '/Li; 'i if: C} n {CP'i < 'lLi; i E C}] = II 'lLiUi II (1 - 'lLiUJ (1.5) 
iEC irfcC 
vVe note that the above expression is nonlinear as it can be expanded into a polynomial of 
degree J in the unit commitment variables. 
The loss-of-load pTObability (LOLP) measures the extent up to whieh a system genera-
tion schedule may not be able to me et the scheduled demand, that is 
(1.6) 
where the variables gi and Ti represent respectively the generation output and the reserve 
level of generator i, while cl is the scheduled level of demand. So far, we have shown how 
to get the probabilities of the random variables Qi; however, it remains to be seen how we 
can determine efIectively which of the generator Olltages combinations C actually lead to 
loss-of-load. In [50], it is proposed to indicate whether a given combination of generator 
outages C leads to loss-of-load using variables 1}J(C) E III These are forced to satisfy 
irfcC irfcC 
----'-[---- ::::; 1/) (C) ::::; 1 + ----'-[---- (1. 7) 
Lg·:
nax 
i=l 
where the parameters gfJax are the upper generation limits of the generators i = 1, ... , J. 
By inspection of (1. 7), the variable 1}) (C) takes the value 1 if the simultaneous unavail-
ability of the generators i E C leads to loss-of-load, while it takes the value 0 othe1'wise. 
Assuming that Lf=l g~nax > d, whenever the load is ove1' the available scheduled generation 
and reserve~ that is rl- LiltC(gi+rJ > 0, then the left-hand si de of (1.7) is strictly positive 
while its right-hand side is ove!' 1. Therefo1'e, the binary nature of the variablelNC) forces 
it to assume the value 1. A similar argument can be followed for the oppmlite case for 
\vhichl/J(C) = O. 
Thus, given tha.1; now we have explicit expressions for the aU possible outage probabilities 
p(C) and loss-of-load indicato1' variables 1jJ(C), the LOLP can be written explicitly as the 
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summatioll, over aH possible subsets of gellerator 01Itages C ç {1, ... ,I}, of the products 
p(C}II'(C) 
LOLP = L p(C),lt,(C). (1.8) 
CÇ{l, ... ,I} 
V-le notice that (i) the LOLP is a nonlinear function of the unit commitment variables, 
through the probabilities p(C) and of the loss-of-load indicator variables 'ljJ(C); and, (ii) the 
computation of the LOLP involves the calculation of aIl probabilities and loss-of-load incli-
cator variables for aIl possible 01Itage combinations. 
An alternative to the LOLP security metric is the e:rpected load not seT'lJed (ELNS), 
which wc express mathematically as 
ELNS = L p(C)'ljJ(C)I(C). (1.9) 
CÇ{l, ... ,I} 
In (1.9), the variable l(C) E ~ me as ures the amount of load shed (when positive) or the 
remaining reserve capacity (when negative) un der some outage combination C 
I(C) = d - LC9i + Ti)' 
irf-C 
1 1 
I(C) = ci - Lgi - LTi + LCCJi + Ti)' 
i=l i=l iEC 
(1.10) 
(1.11) 
Now, using the fact that d- ~;=l gi = 0 under pre-eontingency conditions, wc ean therefore 
reexpress I(C) more simply as 
1 
I(C) = L(gi + T'i) - LTi' (1.12) 
iEC i=] 
As its name implies, the ELNS measures the average load lost during load shedding 
events. For instance, un der the outage of the generators i E C, if load is shed we have 
·(j)(C) = 1 and the quantity l(C) > 0 so that the expected 10ad 10st for that combillation 
is p(C)'1,(C)I(C) = p(C)I(C) > 0; otherwise, we have 'ljJ(C) = 0 and l(C) :::; 0 su eh that the 
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product p(C)ljJ(C)l(C) = O. Like in the case of the LOLP, the computation of the ELNS 
requires the calculation of a large number of variables and of their products. 
As mentioned before, in [50] it is proposed to impose a stochastic reserve criterion by 
bounding the LOLP or the ELNS security metrics from above. However, it is recognized 
that in their current forms, these two metrics are not computationally suitable for current 
mixed-integer linear solvers because they involve the calculation of products of variables 
and, moreover, because they require the computation of aIl outage combinations, whose 
number grows exponentially with the size of the generating system. 
This is where the notion of hybTid probabilisticj deterministic security met ries is intro-
duccd in this model. In [50] the hybrid security criteria are determined by bounding from 
above the probability of losing load (or the expected load not served) caused by single and 
double generation outages only in a way analogous to the detenninistic N - 1 and N - 2 
criteria. Nevertheless, sinee these redueed-order approximate security rnetrics still in cor-
porate a measure of the probability of the OlItage events, they retain part of the desirable 
probabilistic properties of the tnœ LOLP and ELNS. 
Othe1' IlleanS are proposed in [50] to reduce the computational cornplexity of the sto-
chastic rnetrics. First, it is proposed to retain only the lowest-order tenns when cornputing 
the outage probabilities p( C); this furthe1' approximation leads to an over-estimation of the 
out age probabilities 
p(C) :::; II UiUi' (1.13) 
iEC 
In addition, to eliminate the products of binary variables and of mixed binary-continuous 
variables from the problem formulation, the authors make use of a number of fundamental 
results in binary mathernatics [57]. 
As we shaH see in Chapter 2, despite its mathematical eleganee this methodology is 
somewhat naïve as it has two important drawbacks. First, it requires the unit commit ment 
formulation to optimize over a set of binary variables augmented by the loss-of-load vari-
ables 1/;(C). Second, the imposition of an upper bounel on either LOLP or ELNS may be 
p1'oblernatic when the bound is too strict, a situation which inevitably leads to problems 
of infeasibility of the underlying electricity market-clearing problem. 
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On the coupling of short-term and real-time markets 
Another important aspect neglected in current electricity market-clearing problems is the 
coupling between the short-terrn forward markets (DA and HA) and the real-time market. 
This coupling is obvions if we consider that the forward markets determine the initial pre-
disturbance operation set points carried over to the real- time market [341. By selecting 
these t'iet points when clearing a short-tenu forward market, the system operator may do 
so on economic grounds only. However, it may be the case that by sacrificing SOlne of the 
economics in the pre-contingency state, the system operator may save more on average in 
the course of operation under post-contingency states. This reasoning begs the question 
whether in running electricity market-clearing problems it is worthwhile optimizing not 
only over the pre-contingency condition, but also over a pre-selected set of credible post-
contingency conditions that may arise in real time. This should have significant implications 
over the following aspects of market-clearing and operation. 
ReseTve sched'Uling and deployment 
There is usnally a tradeoff that is neglected when system operators schedule reserves services 
sinee they never take into account the expected eost of the eventual post-contingeney 
deployment of the reserves. As a result, it may happen that in sorne instances it is less 
expensive on average to sehedule reserve services with higher capaeity costs (the cost for 
being available to respond to eontingencies), but that end up cOHting less on average when 
they are deployecl. This feature may have significant impacts in unreliable systems wherein 
reserves are deployed frequently. 
Invol'UntaTy load shedding 
Similar to reserve deployment, the expected costs of any post-contingency involuntal'Y load 
shedcling actions could be evaluatecl as part of the DA or HA market-clearing processes. 
Compl1tational complexity 
Considering the coupling betweell the forward and real-time markets, the resulting market-
clearing formulation would requin:) the explicit modeling of both pre- and post-contingency 
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operating conditions. As a result, sneh a modeling refinement eould inerease significantly 
the number of variables and constraints of the short-term market-clearing problem. 
1.2.2 Pricing energy and security 
A key aspect of any electricity market is its associated pricing mechanism used to charge 
consumers and to remunerate generators for the energy they respectively consume and 
produce. There is an ongoing debate on how reserve services should be remunerated and 
paid for [34,58-64]. The most common school of thought currently advocates for separate 
priees for eaeh of the types of reserve services being scheduled [58-60,63], while reeent ideas 
call for the remuneration of a11 reserve services scheduled at a bus to be settled at Olle single 
price, that of security [34,64]. 
In the eontext where the electricity market-clearing formulation accounts for the un-
certainty in the operating conditions, there are a number of pricing issues, especially with 
re8pect to the price of security, that are looked at in this dissertation. 
1.2.3 Integrating renewable generation resources 
"Vith the CUITent trend towards the greater integratioll of renewable electricity genera-
tion resources like wind power into existing grids, research efforts must be devoted to 
formulate generation scheduling problems taking into account the intrinsic variability and 
non-dispatchable characteristics of these resoun~es [65,66]. The type of uncertainty the 
system operator ha.s to deal with here is definitely different from the uncertainty in the 
occurrence of equipment failures. 
1.2.4 Simplifying security-constrained electricity market-clearing 
It is a well-known faet that realistic electricity market-clearing problems are difficult mixed-
integer programming problems of very large dimensions. Therefore, adding a security 
aspect--be it deterministic or stochastic-to market-clearing can render this problem even 
harder because of the added constraints and variables. Bence, it is of illterest to idelltify 
ways to simplify security-constrained market-clearing formulations. It is clear, for instance, 
that one should not attempt to consider the impacts of a contingency if it is known a. 
priori that it is covered by one or several more stringent contingencies. It is under this 
philosophy that this dissertation investigates ways to find these strict contingencies that 
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form an "umbrella" over the other less constraining contingencies, which may be then 18ft 
out. 
1.3 Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 2: Market-Clearing With Stochastic Seeurity 
This chapter describes in detail the main proposition of this dissertation as it introduce8 
formally the concept of eleetricity market-clearing with stochastic security. In so doing, 
we first introduce the model that forrns the basis of the stochastic market-clearing propo-
8ition, namely the deterministic security-constrained electricity market-clearing problem. 
Next, we define stochastic security metrics like the expected load not ser·ved, andwe show 
how this metric is used in fonnulating a market-clearing problem with a stochastic security 
criterion. A discussion of key implementation issues foUm,vs. Finally, we report and ana-
lyze extensively the results of two case studies where, for instance, we show the economic 
superiority of stochastic market-clearing over its deterministic counterpart. 
Chapter 3: Prieing U nder Market-Clearing With Stochastic Security 
A theoretical analysis of the marginal prices of energy and security is presented. Specif-
ically, Chapter 3 demonstrates how the Lagrange multipliers associated with contingency 
scenarios' power balance relations end up determining the marginal values of energy and 
sccurity at each node ofthe network. Moreover, allied results relating the use of involuntary 
load shed ding to the values of Lagrange multipliers are derived. AH results are found for 
a. general nonlinear market-clearing model and are later specialized for the linear case. A 
small numerical example basecl on a two-bus network illustrates sorne of the results. 
Chapter 4: Market-Clearing Under Demand and Wind Generation 
U neertainty 
In Chapter 4, electricity market-clearing with stochastic security is extendecl to the problem 
of clay-ahead (or equally hour-aheacl) schecluling of power systems with renewable genera-
bon resources whose power output cannot be preclicted aceurately--wind power being the 
most llotorious example. A model for the market-clearing problem is formulatecl assuming 
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that, without loss of generality, sets of wind power generators form the bulk of the in-
stalled intermittent generation capacity. vVe expose how wind power genmation scenarios 
are built and how their respective probabilities are computed. In addition, we formulate 
a market-clearing problern general enough to model demand uncertainty as well as bulk 
energy storage capacity. A srnall-scale case study is presented. Tt demonstrates, among 
other things, how the extra degrees of freedorn which are voluntary and involuntary load 
adjustments can improve the economic eHiciency of the electricity market in the presence 
of intermittent generation resources. 
Chapter 5: Umbrella Contingencies in Security-Constrained Market-Clearing 
1'his chapter presents the theoretical and practical aspects associated with the task of iden-
tifying "umbrella contingencies" in the context of security-collstrained electricity market-
clearing problems. Specifically, we present a rigorous definition of the umbrella contingency 
concept, and we propose a rule to identify and rank them. vVe then illustrate the valid-
ity of the identification and ranking ru1es for both deterministic and stochastic security-
constrained market-clearing problems with the aid of numerical examples. 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This chapter smnmarizes the main achievements of this investigation. Recommendations 
for future research are also outlined. 
Appendices 
A number of appendices complement the exposition of the work. First, in Appendix A, 
we outline the basic principles used in the calculation of contingency probabilities. Appen-
dix B presents mathematicai descriptions of the feasible operating regions of hydrothermai 
generators as well as demands. 1'hese descriptions outline, for example, the constraints 
affecting generation-side unit commitment decisions and demand-side elasticity limits. Ap-
pendix C describes the constraints affecting the determination of both generation- and 
demand-side reserve levels, while Appendix D shows a proof of the equivalence of two sets 
of loss-of-load conditions. Next, Appendix E gives the details of the test systems used in 
the case studies included in the dissertation. Appendix F gives short descriptions of the 
hardware and software tools used to conduct the numerical studies. Appenclix G presents 
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the basic marginal pricing theorem Imder which energy and security priees are computed 
and, finally, Appendix H shows how probability distributions of wind power gE:meration 
prediction errors are discretized. 
1.4 Claim of Originality 
The following main resnlts of this dissertation can be considered as distinct contributions 
to knowledge: 
1. The most significant original contribution of this dissertation is the theoretical for-
malization of the concept of electricity market-clearing with stochastic security as 
presented in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. This formalization includes the following as-
pects not previously considered in the formulation of security-constrained electricity 
market-clearing problems: 
(a) The rigorous definition of security-constrailled electricity market-clearing in 
its deterministic form. This definition is made taking into account a number 
of practical considerations that include transmission congestion, multi-period 
unit commit ment and the explicit modeling of pre- and post-contingency op er-
ating constraints applying to generators, demands and the transmission grid. 
(b) The definition of a stochastic security metric evaluating the expected load 
not served (ELNS) due to a pre-selected set of random generator and line 
O1Itages and demand-side disturbanees that may happell during any per'iod of 
the market schecluling horizon. 
(c) This security metric is expressed explicitly in terms of the optimization vari-
ables of the market-clearing formulation without the need to define any extra 
billary variables. 
(d) Sincc the ELNS stochastic security metric is expressed explicitly in terms of 
the variables of the market-clearing problem, we propose to use it to specify a 
stochastic security criterion for the market-clearing problem. The stochastic 
security criterion proposed is a penalization of the magnitude of the ELNS as 
weighted by the consumers' value of lost load. 
(e) In addition to the explicit optimization of the expected cost of post-contingency 
load not served, we propose that the objective function of the stochastic 
market-clearing problem also co-optimizes the preventive security actions as-
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sociatecl with the pre-contingency state and the corrective security actions 
associated with the post-contingency states (Proposition 2.1). 
2. Vve derive properties of the marginal nodal prices of ellergy and security associated 
with the optimal schedules f01llld by the electricity market-clearing with stochastic 
security. 
(a) vVe prove that the Lagrange multiplier of the post-contingency power balance 
at a given bus is greater than or equal to the expected value of the marginal cost 
of load shedding if and only if load shedding is applied aftel' that contingency 
(Proposition 3.1). 
(b) We der ive analytical expressions for the expected marginal costs of operation 
in all pre- and post-contingency states (Propositions 3.2 and 3.3). 
(c) For the special case of linear market-clearing formulations: 
1. Vve prove that when load shedding is used at a bus aHer sorne cOlltingency, 
it is the last recourse needed by the system operator to balance power 
(Lemma ~~.2). 
11. 'yVe derive analytical expressions for the sensitivities of the optimal level 
of load shedding to small perturbations in the pre- and post-contingency 
power balance relations (Corollary 3.2). 
lll. We derive analytical expressions for the Lagrange rnultipliers associated 
with post-colltingency power balance relations (Them'em 3.1). 
3. Based on the principles of electricity market-clearing with stoehastic security, we 
develop a market-clearing formulation that can take into account erro1's in the day-
ahead predictions of intermittent non-dispatchable generation resources, of which 
we assume are based on wind power. This proposed formulation considers: 
( a) A joint stochastic optimization of hydrothermal generation resources-----including 
rnulti-period unit commitment-, load demand and illvoluntary load shed ding 
for given intermittent generation and demand prediction uncertainties. 
(b) Scheduling of large-seale centralized energy storage systems as part of the 
market-clearing formulation. 
4. 'vVe define rigorously the notions of umbrella cOllt.ingencies and of the set of urn-
brella contingencies for both detenninistic and stochastic security-collstrainecl opti-
mal power fiow problems (Definition 5.1). From these definitions we further propose: 
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(a) An identification method for umbrella contingencies based on the Lagrange 
multiplier vectors of the post-contingency power balance relations (Proposi-
tion 5.1). 
(b) A heuristic contingency ranking rule based on the contingencies' marginal 
economic impact on the optimal solution of the market-clearing problem. 
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Chapter 2 
Electricity Market-Clearing With 
Stochastic Security 
l have such foresight a.s assures success. 
The Cenci 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, 1792-1822 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the concept of electricity market-clearing with stochastic secu-
rit y, which cornes as a counterproposal to the deterministic security-constrained electricity 
market-clearing problem. Thus, as a first step, we will describe thoroughly the mathemati-
cal programming problem corresponding ta the deterministic security-constrained ma,rket-
clearing, formulated here with multi-period unit commitment and transmission constraillts. 
Next, we present the stochastic security metrics essential in the specification of stochas-
tic security criteria. These metrics quant if y either the probabilities or the expected need 
for involulltary load shedding eaused by pre-selected sets of random generator and line 
outages as well as random demand disturbances. vVith these stochastic security metrics at 
band, we demonstrate how they can be illtegrated into security-constrained market-clearing 
schernes. As a consequence of this integration, it is possible, unlike in classical determinis-
tic reserve-constrained unit commit ment formulations [22-31], to determine the requirecl 
levels of reserve services without the use of sorne rules-of-thumb. lndeed, he1'e the driver for 
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setting the reserve requirements is a rigorous assessment of the expected costs of load not 
served against those of pre-contingency preventive security actions [41] (reserve scheduling 
and system pre-positioning) combined with those of post-contingency corrective security 
actions [41] (reserve deployment). 
VVe then go on to study the behavior of the proposed electricity market-clearing seheme 
through two cases studies. The first one is based on a small transmission-constrained three-
bus nctwork scheduled over a horizon of four hours. In this case, we assess thoroughly the 
impacts on the resulting generation and reserve schedules of: transmission constraints, gen-
eration ramp limits, demand-side reserve, the value of load not served and the constitution 
of the pre-selected set of contingencies. The second case study looks at the market-clearing 
results obtainecl when the IEEE Reliability Test System (IEEE RTS) [67] is scheduled over 
24 consecutive hours. 
2.2 Security-Constrained Electricity Market-Clearing 
As a preliminary step to the introduction of the electricity market-clearing problem with 
stochastic security, we consider the seeurity-constrained market-clearing (SCMC) problem 
in its deterministic flavor: l 
(2.1) 
snbject to 
PTe-contingency poweT balance 
H(u, g, d, ()) = 0, (2.2) 
PTe-contingency tmnsrni8sion line flow limits 
(2.3) 
1 vVe l'der the l'cader to thc List of Symbols starting on page xv for the complete listing of the nO.men-
elature. 
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Moreover, for each of the pre-selected contingencies, k = l, ... , K, and aIl contingency 
occurrence intervals, T = l, ... , T, that is for an contingency scenarios (k, T), the mini-
mization (2.1) is further subjected to 
Post-contingency power balance 
H(u(k, T), g(k, T), d(k, T), 8(k, T), k, T) = 0, (2.4) 
Post-contingency transm'ission line fiow lirnits 
_frnax(k, T) ~ f(8(k, T), k, T) ~ rrnax(k, T), (2.5) 
Pre- and post-cont'ingency generator constraints 
Pre- and post-contingency demand constraints 
m, = l, ... , AI, 1; = l, ... , T. (2.7) 
The objective of the SCMC, (2.1)--(2.7), is to maximize the total social welfare, or 
equivalently as secn in (2.1), to minimize the net social cost given the offers for energy and 
reserve production less the bid-based energy consurnption benefits. The energy production 
cost function, Cg(u, g), embeds the generators' offered no-load, startup, and variable costs, 
while the reserve cost function, Cr (r1IJ!, rdrt, fUJ!, fdn), includes generation- and demand-side 
offered rates for providing reserves. The dernand side of the objective function considers 
the benefits frorn energy use in the forrn of bids for energy consumption, as modeled by 
the function Bd (d). 
Reserve services scheduled he1'e are either of the spinning or non-spinning type, both 
of which can be up- or down-going.'vVe assume that if a contingency occurs during sorne 
tirne interval T, then sorne of the scheduled reserves rnay have to be deployed during aIl 
subsequent tirne intervals t 2': T. In the case of generation-side spinning reserve, be it up-
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or down-going, it is supplied only by generators already online. On the other hand, non-
spinning reserve involves changes in the scheduling status of generators---that i8, it involve8 
turning them on or off. For example, a generator already scheduled off could supply up-
going non-spinning reserve given that it is free to turn on and to produce some energy 
during time periods following the occurrence of a contingency. This is unlike dowll-going 
non-spillning reserve which can be provided by a generator already onlille given that it 
can be brought oHline following the contingency occurrence interval T. In the case of a 
consumer, the provision of up-going spinnillg reserve involves being ready to voluntarily 
decrease its consumption following the contingency occurrence interval T [21]. For down-
going dernand-side spinning reserve, consumers that provide this service would be ordered 
to increase their consumption in the afterma.th of a contingency. The details of reserve 
calculations are addressed thoroughly in Appendix C. 
The pre-contingency power balance equality constraints, applying for each network bus 
and for every period of the scheduling horizon, are represented by (2.2), while the corre-
sponding transmission line fiow limits are given in (2.3).We assume in this dissertation 
that aIl of the above power fiow relations use the lincar de load fiow model [32]. The rea-
sons motivating this assumption are twofold. First, our desire here is to demonstrate the 
practical workings and theoretical soundness of the formulation of the security-constrained 
electricity market-clearing problern without overloading the exposition with unnecessary 
technicalities. Second, this assurnption does not constitute a departure from current prac-
tice as nowadays most electricity market-clea.ring problems are based on de load fio"y rnodels 
(or ignore th(:, network entirely) in order to limit the problem's cornputational complex-
'. l')'3 2t:: ')8 6'8] Ity ~,-~ c), ~, . 
In the H,bove problern, (2.1)-(2.7), the reserve services are scheduled making sure that 
the power system can recover, without loss-of-load or liIle fiow limit violations, from the 
occurrence of any of the credible pre-selected contingencies, k = 1, ... , K, which may 
OCCLU' during any time interval of the scheduling horizon, T = 1, ... ,T. This requirement is 
expressed mathematically via the post-contingency power balance relations, (2.4), as well 
as by the post-contingency transmission hne fiow constraints, (2.5). 
Unlike the use of the de load fiow model, we point out that this approach truly cOllsti-
tutes a departure from current practice in formulating security-constrained market-clearing 
problerns [22--:31]. However, as justified in [34] and [64], this generalization is necessary in 
situations when transmission congestion may be present in the pre- and post-contingency 
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states, and when the market-clearing solution has to consider the costs of deploying post-
contillgency actions. This formulation is advantageous because it permits the definition 
of aIl types of reserve from the differences between the pre- and post-contingency oper-
ating states, and, more fundamentally, that the are a reserve criteria do not have to be 
defined a pr'ioT'i using sorne rule-of-thumb [2224,2631,35]. Rather, the reserve criteria 
are irnplicit in the requirement that pm,ver must balance at every llode for all pre-specifiecl 
post-contingency states, while satis(yillg aH the operational requirements of the transmis-
sion gricl, induding those of the generators and the consumers. 
The sets of constraints applying to the generators, Q.it in (2.6), represent aU operational 
limitations for an pre- and post-contingency states over the scheduling horizon. These 
operational limitations include the classical unit commit ment constraints applying to hy-
drothennal generators such as minimum up- and down-times, ramping, minimum and max-
imum output power [45,68-80], as weIl as reserve levels. Appendix B provides a detaüed 
description of minimum up- and down-time, ramping as well as capacity constraints based 
on the cornputationa.lly-efficient Ruiz-Peinado unit commit ment formulation [79], while Ap-
pelldix C describes in details the workings of the reserve constraints. On the demand side, 
the operating sets 'Dmt appearing in (2.7) describe operational restrictions such as elasticity 
limits, further explained in Section B.3 of Appendix B, and demand-side spinning reserve 
limits, which are detailed in Section G.1.2 of Appendix C. 
2.3 Stochastic Security Metrics 
The detenninistic SCMC problem just formulated has two mam weaknesses. The first 
one is that if involuniary load shedding--as opposed to 1Joluniary demand adjustmellts in 
the form of demand-side reserve [21]-is not permitted in post-contingency states it may 
be impossible balance power at every bus while satisfying simultaneously the entire set of 
transmission line fiow limits (2.5) a.nd the generator and demand operational constraints 
(2.6) and (2.7) respectively. The second drawback of the deterministic approach is that 
in instances when the market-clearing problem is feasible without the use of involuntary 
load shedding, it is necessary to cuver all contingencies regardless of their likelihood of 
occurrence. By neglecting the probability of the occurrence of contiugencies, the power 
system suffers from an increase in its overall expecied social costs and, particularly as will 
be shown later in Section 2.5, this overly conservative requirement may lead to increases 
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in the ma.rginal costs-and thus in the priees-of security and energy. 
These two drawbacks give a strong motive to formulate an electricity market-clearing 
problem with a stochastic security criterion that will take into account the likelihood of 
the contingencies and that will permit the use of involuntary load shedding only when 
justified economically or for feasibility reasons. We reiterate here that in this dissertation 
load shedding is meant to be involuntary load shedding as opposed to voluntary demand 
reduction offered to the market as up-spinning reserve. Therefore, under the proposed 
stochastic SCMC formulation, we are ready to tolerate some amounts of involuntary load 
shed ding if the contingencies causing these loss-of-load events happen with sufficiently low 
probabilities and if their correspondillg increases in the expected social cost are srnall. 
2.3.1 Loss-of-load calculations 
In the proposed formulation, the arnount of involuntary load shed at bus rn during period 
t due 1.0 cOlltingency k occurring during interval T, denoted by lmt(k, T), is cornputed from 
the post-contingency power balance relation 
(2.8) 
where dmt(k, T) is the demand at bus TIt, fe.(Ot(k, T), k, T) is the power fiow in li ne e, Ot(k, T) 
is the vector of voltage angles and 9it(k, T) is the generation level of unit i. The expression 
in (2.8) applies for any single or compound outages and load disturbances. The latter can 
be made up of the concurrent failure of sorne lines and sorne generators, cornbined with 
sorne pre-specified load disruptions, as specified in the set of failed/ disrupted cornponents 
Cf;. 
In addition, involuntary load shedding canllot be negative, and it cannot be greater 
than the actual load 
o :::; lnlt (k, T) :::; dmt ( k, T). (2.9) 
This applies for aU contingencies k = 1, ... ,J(, buses Tn = 1, ... , 1\II and time periods that 
follow the occurrence of contingellcies, that is t 2 T. 
'vVe further remark that it is needed to impose that illvoluntary load shedding should not 
be applied in the pre-contingency state; in other words, we should impose that lmt(k, T) = 0 
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if t < T. Note, however, that in order to meet this condition, we assume that there is 
sufI-icient generation and transmission capacity available in the pre-contingency state to be 
able to meet the consumers' demands. 
'1'0 detennine the expected extent of involuntary load shedding, we define the quantity 
[mt, the expected load not served (ELNS) [46,50] at bus TrI during period t averaged over 
aIl cOlltingencies occurring ralldomly over the past intervals 
]( t 
{mt = 2:: 2::p(k, T)lmt(k, T)~. (2.10) 
k=l 7=1 
In (2.10), the quantity p(k,T), beillg the probability of the event "no contingencie8 OCCllT 
d1.tTing the 8ched'uling hOTizon except fOT contingency k, which OCCUT8 dUT'ing 'ÏnteT'lIal T," is 
calculated from historical me an time to failure data (assumed to remain constant over the 
scheduling horizon) as shown in Appendix A.2. In addition, the quantity ~ represents the 
time duration (generally in hours) between two successive periods t and t + 1.2 
2.3.2 Stoehastie met ries 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the ELNS is not the only stochastic metric available to asses~ 
the risk and/or the expected consequences of involuntary load shedding. The loss-of-load 
probability (LOLP) [46,50], measuring the probability that load shedding events happen 
following the occurrence of contingencies, is another valid stochastic security metric assess-
ing the risk of load shedding. Contrary to the ELNS, however, the LOLP does not give 
any information regarding the relative importance of the contingencies, as it fails to give 
a physical measure of the "damage done"----'i. e. the energy not supplied. This leads to the 
second argument against the use of the LOLP to impose a stochastic seeurity criterion. 
System operators generally have more facility in dealing with physical quantities (power or 
energy, for instance) than in treating dimensionless numbers like probabilities. Moreover, 
as shown before in Chapter 1 and in [50,53], the computation of the LOLP as part of 
the market-clearing pro cess requires the definition of extra binary variables (7j;) to indicate 
the occurrence of loss-of-Ioad events. We recall, though, that in Chapter 1 and [50] the 
ELNS is also computed using extra binary variables; however, we show in Appendix D 
2We remark he1'8 that this assumes that the duration of the loss-of-Joa.d event for a given period t Jasts 
6 uuits of time and that the "rates" of load shedding, lmt(k, T), are assumed constant over that period. 
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that in the proposed market-clearing formulation, the ELNS cau be equivalently cornputed 
without these extra binary variables. Thus, the LOLP is also inferior to the ELNS from 
a computational cornplexity point of view un der the assurnption that good rnodeling prac-
tiee in mixed-integer optirnization generally seeks to reduee the number of binary variables 
as much as possible [57,81-84]. Lastly, wc might have considered as well the loss-of-load 
expectation (LOLE) [46], evaluating the expected Humber ho urs during which loss-of-load 
events could occur. H owe ver , like the LOLP, it requires the definition of extra binary 
variables for its computation; furthermore, the LOLE fails to give a good measure of the 
severity of the contingencies. There is no doubt in our opinion that the ELNS is by far 
a superior security asscssrncnt tool and, as a result, it will be the sole stochastic security 
metric used in the remainder of this dissertation. 
2.3.3 Stochastic security criteria 
There are three ways to impose a stochastic security critedon based on the ELNS. The 
first one, as proposed initially in Chapter 1 and in [50], is to impose an upper limit on 
the magnitude of the ELNS calculated either bus-by-bus, area-by-area or over the whole 
system. These upper limits can be imposed also over subsets of time periods of the schedul-
ing horizon (for example, hour-by-hour, over on-peak and oH-peak hours, or simply over 
the entire scheduling horizon). The second way is to add a penalty function, increasing 
monotonically with ELNS, to the objective function of the market-clearing problem. Lastly, 
the thircl method involves combining both upper bounds and a penalty function. 
Imposing bounds on the ELNS as part of or as the sole stochastic security criterion 
lS sornewhat disadvantageous. One difIiculty with this approach is the specification of 
the bounds' upper limits. Most likely, these wouid need to be specifiecl by a regulatory 
agency. This task would probably be a difficult proeess sinee the l'ules underlying this 
specification rnay be hard to justify and could leacl to some consumer inequities. Moreover, 
even though stochastic market-clearing based on upper bounds on the ELNS permits load 
shedding-unlike the deterrninistic approach outlined before----, there are still possibilities 
that the specified upper bounds on ELNS cannot be satisfied when there are insufficient 
reserve resourees or transmission capacity available, as well as in cases when the system 
rcsources arc fairly unreliable. Lastly, under the ELNS bounding approach, involuntary 
load shed ding would be applied until the ELNS inequalities became binding as a way to 
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minimize the social cost of scheduling and deploying reserves clespite the possible fact that 
there rnay be sufIicient reserve resources and transmission capacity available to coyer the 
set of pre-selected contingencies. Such a situation, in general, woulcl be unacceptable to 
the consurners. 
\Vith the explicit goal of avoiding these shortcomings, in the next section, we propose 
to use a stochastic security criterion only basecl on the penalization of ELNS within the 
objective function. 
2.4 Electricity Market-Clearing With Stochastic Security 
This section presents the kernel of the proposecl electrieity market-clearing with stochas-
tic security. First, we describe how this problem is formulated as a two-stage stochastic 
optirnization problern with fixed recourse [85], wherein the uncertainty affects both the 
objective function and its constraints. Vve then follow with a formaI discussion of the 
proposaI. 
2.4.1 Formulation 
Assumptions 
For the proposed formulation, as for the deterrninistic SGMe presented before, the following 
as~mmptions are made: 
1. Only single contingencies may occur over the length of the scheduling horizon, where, 
as previously rnentioned, snch a contingency could be a sirnultaneous compounded 
failure; and, 
2. The reserve service requirements are left nndeterrnined in the post-contingency states 
because their specification and optimization would necessitate taking into account 
non-simultaneous, seqnential contillgencies. 
In relation with the second assumption, we note that the important increase in the 
complexity of the problem (both in terrns of the number of variables and constraints) 
associated with the inclusion of such low probability events may not be warranted for most 
practical situations. In fact, following the occurrence of any contingency, it is implied 
that the system operator has to assess the state of the power system. This calls for a full 
reevaluation of the levels of reserves required to respond to further contingencies. We note 
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that the system operator can well use the proposed formulation (or sorne simplified version 
of it) to accomplish this task. 
Objective 
The objective function of the electricity market-clearing with stochastic security is the 
keystone of the global proposaI of this chapter; we introduce it formally in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2.1 (Objective of electricity market-clearing "vith stochastic security). The 
objective of electricity market-clearing '/Vith stochastic security is to sched'ule the pre- and 
post-contingency generation and consumption as well as reserves and invol'untary load shed-
ding minimizing the total expected social cost, lhat is 
minp(O) [Cg(u, g) + C1"(r1<]), rdn , rU!!, rdn) - Bd(d)] 
I< T l'v! T 
+ L LP(k, T) [Cg(u(k, T), g(k, T)) - Bd(d(k, T))] + L L'UmJmt. (2.11) 
k=l T=l 'fn,=l t=1 
The maTket-cleaTing o~jective (2.11) consists of the S'ltTn of thref teTTns: (i) the expected 
social cost aS80ciated with the pre-contùLgency state [happen'ing w'ith pTObability ])(0); see 
Appendix A.2j that acco'UTds for the social cost of 8cheduling pre-contingency generation, 
load and reserve services; (ii) the expected soC'ial cost assoC'iated with the post-contingency 
decisions that comprise the deployment of 1'ese1'ves that 'rnay involve the possible sw'itching 
on 01' off of generato1'8 as well as the re-dispatching of generation and cons'ltmption; and, 
(ii'i) the e;r;pected cost of involnntary load shedding, for which the q'll,antity 'Umt 'is the value 
of lost loarl (VOLL) [10,14, 86-90j at bus m d'UT'ing period t. 
Constraints 
Like the detenninistic market-clearing problem described before in (2.1)-(2.7), the proposed 
stochastic millimization problem is constrained by the same pre-contingellcy power balance 
and tra,nsmission line fiow limits [respectively (2.2) and (2.~~)], the same post-contillgenc,Y 
transmission line fiow limits (2.5), and the same generation and demand constraints [(2.6) 
and (2.7) respectively]. The differences between the two formulations, in addition to the 
objective function, lie in the post-contingency power balance constraints, which now take 
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into account the involuntary load shed ding variables, l( k, T) 
H(u(k, T), g(k, T), d(k, T), 6(k, T), l(k, T), k, T) = O. (2.12) 
Moreover, the stochastic problem ought to meet the load shedding bounds already defined 
befon~ in (2.9). 
In the field of stochastic optimization, the optimization problem proposed here is called 
a scenario analysis problem [85,91,92]. Here we define a scenario as: 
Definition 2.1 (Scenario). A scenario describes a possible outcome of a randomly-varying 
state of nature. Here, the realizations of the randomly-varying states of nature, which define 
the scenarios identified by the pairs (k, T), are the specifie occurrences of contingencies 
k = 1, ... ,K during one of the time periods T = 1, ... ,T, as well as the pre-contingency 
state. 
Typical of scenario analysis problems are bnndle constmints [91]. Here, these constrains 
need to be added to the sets describing the operationallimits of the generators and demands, 
git and Dmt respectively, to mode! the nonanticipatory character of the schedules. Similar 
comments apply to the network-related variables and functions, 6 and f( 6). In plain 
words, bunclle constraints impose the condition that as long as the uncertainty has not 
been resohred, optimal operational schedules should follow the schedule associated with the 
pre-colltingency scenario. Mathematically, this translates to the requirement that before 
the occurrence of contingency k during the interval T, the following conditions must hold 
dmt(k, T) = dml;; 
lmt(k, T) = 0; 
(Smt(k, T) = (Smt; 
fR-(6 t (k, T), k, T) = fR-(6 t ); 
for each t = 1, ... , T. 
i = 1, ... ,l, t < T, 
i = 1, ... ,l, t < T, 
m = 1, ... ,1vl, t < T, 
TrI = 1, ... , Nf, t < T, 
m = 1, ... ,NI, t < T, 
e = 1, ... , L, t < T, 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
After contingency k, which occurred during the time interval T, all post-contingency 
variables should keep on satisfyillg the constraints applicable in the pre-contingency state, 
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with the exception of those variables associated with the failed elements defining the spe-
cifie eontingency. For exarnple, given that contingency k leads to the loss of generator 
j----that is, .i E Ck--, the post-contingency generator variables must satisfy still the cons-
traint (v"it;(k, T), git(k, T)) E Qit, given that i ~ Ck. For generator .i, however, we have 
(v,jt(k, T), gjt(k, T)) = (0,0). 
Lastly, we reiterateand we demonstrate forrnally in Appendix D-that in calculating 
the ELNS, constraints (2.8), (2.9) and the action of the market-clearing objective (2.11), 
yielcl ELNS values equivalent to those found through the conditions developed in Chapter 1 
and 150] which required the definition of extra binary variables. However, if one uses the 
LOLP or the LOLE as the stochastic security metric, the use of these extra binary variables 
lS necessary. 
Stochastic programming classification of electricity market-clearing with sto-
chastic security 
Birge and Louveau [85] describe the general (linear) form of the two-stage stochastic pro-
gramming problem with fixe cl recourse as the following optimization problem: 
min c'I'x + Ew [( q(w) )"'y(w) ] 
x2':O,y(w)2':O 
snbject to 
Ax=h, 
T(w)x + W(w)y(w) = h(w). 
(2.19) 
(2.20) 
(2.21) 
Here, w E n is a l'andom variable (RV) having sorne known probability distribution over 
the support spaœ n c lEt, and Ew['] is the mathematical expectation operator over the RV 
w. In (2.19)---(2.21), the variables contained in the vector x are known as the first stage 
variables, which model the decisioll-making process done prior to the resolution of the 
uncertainty, while the vector y(w) contains the second stage variables which are dependent 
on the specifie realization of the RV w. In addition, the general problem formulation shows 
depenclence on the specifie realization of the RV win: (i) the objective functioll [through 
the vector q(w)]; and, (ii) the constraints [through the matrices T(w) and W(w) and the 
right-hand side vector h(w)]. 
lt is clear by inspection of (2.11) that the objective function of the proposed electricity 
marküt-clearing with stochastic sücurity is a specifie instance of (2.19), wherein the ran-
donllless component lies in the realization of one of the probable contingency scenarios. 
In this case, the objective function optirnizes only over the second-stage variables, which 
are dependent on the realization of a given contingency scenario. Likewise, all the cons-
traints depend on the realization of sorne given contingency scenario, as indicated by the 
arguments (k, T). 
We should point out that variants of the formulation of the electricity market-dearing 
with stochastic security may be constructed. In those, for instance, subsets of the variables 
associated with the pre-contingency scenario---which has a probability of occurrence below 
one---may be considered as part of the set of first-stage decision variables. This is the case, 
as will be seen in Chapter 4, "vhen unit commitment decisions are made ahead of tirne 
and cannot be altered once the uncertainty is revealed. Likewise, since reserve levels are 
not necessarily updated when a given scenario is reached (as assumed here) , these rnay 
be treatcd as first-stage variables with a corrcsponding cast of supply, C. (rU», r dn , r ILP , fdn), 
incurred with unit probability. 
vVe recall also that stochastic optimization rnethods have other very important appli-
cations in the field of generation planning problems. For completeness, next, we provide 
sorne of the most important applications of stochastic optimization to the field of generation 
scheduling. 
Hyd'T'Oelectr-ü: gener-at'ioTi open:Ltions planning 
Hydroelectric generation planning is a well-known challenging stochastic optimization prob-
lem. Generally, its objective is to maximize the expected value of the water stored in 
rcservoirs contingent on the realization of randomly-varying electricity demand and water 
infiows. This problern has very large dimensions due to the variety of scenarios that must be 
considered. It is also computationally demanding because of complex river basin flow cou-
pling constnünts and nonlinear hydro turbines' efficiency characteristics. The work of the 
Brazilians Pereira and Pinto is probably the most famous contribution in this field [9;),94]. 
This work is remarkable for its ri gourous hydroelectric operations planning formulation and 
for the devdopment of a solution method by means of Benders' decornposition. 
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Generation operations plann'ing v,ndeT demand 1J,nccTta:inty 
The second classical application of stochastic optimization in electricity generation planning 
is the problem of scheduling in the presence of demand uncertainty. In most instances, sce-
nario analysis type problems are formulated with the objective of minimizing the expected 
generation cost such that the power should balance almost s'uTely for the predicted, but un-
certain, load [92,95,96]. Other formulations use a "chance constrainecl" approach whereby 
the probability that it will be possible to me et the randomly-varying load is constrained to 
be above senne lower limit [97]. 
Generation operations planning 'u,nde1' PTice unceTta:inty 
In recent years, electricity restructuring has spurred interest in price-driven generator self-
scheduling rnethods [77,78]. Obviously, given that price predictions for electricity and/or 
fuels are uncertain, stochastic optimization methods are well suited to tackle these prob-
lems. In general, such problems attempt to optimize expectecl profits and/or some risk 
measures of a given generation company subject to the operating constraints of its gener-
ation capacity portfolio and its set of pre-agreed bilateral contracts. This problem, unlike 
the problem considered in this dissertation and the two other problems just described, does 
not have to worry about the complicating constraints like nodal power balance relations 
or transmission line flow limitations. A vast body of literature on this problem is now 
available; see, for example, the works of [98-105]. 
2.4.2 Discussion 
On the innovative features of electricity market-clearing with stochastic security 
'J'he proposed e1ectricity market-clearing formulation provides a number of key general-
izations in comparison to earlier security-collstrained market-clearing schemes. First, the 
work pioneered by Monticelli et al. [1061 on optimal post-contingency corrective control 
actions in security-constrained optimal power flow problems did not consider unit com-
mitment clecisions, contingency probabilities, nor the expected social costs of corrective 
actions-like generation re-dispatch and involuntary load sheclding. .Likewise, the works 
of [86,87,107,108] take into consideration the expected costs of preventive and corrective 
security actions, but again only for optimal power flow problems without unit commitment. 
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The intentions of the authors of [86,87,1071 were to develop methods to compute the ex-
pected total and marginal social costs of security measures for pricing purposes, whereas 
Kimball et al. [108] essentially con cern themselves with the development of a decomposition 
metllod to solve a specifie instance of a stochastic optimal power fiow problem. 'Wang et 
al. [109] propose a risk-based costjbenefit approach for the scheduling of reserve services 
to compensate for generator failures. However, as their method assumes some a pr-'lort 
pre-contingency generation schedule, these authors fail to recognize the tight coupling that 
exists between the energy and the reserve scheduling tasks. It is well known that such 
functional separation can lead to inefficient or infeasible market-clearing resu1ts [:34, 110]. 
Rashidillejad et al. [111] contemplated the idea of simultalleously accountillg for the costs 
of reserve scheduling and deployment. Nonetheless, they based their reservc-constrained 
market-clearing problem formulation on simple rule-of-thumb reserve criteria-----for example 
setting the requirement equal to a fraction of the demand or the largest (mline generator-, 
while they ignored unit commitment, transmission network congestion as well as the time 
dynamics associated with power system operations. The work of Carpentier et al. [112] 
done at Électricité de France in 1996 shares sorne common points with the proposed ap-
proach; for instance, the authors consider generator failure scenarios and the optimization 
of post-contingency generation as part of the scenarios. However, they did not indude a 
network model in their formulation nor did they consider the co st to the consumers cor-
respondillg to involuntary load shedding events. For these authors, any generation deficit 
does not nccessarily lead to load shcdding; thcy daim that their power imbalance penalty 
represents the cost of extraordinary measures induding the use of resources outside of the 
utility's service territ ory or the startup of expensive peaking generators. In addition, unlike 
here, the unit commitment problem is formulated as a nonlinear mixed-integer prograrn-
ming problern, a feature that increases computational complexity and that reduces the 
likelihood of finding H, global optimal solution. 
Arroyo and Galiana in [64] formulated a security-constrained market-clearing tool based 
on a single-period network-constrained unit commitment; however, they clid not consider 
the probabilistic features of the proposed formulation, the cost of deploying corrective 
a,ctions nor involuntary load shedding. }.ilany security-constrained unit commitment for-
mulations have becn proposed in the literature and are in use; this is the case in P.J~/l, 
New York ISO, ISO New England as well as in New Zealand and Ontario [22---31]. None of 
these security-constrained market-clearing formulations, however, consider explicitly how 
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the probability of occurrence of contingencies and their associated post-contingency cor-
rective actions can aflect generation, demand and reserve schedules. Furthermore, the 
works reportcd in the literature have not treated jointly the complicating aspects of elec-
tricity market-clearing that we consider 11ere, namely: (i) multi-period unit commitment; 
(ii) probabilistic security criteria based on the expected value of involuntary load shedding; 
(iii) pre- and post-contingency transmission line flow limits; and, (iv) the expected value 
of the social costs of bath preventive and corrective security actions. Most importantly, 'vve 
point out that none of the works cited above intended to provide the necessary theoretical 
foundations nor the Implementation details of an electricity market-clearing mechanism 
based on a stochastic seeurity criterion as it is do ne in this dissertation. 
On the integration of electricity market-dearing with stochastic security in the 
wider power system operations paradigm 
A practical Implementation of the proposed electricity market-clearing scheme is certainly 
tied to the appropriate functioning of fast emergency actions that are automatically imple-
rnclltecl in the immedia.te aftennath of a disturbance. In fact, the sets of preventive and 
corrective actions determined by the proposed market-clearing scheme are by themselves 
not suflicient to prevent cascaded Olltages that cou Id lead to a complete power system c01-
lapse. The assumption he1'e is tha.t the fast emergency actions, taking place in the order 
of fractions of seconds to a few minutes following the occurrence of a contingency, pre-
vent the system from drifting away from its secure pre-contingency operating point into 
instability. For most situations, the fast and local automatic emergency actions based on 
primary frequency regulation [32-34, 36] are sufficient to do so. In cases of more severe 
contingencies, however, automatic involuntary load shedding actions, based on frequency 
and voltage-sensitive relaying, may have to complement the primary frequellcy regulation 
actions. 3 
The post-contingency corrective actions detennined by the market-clearing scheme he-
long to the realm of tertiary regulation actions implemented 10--20 minutes after a dis-
turbance [33,34]. In resolving the market-clearing problem, the system operator centrally 
:IThe autoll1atic involuntary load shedding actions to which we refer here are not of the same type as 
thnse caJclllated by the market-clearing seheme. The economics behind these loa.d shedding actions are 
igllored as they fail to discriminate between consumers having high or low value of [ost load. The unique 
goal of these automatic actions is to keep the system from collapsing. 
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determines how the power system can be re-positioned during the tertiary regulation in-
tervaJ so as to meet all its technical limits and to operate more economically, two aspects 
not addressed by the previous primary regulation interval. 
One obvious advantage of the proposed market-clearing is the co-optimization of the 
pre- and post-contingency states. By so doing, the system operator has the possibility of 
pre-positiolling the system, through preventive control actions, in such a way that it may 
be better prepared to react to those highly severe and probable contingencies. Moreover, 
the explicit modeling of the post-contingellcy states allows for a betterrnanagement of 
corrective control actions. As the expected costs of reserve scheduling and deployment and 
those of involuntary load shedding are calculated jointly, the system operator can generate 
monetary savings in terms of the net social cost as well as in the marginal priees of energy 
and security. These features will be illustrated in Section 2.5 and further analyzed in 
Chapter :3. Vve must note also that so far none of the existing electricity markets worldwide 
has implernented this kincl of functionality. 
On the use of involuntary load shedding 
Historically, power systems have been operated with the implicit requirement that load be 
shed as a last recourse only, regardless of the cost associated with the deployment of the 
available resourees needed to counter the disturbanees. Thus, the explicit consideration of 
involuntary load shedding as a potential corrective post-contingency action in a market-
clearing scheme, as we propose he1'e, is unorthodox. However, one has to assume that 
involuntary load shedding should be used sparingly because in most situations it is much 
more costly to eut load than to have to schedule and deploy rese1'ves. In addition, one 
weakness he1'e is the t'act that the value of involunta1'Y lost load at a given bus and time, 
as specified by '/Jm /., is uncertain and surely depends on the duration of a given interruption 
[14,4G]. As of now, it is still unclear whether it should be specified by a regulatory body 
or the load-serving entities. Stoft [10], as weIl as JoskO\v and Tirole 114] provide insightful 
theoretical economic discussions on this subject. We believe that, for questions of social 
fairness, regulators are in better positions to determine a uniform value of lost load aeross an 
entire or sorne areas of a given ndwo1'k. For example, the Australian regulatory autho1'ities 
havo adopted a uniform value of lost load of the order of AU$10 000 pel' megawatt-hour [10]. 
Of course, buses feeding critical loads like hospitals and ah'ports, for example, should be 
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assigned very high values of 'Umt. Nonetheless, one should be aware that in situations whon 
there is insufIicient transmission capability following some contingency (in cases of network 
separation, for example), even critical loads may have to cut down their consumption 
regardless of their level of Vmt. 
vVe should stress also that there has been, and there are still llowadays vast industry-
driven research efforts devoted to the evaluation of social costs of power interruptions; see, 
for example, the econometric and engineering studies reported in [10,14,46, 88, 11~~, 1141. 
These efforts must be continued and should evolve in the direction set by the constraints 
and characteristics of restructured power systems wherein the notion of "value" to the 
consumer is fundamental. 
On the computational complexity of electricity market-clearing with stochastic 
security 
One may correctly infer that optimizing over the post-contingency on/off generator status 
variables, 11it (k, T), is computationally costly (both in terms of core memory usage and 
CPU time) because the number of possible binary variable combinations grow exponentially 
with the number of contingencies and the possible contingency occurrence times over the 
scheduling horizon. Therefore, in cases where large-scale systems need to be scheduled, it 
may be necessary to forgo the explicit optimization of post-contingency binary variables 
by fixing them to their pre-contingency levels. This is done, simply, by requiring that 
'U'it(k, T) = 'Uit for aU contingencies k and times of occurrence T. vVe note that, by so doing, 
non-spinning reserves are no longer defined in the formulation. 
Likewise, sinee both the pre- and post-contingency variables and constraints are explic-
itly modelecl, the dimensions of the optimization problem that may need to be solvecl in 
rcalistic systems can be quite significant. The consideration of solution techniques based 
on Benders' decomposition [27,31,82,85,112, 115117J is a promising way to deal with large 
systems by limiting the size of the constraint set stored in core memory and by taking ad-
vantage of the parallelism offered by this solution strategy. One can make similar comments 
about the "branch-and-price" decomposition technique [118-120]. In addition, several au-
thors [10,5,121123] have proposed and used Bome rigorous scenario reduction algorithms, 
wheru via a pre-processing step, these algorithms aggregate the scenarios having similar 
impacts in a given stochastic optimization problem. In a variant of scenario reduction, 
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one seeks to eliminate the need to consider the variables and constraints associated with 
scenarios that lie under the "umbrella" of other more constraining scenarios. With that 
goal in mind, Chapter 5 proposes a technique to discover those umbrella contingencies. 
2.5 Case Studies 
ln this section, we analyze the market-clearing formulation with stochastic security just 
developed through two case studies solved using mixed-integer linear programming (:r..iflLP) 
techniques. 
First, Section 2.5.1 studies a smaU-scale system. Although this case is simple enough so 
as to verify readily the validity of its outcomes, it illustrates weIl many of the ramifications 
of electricity market-clearing with stochastic security. SpecificaIly, we analyze: (i) the ef-
fects of transmission line fiow limits; (ii) the opportunity costs of excluding non-spinning 
reserve; (iii) the impacts of demand-side valuation of energy not served; (iv) the influence 
of ramping limits; and, (v) the effects of the pre-selected set of contingencies. \Ve also C01n-
pare the outcomes of the proposed stochastic market-clearing to those of its deterministie 
counterpart described in Section 2.2. In addition, we derive and compare the nodal priees 
of energy and security associated with the stochastie and the deterministic market-clearing 
optimal sehedules. 
Then in Section 2.5.2, we apply the proposed market-clearing seheme to the IEEE 
Reliability Test System [67] whieh is scheduled over a 24-hour horizon. This case sheds 
sorne light on the dimensionality issues of the proposed market-clearing seheme. 
2.5.1 Small-scale study 
This case study analyzes the scheduling of System A, described in Appendix KI. Here, 
we assume that the set of pre-selected contingencies eharacterizing the security criterion 
include aH single generator and hne outages. We index the failures of generators 1, 2 and 
3 with k = 1,2,3 respectively, while k = 4,5,6 respectively index the failures of lines 1, 2 
and :3. vVe moreover assume that any one of these six contingencies can occur during any 
of the four h011rs of the scheduling horizon, that is T = 1, ... ,4. 
vVe remark that the 6 x 4 = 24 contingeney scenarios characterizing the seeurity eriterion 
here are few compared to the actual number of possible contingency scenarios. The latter 
is defined by aIl possible combinations of generator and line mItages over all possible times 
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of failurcs, including sequcntial failures, which equals I:~=l 4n (~) = 15624. Since time 
periods last one hour each, the parameter 6 is assumed to be one hour-long. 
The formulation of the electricity market-clearing problem is already in linear form 
given the system data and the objective function described in Appendix E.L The resulting 
mixed-illteger linear problem was then solved using CPLEX 9.0.0 ullder GA~'lIS on Paco 
(CPLEX, GAMS and Paco are described in detail in Appendix F). For all the subcases 
shown below, computation times (CPU times) were all below one second. 
Results and analysis 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the main features of the optimal schedule obtained fol' Sys-
tem A. First, Table 2.1 gives the breakdowIl of the corresponding optimal expected social 
cost. \Vithout much surprise, the component corresponding to the expected operating cost 
under the pre-colltillgency state dominates with 95.01% of the total amount. The remain-
ing portion of the expected co st is incurred foUowing the occurrence of the pre-selected 
eontingencies. This amount splits between the expected cost of deploying the reserves by 
re-dispatching and turning on or oH generators (3.30% of the total) and the expected eost 
assumed by the consumers beeause of the use of involuntary load shedding (1.69% of the 
total). 
Table 2.1 Breakdown of expected social costs--System A 
Total Pre-
contingellcy 
Reserve 
deployment 
Loss-of-load 
Cost ($) 7228.74 6868.15 238.51 122.07 
% total co st 100.00 95.01 :3.:30 1.69 
This breakdown agrees with the probability level of the event that none of the pre-
selected eontingencies occurs over the four-hour scheduling horizon, p(O) = 0.9673. \Ve 
observe also that this probability is somewhat close to its associated expected cost propor-
tion (95.01%). In the same vein, the optimal expected cost proportions associated with 
reserve deployment and illvoluntary load shedding (3.30%+ 1.69% 4.99%) are of the 
sa.me order of magnitude as the probabilities of the eontingency scenarios put together) 
that is I:k,TP(k,T) = 0.032:j. 
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Tahle 2.2 summarizes the optimal generation and reserve schedules of the generators as 
well a.s the dcrnand-side reserve contributions associated with the pre-contingency scenario. 
In this case, being incrementally the least expensive at $20 pel' megawatt-hour, generator 
3 supplies energy over aU four hours; however, it does not provide any reserve service. 
Being the next least expensive unit available to provide energy at $30 per megawatt-hour, 
generator 1 generates the demand not yet fulfilled by generator 3 during the higher load 
hours 2 and :3. Unlike generator 3, generator 1 supplies non-spinning up reserve during hour 
4, up-spinning reserve during hour 2, and down-spinning reserve during hour 3. Lastly, 
generator 2, which offers energy at the highest rate among aIl three units at $40 per 
megawatt-hour, is not committed, but nOlletheless supplies sorne non-spinning up reserve 
during hou1's 2 and 3. 
On the side of the demand at bus ~~, Table 2.2 shows that it does not get to provide any 
reserve based on volulltary load adjustments. The last row of Table 2.2, however, indicates 
that the optimum market-clearing schedule caUs for sorne involuntary load shedding during 
periods 1 and 3. An observation of that sarne row indicates that sinee the value of lost load 
is high ($1000 pel' megawatt-hour), the ELNS at bus 3 caleulated over the four hour-long 
horizon is low····-that is, Lt f:~t = 122.1 l\.\iVh or 0.05% of the 260 M\V"h of energy scheduled 
to be consurned over the who le horizon. 
vVe observe that even though involuntary load shedding is costly, the market-clearing 
solution still calls for sorne amount of it. This result displays the essence of the stochas-
tic security criterion that simultaneously a,ssesses the credibility and the severity of the 
contingeneies making up that. criterion. 
BelO\v, still referring to Table 2.2, we study hovv the different l'eserve levels are set for 
each of the four hours, paying particular attention to the reasons why load is shed ullder 
market-clearing with stochastic security. 
HO'uT t = 1 
vVe observe that during this hour there are no reserve services being scheduled, and that, 
conscquently, the failure of generator 3 would lead to loss-of-load. Such scheduling behavior 
is surely unique to market-clearing with stochastic seeurity. This reflec1:s the faet that the 
101:38 of gcncrator :3 has both a low enough probability combinecl with a low enough loacl 
shedding impact in comparison to the expeeted costs of reserve scheduling and deployment. 
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Table 2.2 Pre-contingency generatioll, reserves and ELNS -System A 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
9lt (MW) 0.0 30.0 60.0 0.0 
11.p 
rll; (MW) 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 
Tdn 1t (MW) 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 
,pup 
lt (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 
rdn lt (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
92t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
T'11.p 
2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
T'dn 
2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-11.p 
r 2t (MW) 0.0 30.0 60.0 0.0 
-dn 
T'2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
9:3t (MW) 30.0 50.0 50.0 40.0 
'liJ! 
r 31: (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
r dn 3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-11.p T3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
,p:ln 
.3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
d3i (MW) 30.0 80.0 llO.O 40.0 
1lp T3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
T'eln 
:3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
l;)t (kWh) 117.7 0.0 4.4 0.0 
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lt is simple to show by trial-and-error that this contingency gets fully covered by reserve 
only if the value of lost load is raised over and above $1171 pel' megawatt-hou!' for that 
hour. vVe refer the interested reader to Chapter ~~ for a detailed theoretical analysis of the 
observed behavior. Furthermore, it is obvious from Table 2.2 that failures involving any of 
the other generators or lines do not cause loss-of-load during that hour. 
Ho'uT t = 2 
Here, the loss of generator 1 that may occur during one of the hours T E {1, 2} is fully 
coverecl by the 30 megawatts of non-spinning up reserve supplied by generator 2. Likewise, 
the failure of generator 3 is taken care of by the 20 rnegawatts of up-spinning reserve 
provided by generator 1 combined with the 30 megawatts of non-spinning up reserve from 
generator 2. By inspection, no line loss occurring during T E {1, 2} can cause loss-of-Ioad 
and neither can the failure of generator 2. 
Hou?' t = 3 
The failure of gencrator 1 happening during one of T E {1, 2, 3} is covered in full by the 
60 megawatts of non-spinning up reserve provided by generator 2. In cases when generator 
:3 fails during one of T E {1, 2, 3}, generator 1 is required to back down its generation 
level by 5 rnegawatts (explaining why it provides 5 megawatts of down-spinnillg reserve) 
at the same tirne when generator 2 has to turn on to generate 55 megawatts, deploying 
its provision of non-spinning up reserve. Accounting all these reserve deployment actions, 
wc find out that the illvo1untary 10ad loss associated with this contingency is nil for that 
hour. The post-contingency dispatch here maximizes the use of the transmission network 
to lower as rnuch as possible the amount of load shed at bus 3. vVe remark that if gellerator 
1 were to keep generating at its pre-contingellcy level (60 megawatts), then generator 2 
would be capable of delivering 45 rnegawatts only, leading to a corresponding loss-of-load 
of 5 megawatt-hours at bus ;3. This would occur because the transmission line ftow lirnits 
(55 rnegawatts for each line) have to be enforced during aIl of the post-contingency states. 
AH three line outages occurring during any one of T E {l, 2, 3} would lead to load 
shedciing in the amount of 5 megawatt-hours during that hour. This is so because of the 
low probabilities and the low load shedding impacts associated with these events. Fig. 2.1 
illustrates an example of how the reserves are deployeci after the failure of line 2. In this 
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case, generator I backs down by 5 megawatts to comply with the line fiow limits, while 
generator 2 stays off and generator 3 still outputs 50 megawatts. 
913(5,T) = 55MW 
Bus 1 
55MW 
~ 
-.--t-Bus 3 
Bus 2 
933(5,T) = 50MW 'V d3:l(5,T) = llOMW 
133(5,T)L':. = 5MWh 
Fig. 2.1 Effeet of the out age of line 2 (k = 5) cluring hour t = 3 if it occurs 
during T E {l, 2, 3} 
Ho'u,rt=4 
The loss of generator 3 during T E {l, 2, :3, 4} is taken care of by the 40 megawatts of 
non-spinning up reserve supplied by generator 1. The line mItages occurring during any 
one of T E {l, 2, 3, 4} cannot lead to loss-of-load. Finally, the failure of generator 1 or 2 
cannot cause loss-of-load either. 
Stochastic versus deterministic schedules 
Here we compare the results obtained with the stochastic approach to those of a purely 
deterministic security-constrained market-clearing scheme (as described in Section 2.2) for 
which 10ad shedding is not allowed. Table 2.3 indicates that for the deterministic schedule 
generator 1 gets to provide the extra 30 megawatts of non-spinning up reserve required 
to coyer the failure of generator 3 during the first hour. In addition, during hour t = 3, 
the clemand at bus :3 provides 5 megawatts of up-going spinning (voluntary) l'eserve to 
compensate for any of the line losses. We notice also that these 5 megawatts are used in 
the aftermath of the outage of generator I or 3 during T E {l, 2, 3}. This provides an 
explanation as to why generator 2 supplies only 55 megawatts of up-going non-spinning 
reserve during t = 3, rather than the 60 megawatts previously seen in Table 2.2 for the 
stochastic case. Thus, for example, the loss of generator 1 woulcl be covered by 55 megawatts 
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from generator 2 along with 5 megawatts from a voluntary reduction in demand at bus 3. 
Vve ought to remark, however, that the corl'E'sponding cost incurred by scheduling these 5 
megawatts of demand-side reserve during t = 3 ($100) is much higher than the expected 
eost associated with loacl sheclding of 5 megawatt-hours in the aftermath of a line failure 
($4.40). 
Table 2.3 Pre-contillgency generatioll and reserves under deterministic 
market-clearing--System A 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
9It (MW) 0.0 30.0 60.0 0.0 
.'uP 
TH (MW) 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 
rdn 1t (MW) 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 
rUP 1t (MW) 30.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 
-tin r]t (MW) O.D D.O D.O 0.0 
921: (MW) 0.0 D.O 0.0 0.0 
"yp (MW) O.D D.Cl 0.0 0.0 2t 
rdn 2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 Cl.O 0.0 
-up 
r2t (lVIW) Cl.O 30.0 55.0 0.0 
rdn 2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 D.D 0.0 
9;3t (MW) 30.0 50.0 50.0 40.0 
'up 
r3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 Cl.O 
rrin 
at (MW) Cl. Cl Cl.O 0.0 D.O 
-up 
rat (MW) O.D O.Cl 0.0 D.Cl 
r0n 
,3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
dat (MW) 30.D 80.Cl 110.0 40.0 
71p 
r3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 
rdn 3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Next, Table 2.4 gives a comparison of the expected social co st breakdown of the sto-
chastic scheclule to that of the expected social cost of the cletenninistic schedule, which is 
gi ven by the expression 
T K 
p(O)VV;et + I: I:p(k, T)~V(;et(k, T). (2.22) 
7=1 k=l 
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ln (2.22), TYdet represents the optimal social cost of the deterministic sched nIe and the tenns 
vVdet (k, T) represent the reserve deployment social costs associated with the contingency 
scenarios being considered. The term p(O)vVdet refers to the expected cost incurred in the 
case wh en no contingencies occur, whereas the terms p(k, T)TYdet(k, T) correspond to the 
expected costs incurred when reserves need to be deployed under the contingency scenarios 
(k, T). ln the case of the deterrninistic schedule, we recall that the reserve deployment 
actions are Hot optimized during the scheduling process, unlike in the stochastic case. 
Table 2.4 shows th<-1t the "Pre-contingency" and the "Reserve deployment" expected cost 
eomponents of the stoehastic sehedule are lower than their eounterparts associated with 
the deterministic schedule. Yet, the expected cost associated with load shedding in the 
stochastic schedule ends up diminishing these gains. The expected cost efficiency gain of 
the stochastic programming solution versus that of the deterministic solution, known as the 
value of the stochastic solution (VSS) [85], is equal to $200.72 + $2.00 - $122.07 .. ·.··. $80.65, 
represent.ing l.1 % ofthe net. det.erministic schedule expect.ed cost.. This result demonstrates 
that when one t.akes into account t.he probabilit.ies of failure, it is possible pre-position t.he 
system and deploy reserves at a lower expected cost, while st.ill achieving a high Ievel of 
reliability on average (as measured by t.he ELNS). 
Table 2.4 Comparison of expectecl social costs under cletenninistic and sto-
chastic market-clearing-System A 
Pre- Reserve Loss-of-loacl 
contingency deployment 
Deterministic ($) 7068.87 240.51 0.00 
Stochastic ($) 6868.15 238.51 122.07 
DifIerence ($) 200.72 2.00 -122.07 
Priees of energy and security 
Market-clearing procedures are Hever complete without. the specification of a set of pricing 
l'Ules sueh as locational marginal pricing for energy [3,13], a pricing scheme that has gained 
industry acceptance and is now widely used. However, it is still unclear how reserve services 
should be rernunerated and paid for [34,58-64]. 
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Recent works on security-constrainecl electricity market-clearing problems [34,64] pro-
pose tha.t aU the reserve services suppliecl at a bus should be pricecl at the corresponding 
nodal marginal social cost of security. The central premise of this approach, under which 
there exists a single per-bus priee for aH reserve services, cornes from the idea that m 
securing the energy supply at a bus, all the reserve services act in a concerted mannel'. 
Here, we use the marginal pricing mIes of [64], which are summarized in Appendix G 
and are thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 3 in the context of market-clearing with stochastic 
security. This proposition diverges from CUITent practices in which the different reserve 
services-up / down and spinning/ non-spinning reserves-are valued at different marginal 
rates [23,28,30,58,59,63]. 
In the first three rows of Tables 2.5 and 2.6, we find the corresponding nodal prices of 
security and energ .. ~r for the schedule based on market-clearing with stochastic security. We 
note sorne of nodal priee differenees during the third hour because of the transmission hne 
congestion that follows the random failure of any one of the Enes or that of generator 3. 
Table 2.5 Priees of security-System A 
Tirne t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
Stochastic scheclule ($jMWh) 
1 8.11 6.01 1.27 12.89 
Bus m 2 8.11 6.01 6.82 12.89 
3 8.11 6.01 7.23 12.89 
Deterrninistic scheclule ($/MWh) 
1 12.60 6.01 1.71 12.90 
Bus m 2 12.60 6.01 19.66 12.90 
~3 12.60 6.01 19.35 12.90 
vVe compare next the nodal prices obtained for the deterministic a.nd stochastic market-
clea.ring formulations. Before venturing any further, however, we remark that this compar-
ison can110t be readily made sinee the sets of prices that correspond to the deterministic 
market-clearing woulcl be clerivecl from a mathematical programming problmn with a (Ef-
ferent. objective function. Therefore, we require to unbias the comparition by compuUng 
the corresponding cleterminist.ic priees of security and energy from the expectecl cost of the 
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Table 2.6 Priees of energy--System A 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
Stoehastie sehedule ($jMWh) 
1 23.84 30.60 35.41 24.50 
Bus m 2 2~3.84 ~30.60 40.9() 24.50 
3 23.84 30.()0 41.37 24.50 
Deterministie schedule ($/MWh) 
1 24.50 :30.60 35.41 24.50 
Bus m 2 24.50 30.60 53.37 24.50 
3 24.50 30.60 5:3.49 24.50 
deterrninistic schedule, as calculated using (2.22), from small perturbations of the power 
balance relations of the deterministic market-clearing formulation. In other words, we ob-
tain the nodal prices of energy for the deterministic schedule in Table 2.6 by calculating the 
ratios of the increments in the expected social cost of the deterministic schedule, caused by 
small demand perturbations affecting both the pre- and post-contingency power balance 
equality cOllstraints (2.2) and (2.4), to those corresponding demand perturbations. We 
calculate the deterministic nodal prices in Table 2.5 using the same principle, but this time 
only perturbing the post-contingency power balance equality constraints (2.4). 
If we compare the first three rows of Table 2.5 to its last three, we see that during 
homs 1 and :3, periods during which involuntary load shedding is used in the stochastic 
schedule, the priees of security associated with the stochastic scheclule are much lower 
than those associated with the deterministic schedule. During hours 2 and 4, however, the 
prices of security are identical up to one cent per megawatt-hour. This illustrates that in 
sorne circumstances, given the value of lost load and the probabilities of the contingency 
scenarios, it is incrementally less expensive on average to shed load than to schedule and 
deploy the incrementally more expensive reserve services. 
Perforrning the same comparison, but this time with the prices of energy, from Table 2.6 
we observe once more that the stochastic priees are less than or equal to those of the 
cieterministic schedule. As with the priees of security, we notice that during homs 1 and 3 
the stochastic prices of energy are lower than those of the deterministic schedule. During 
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period 3, for example, the priee of energy correspollding to the stochastic schedule at bus 
3 is 2:3% lower on average than the one eorresponding to the deterministic schedule. These 
priee differentials ean be interpreted as premiums provicled to the consumers for running 
the risk of beillg eut. 
Impacts of key formulation parameters 
Non-spinning Teserve 
Inclucling llon-spinning reserve serVIces III the market-clearing formulation requires the 
explicit optimization of the on/off status of the generators for aIl contingency scenarios. 
This is a characteristic which, for large systems, may leacl to computationally intractable 
problems, as was mentioned before in Section 2.4.2. 
In order to eva.luate the impact of ignoring non-spinning reserve in the current small sys-
tem, we resolvecl the market-clearing problem again, but this time imposing that 'l1it(k, T) = 
?lit for an i 1:. Ck , k = 1, ... ,K and t 2: T. The first two rows of Table 2.7 show how the 
expected social eost breaks down without non-spinning reserve. By comparing these re-
sults with the previous social cost decomposition with non-spinning reserve found in the 
following two rows, we observe that most of the expected social cost components have 
increasecl. The expectecl sodal cost component that corresponds to the post-contingency 
reserve deployment, however, has go ne clown by 4.35% because now this component no 
longer accounts for post-contingency generator startup costs. It is illteresting to note as 
well that the expected social cost related to involulltary load sheddillg has increased signif-
icantly (182% of the original expected social co st with non-spinning reserve). This acute 
jump can be explained by inspecting how the reserves and generation schedules, shown 
in Table 2.8, have been modified from the original case with spinning reserve (reported in 
Table 2.2). It is seen that the failure of generator 1 is no longer covered during hour 2; thus, 
this causes a 30-megawatt-hour deficit for that period, unlike previously when generator 2 
was providing the 30 megawatts of non-spinning reserve to coyer that contingency. 
This behavior is a clear example of the balancing act operating between security and 
economics. Indeed, one can show that only if the value of lost load is raised up and above 
$1247 per megawatt-hour then the ELNS can be brought back to its originallevel found in 
the case with both reserve types. Nevertheless, this improvement in security is costly, as 
it leads to an increase in the expected co st of pre-contingency operation to $7395.35 from 
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$6868.15, and from $238.51 to $241.27 for post-contingency reserve deployment. 
Table 2.7 Breakdown of expected social costs wheu excluding non-spiuning 
reserve-System A 
Total Pre- Reserve Loss-of-l08d 
contingency deployment 
Excluding non-spinning reserve 
Cost ($) 7721.07 7148.68 228.13 344.26 
%j total cost 100.00 92.59 2.95 4.46 
With Ilon-spinning reserve 
Cost ($) 7228.74 6868.15 238.51 122.07 
% total cost 100.00 9,5.01 3.30 1.69 
Difference ($) 492.33 280.53 -10.38 222.19 
Difference (%) (>.:38 4.08 -4.35 182.00 
Val'ue of lost load 
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'vVe just saw that by raising the value of lost load (VOLL), it is possible to improve the 
security of the supply as measured by the ELNS, which generally decreases. Of course, 
usually this has sorne cost. Fig. 2.2 illustrates quite weIl how the ELNS and the expected 
social cost vary with the VOLL. Initially, for low values of the VOLL, the ELNS is somewhat 
insensitive to changes in the VOLL, only with a slight tendency to decrease monotonically. 
Then, in the range betwœll $300 and $1000 per megmvatt-hour, the ELNS starts to decrease 
sharply a.s, at the same time, the correspondillg expected social cost of load shedding begins 
to represent a more significant portion of the total expected social cost in comparison to 
those of reserve scheduling and deploymellt. 
In cases when isola.ted load pockets are created during post-contingency states, rai8ing 
the VOLL in those load pockets is not sufficient to improve security in the ELNS sense. 
The only recourses available to improve the security of supply in those load pocket8 involve 
longer-term measure8 like the addition of transmission lines and local generating 8tations, 
as weIl as the implementation of more elaborate and aggres8ive demand-8ide management 
programs. 
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Table 2.8 Pre-cont.ingency generation, reserves and ELNS when exducling 
llon-spinning reserve----System A 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
glt (MW) 0.0 30.Cl 50.0 10.0 
'up 
rit (MW) 0.0 50.0 10.0 30.0 
r dn 1t (MW) 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 
g2t (MW) 0.0 O.Cl 1Cl.0 0.0 
'Up 
r 2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 45.0 0.0 
r dn 2t (l\1W) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
g3t (MW) 30.0 50.0 50.0 30.0 
'Up 
r 3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
r dn :3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 Cl.O 
d3t (MW) 3Cl.0 80.Cl 110.0 40.0 
'UJi r 3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
r dn :3t (MW) Cl.O 0.0 O.Cl 0.0 
13t (kWh) 117.7 116.8 ~32.1 77.7 
(a) 
25 
0.5 
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Fig. 2.2 EfIect of the magnitude of the value of losl; load at bus :3: (a) on 
the ELNS; (b) on the total expected social cost 
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Rarn'{Ying lirnits 
Ramping limits are of prime con cern in time-dynamic generation scheduling problems, 
especially those that jointly schedule energy and reserve services. ln the previous test 
cases, the generators were assumed not to be limited by ramping, allowing them to ramp 
from zero to their maximum capacity, gtax , and back to zero within a single time period. 
Here, let us assume that generator 1 now has a ramping limit of 29 megawatts pel' hour, 
with generators 2 and 3 still having the possibility to change their output at the rates of 
100 and 50 megawatts pel' hour respectively. Vve further let these ramping rates apply for 
both up- and down-going ramping, including startup and shutdown. 
COlllparing the schedule in Table 2.9 to the original one--with relaxed ramping limits, as 
shown in Table 2.2-, we observe major modifications in the schedule. The most noticeable 
diHerence is the requiremellt that generator 2 be brought online during hour t = :3. ln 
addition, the l'amp limitations of generator 1 restrict it from turning oH during period t = 4. 
This results into the need for generator 3 to back oH by 21 megawatts becallse generator 
1 is restricted from ramping further down. Furthermore, we notice the scheduling of 2.5 
megawatts of demand-side up-spinning reserve during the third hour. The purpose for 
scheduling this reserve, which costs $20 pel' megawatt-hour, is to counter the loss of a line. 
If wc look more closeIy, it serves the extra purpose of avoiding the deployment of reserve 
from generator 2, who se deployment cost is quite high at $40 per megawatt-hour. 
Set of jJT'e-selected cont'ir~gencie8 
The membership of the pre-selected set of contingencies can potentially have important 
impacts on the optimal market-clearing outcome. For example, the addition a new con-
tingency to an already existing set deCI'eases the probability that no contingency OCCLUS, 
while at the same time it increases the probability that at least one contingency occnrs. 
Thus, this leads the pre-contingency expected social cost tel'm, propol'tional to p(O), to as-
sume less importance in the market-clearing objective function (2.11). On the other hand, 
the reserve deployment term ends np carrying more weight, as the objective function then 
accounts for the extra expected cost associated with the probable occurrence of the new 
contingency. AIso, the new contingency may require additional involuntary load shedding 
if its corresponding expeeted cost increment is less than the expected costs of scheduling 
more reserve plus those associated with its deployment. VVe remal'k, however, that by 
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Table 2.9 Pre-contingency generation, reserves and ELNS under ramp 
limits---System A 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
glt (MvV) 10.0 30.0 50.0 21.0 
T UP 1t (MW) 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 
1'dn lt (MW) 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 
-up TIt (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
f:dn 
11 (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
g2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 
'Uf' 
1'21: (MW) 0.0 0.0 47.5 0.0 
r dn 2t (I\1W) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-1Lp 
'l'2t (MW) 10.0 41.0 0.0 21.0 
-dn 
l' 2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
gat (MW) 20.0 50.0 50.0 19.0 
1LZJ T at (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
'l'dn 
at (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-up 
'l':3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 (l.O 
f~n 
.lt; (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 LlO 
clat (MW) 30.0 80.0 110.0 40.0 
.1LP 
r :3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 
T dn at (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
l:3t (kWh) 39.2 0.0 45.2 0.0 
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addillg one more contingency to an existing pre-selected set, one cannot make VlOrse the 
value of the true ELNS that considers aH possible contingency scenarios. 
As an illustration of the above assertions, consider adding aH double generator mItages 
(assumed to occur independently and simultaneously) to the original set of pre-selected 
contingencies (comprising all single generator and li ne failures). In this case, the optimal 
pre-contingency generation and reserve schedule found by stochastic market-clearing is 
identical to the one already obtained with the original set of contingencies reported in 
Table 2.2. What is striking here is that even though there are several more contingency 
scenarios, no extra reserve services were scheduled. However, as a result of that, here an the 
hourly levels of ELNS have gone up as shown in Table 2.10 (for a total of 128.4 kilü\\Tatt-
ho ms representing again about 0.05% of the total scheduled energy consumption over the 
entire horizon). 
The sInall increases in ELNS associated with the extra contingencies did not justify 
scheduling and deploying any more reserves. This shows that, when one uses stochastic 
market-clearing, new contingencies may Ilot be fully covered in the deterministic sense (in-
deed here, market-clearing based on a deterministic security criterion is infeasible). \iVhen 
considering extra contingencies un der stochastic market-clearing, additional reserve services 
are scheduled only if their corresponding expected costs of scheduling and, particularly, of 
deployment are less than those of load shedding. 
Finally, Table 2.11 compares the expected social cost breakdown with the extra contin-
gencies to the co st breakdown corresponding to the schedule fmlIld with the origina.l set of 
contingencies. As conjectured ab ove , it demonstra.tes that the proportions of the expected 
social cost components have shifted from the pre-contingency toward the post-contingency 
control actions. 
Table 2.10 ELNS un der an alternate set of contingencics-System A 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
Alternate set of contingencies 
lat (kWh) 118.2 1..5 7.4 1.3 
Original set of contingencies 
l3t (kWh) 117.7 0.0 4.4 0.0 
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Table 2.11 Breakdown of expected social costs under an alternate set of 
contingencies-System A 
Total 
Pre- Reserve Loss-of-load 
contingency deployrnent 
Alternate set of contingencies 
Cost ($) 6913.54 6546.27 2:38.92 128.:3G 
% total cost 100.00 94.69 3.46 1.86 
Original set of contingencies 
Cost ($) 7228.74 6868.15 238.51 122.07 
% total cost 100.00 95.01 3.30 1.69 
2.5.2 IEEE RTS study 
In this section, electricity market-clearing with stochastic security is tested over a 24-hour 
scheduling horizon on the IEEE RTS [67] (System B), described in Appendix E.2. 
Here, the set of credible contingencies is made up of an the single failures of generators 
having a capacity greater than or equal to 197 megawatts: the three U197 units located 
at bus 13, the U350 unit located at bus 23 and the two U400 units located at buses 18 
and 21 l'espectively. This limited pre-selected set is justified becttuse it contains sorne 
of the contingellcies having the most severe impact on the system-wide expected load not 
served [52]. Like in the previous small-scale case study, here we assume that the involuntary 
interruption duration parameter ~ is one hour-long. 
Computational complexity 
As for the small-scale study reported in Section 2.5.1, this example was solved using the 
MILP solver CPLEX (version 9.0.2) l'unning under GAMS. Given a pre-specified solution 
tolerance gap of 1 %, the CPU solution time was 40 minutes and 41 seconds on Ampère. See 
Appenclix F for descriptions and relevant references about GAMS, CPLEX and Ampère. 
The dimensions of the problem being studied are rernarkable: a total of 1018033 
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variables-576 of which are binaryC---and 1 754981 constraints. Table 2.12 reports on the 
breakdown of the main contributors to the formulation's variable and constraint connts. 
We should point out that the numbers found in Table 2.12 are those calculated before 
the pre-processing engine of CPLEX is ruu. We recall that the role of the solver's pre-
processing engine is to eliminate redundant constraints (rows) and optimization variables 
(columns) \vith the ultimate goal of reducing the computing hardware's core memory al-
location requirements and the CPU time. In fact, after pre-processing, the array size of 
the market-clearing problem is reduced to the more manageable size of 383276 rows and 
297079 columns. Some instances of redundant variables include the fixed voltage angle of 
the reference bus or the pre-contingency load shedding variables set equal to zero in (2.16). 
Exarnples of redunclant cOllstraints include ramping limitations that apply to generators 
forced to remain off because of a minimum down-Urne restriction. 
Table 2.12 Breakdown of the dominant post-contingency variables and 
constrairlts--Systern B 
Variable 
Voltage angles 
Load shedding 
N et power output 
Power blocks 
Constraint 
Power balance 
Surn over the power blocks 
Power flow lirnits 
Upper bounds on power blocks 
COUllt 
43200 
43200 
340224 
428544 
Count 
43200 
107136 
27:3 600 
428544 
From Table 2.12, it is obvious that, in spite of the limited size of the IEEE RTS, the 
dimensions of the corresponding stochastic market-clearing problem are important. VVe 
note, however, that some reductions can be made to palliate the associated dimensional 
explosion. One such mitigation measure would use a reduced zonal description of the grid. 
4The number of binaIT variables refieets the faet that eight of the generators (six U50 and two U4(0) 
were assumed to be must-run, i.e. '(Lit = 1 for t = 1, ... , T. l\1oreover, as shown in Appelldix B, the 
unit commitrnent formulation we used did not require any extra binary variables to model the startup 
and shutdown of generating units. Thus, sinee the problem spreads over a 24-hour horizon and sehedules 
32 - 8 = 24 generating units, then the problem formulation contains a total of 576 binary variables. 
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Likewise, decreasing the number of pre-selected contingencies can reduce the dimensions 
of the problem, undür tlw assllmption that il; is always better to consider a few significant 
contingencies than none at aIl. Furthermore, as mentioned before in Section 2.4.2, scenario 
reduction techniques [105,121-123] are certainly promising, as weU as is the large family of 
decomposition techniques [27,31,82,85,112,115--120]. Lastly, one cannot negleet the con-
stant improvements in the cost and performance of computing machinery and mixed-integer 
optimization codes [124]. These advances a110wed the development ofthe CUITent large ISOs 
in the United States of America and Canada (P.1M, New York ISO, ISO New England and 
Ontario being the prime examples )-sornething, of course, that was Ilot conceivable even 
twenty years ago. 
Results and analysis 
As it was done before with System A, Table 2.13 compares the breakdown of the expected 
social cost of the optimal stochastic schedule to that of the deterrninistic schedule for 
which involuntary load shedding is not permitted. As before, the expected cost of the 
cleterministic scheclule is computed using (2.22). By inspection of Table 2.13, we note 
that for the stochastic schedule the "Pre-contingency" and "Reserve deployment" expected 
costs, particularly the latter, are lower than the corresponding expected costs under the 
deterministic market-clearing. These gains, however, are reduced by $161, corresponding to 
the expected cost of involuntary load shedding. Nevertheless, when cornbining a11 three cost 
cornponents, we deterrnine that the stochastic solution provides a net expected economic 
improvement, or value of the stochastic solution (VSS), of $4301 (representing about 1% 
of the expected social cost under deterministic market-clearing). This example shows very 
weU the economic advantage brought about by the co-optimization of post-contingeucy 
actions, since here the expected savings represent a good 7% ($4304 - $161 = $41-'13) of 
the expected reserve deployment costs under the deterministie schedule ($56602). 
In addition, we point out that the only instances of involuntary load shedding in the 
stochastic schedule are applied at buses 8 and 20 (in the expected amoullt of 40.4 kilowatt-
hours at each bus) during hour 1, an off-peak hour during which the value of 10st 10ad is 
the 1mvest ($2000 pel' megawatt-hour versus $:3000 pel' megawatt-hour cluring the on-peak 
11ours). 
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Table 2.13 Comparison of expected social costs under deterministic and 
stochastie marlcet-clearing-System B 
Pre- Reserve 
Loss-of-load 
contingency deployment 
Deterministic ($) 379540 56602 0 
Stochastic ($) 379382 52298 161 
Difference ($) 158 4304 -161 
Priees of energy and security 
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Fig. 2.3 (a) illustrates how the marginal priees of energy and seeurity, for all buses exeept 
bus 7, vary with time, while Fig. 2.:3 (b) demollstrates the priee evolution at bus 7. We 
observe a major priee spike happening during hour 9 as seeurity priees climb up to $43.46 
pel' megawatt-hour and energy priees to $51.29 pel' megawatt-hour at all buses exeept at 
bus 7, where the priees remain low at $5.84 pel' megawatt-hour for seeurity and $13.67 pel' 
megawatt-hour for energy. The conjunction of a number of factors explains this priee spike. 
First, during hour 9, the three U1GO generators located at bus 7 (see Fig. E.2) have plent..y 
of inexpensive up-spinning reserve available. Nevertheless, this reserve capaeity cannot be 
fully deployed because of the flow limit of 175 megawatts on t.he transmission line tying t.his 
bus to the l'est of the power system. Second, also during that hour, two out of the three 
incrementally eheap U197 generators (alllocated at bus 13) have t.o he maintained ofRine 
beeause of minimum down-time eonstraints. T'he end result is that with so little reserve 
capacity available, the system operator has to (i) bring online the four very expensive U20 
generators; and, (ii) schedule 1.71 megawat.ts of expensive demand-side up-spinning reserve 
at bus 1:3. 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we proposed and formulated an electrieity market-clearing seheme with 
multi-period unit commit ment that integrates a stochastic security criterion. The stochastic 
security criterion is based on the probabilities of occurrence of pre-selected sets of generator 
and Hne mItages with lcnown historical failure rates as well as for random demalld distur-
banees. Unlike in the deterministie seeurity-constrained market-clearing problern with unit 
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commitment, also deseribed in this ehapter, here the required levels of reserve services are 
determined by economieally penalizing the operation of the market by the expected social 
cost associated with post-contingency involuntary load shed ding events. 
This formulation is a stochastie programming problem that contains several signifi-
cant generalizations over earlier work in the field of security-constrained market-clearing, 
namely: (i) the consideration of time-dynamic generation constraints like minimum up- and 
down-time as well as ramping limits; (ii) a dc network mode! to account for pre- and post-
contingency transmission li ne fiow limits; (iii) the explicit consideration of involuntary load 
shed ding as well as voluntary consllmption adjustments in the form of demand-side reserve; 
(iv) the addition of the time dimension to contingencies as they may OCClU randomly within 
the scheduling horizon; (v) a stochastie market-clearing objective function that measures 
the expected pre-contingency social co st added to the expected post-contingency social 
cost associated with the corrective rescheduling and involuntary load shedding actions; 
and, (vi) a security index defined by the expected load not served clue to ranclom line and 
generator outages calculated without the Ileed to define any extra binary variables on top 
of the classic generator on/off binary variables. 
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The underlying philosophy here acknowledges the complex engineering and eeonomi-
cal couplings that render the operation of large-scale power systems a challenging task. 
In addition, the proposed market-clearing seheme reeognizes that the management of ran-
clomness in power system operation constitutes one of the core elements of this complicated 
task. Therefore, power system operation planning based on a stochastic seeurity criterion 
is aclvalltageous because it provides system operators with gauges about the likelihood 
and expected consequences of contingencies as well as response plans for post-colltingency 
actions and their corresponding expeeted costs. The results of the t\\TO case stuclies have 
illustrated these advantages. 
In the first case study, we investigated how a number of factors impact on the generation 
and reserves sehedules found via market-clearing with stoehastie security. These factors 
inclnded: (i) transmission line fiow limits; (ii) the exclusion of non-spinning reserve; (iii) the 
clemancl-sicle value of involuntary load shedding; (iv) generator rampillg limits; and, (v) the 
composition of the pre-selectecl set of contingencies. To demonstrate the superiority of 
market-clearing with stochastic security over its determillistic counterpart, we compared 
their respective scheduling results and expected costs. One important finding is that the 
expected social costs of preventive and corrective security control actions are lower in the 
stochastic case even though these efficiency gains are slightly eroded by the expected costs 
of involuntary load shed ding actions. 
Likewise, we saw that the balancing act between reliability and social co st minimization 
depends strongly on the consumers' valuation of illvoluntary load interruptions. Another 
worthy observation is that the expected prices of energy and of security derived from the 
stochastic scheclule are lower than those derived from the cleterministic schedules, under 
which load sheclding is not permitted. This is fundamental in the sense that as there is a 
risk of involuntary load shedding, the consumers get to pay less for security and energy. 
In the second case study, we ran a 24-hour scheduling of the IEEE Hdiability Test 
System based on market-clearing with stochastic security. This study illustrated that, in 
large-scale market-clearing problem instances, the system operator shoulcl try to restrict 
the Humber of pre-selected contingencies and their associated time of occurrence within the 
scheduling horizon. An inspection of the solution results provided by the commereial mixed-
integer linear solver used to resolve the market-clearing problems showed that often many of 
the constraints associated with particular contillgeneies remain inactive. This is a property 
that warrants further investigation of so-called umbrella contingencies, which we attempt 
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later in Chapter 5. In addition, solution techniques based on decornposition rnethods should 
be prornising strategies because they do not require that the entire problern array be located 
in core rnernory, and they allow for the exploitation subproblern parallelism. Lastly, we 
suggested that scenario reduction techniques for stochastic optimization problerns, applied 
specifically to electricity market-clearing with stochastic security, be investigated. 
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Chapter 3 
Pricing of Energy and Security U nder 
Market-Clearing With Stochastic 
Security 
3.1 Introduction 
The real priee of every thing, what every 
thing l'eally costs to the man who wants 
to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of 
acquiring it. What every thing is really 
worth to the man who has acquired it, and 
who wants to dispose of it or exchange it 
for something else, is the toil and trouble 
which it can save to himself, and which it 
can impose upon other people. 
Wealth of Nations 
Adam Smith, 1723-17!JO 
The design of a market-based eleetricity schecluling seheme is never complete without the 
specification of a set of pricing rules. ()ver the last decacle, as the electricity industry 
restructured, a number of electricity pricing schemes have been proposed and implemented 
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among which we distinguish two fundamental philosophies: one based on margüwl pTù;'ing 
and the other based on pay-as-bid pricing. 
3.1.1 Marginal pricing 
The founclations of marginal pricing are strong in the field of theoretical microecollomics 
[125]. For a given market, under somewhat restrictive assumptions of convexity of the 
feasible production sets of suppliers and of concavity of the utility functions of consumers, 
it can be shown that there exists a single equilibrium priee, equal to the marginal cost of 
production or, equally, the marginal consumer utility, achieved wh en supply and demand 
meet. It is indeed easy to show that, under these market equilibrium conditions, the 
Marshallian aggregate surplus U e. social welfare) is maximized, while the market allocation 
associated with the single uniform marginal priee is Pareto optimal. This result is often 
called the Firsl Fundamenlal Theorem of We~fare Economics [125]. 
More fundamentally yet, the coneept of marginal pricing parallels the notion of duality 
in constrained optimizatioll theory [82,126J. For a given constrained optimization prob-
lem, one can define, associated with each constraint, a so-called dual variable or Lagrange 
multiplier. At the optimum of the mathematical programming problem, the values of the 
associated dual variables represent the marginal change in the value of the objective func-
tion brought about by small perturbations of their corresponding right-hand sicles. ln the 
case of an electricity market-clearing problem, the Lagrange multiplier associated with a 
bus power balanee constraint is equal to the marginal change in the optimum social cost 
due to a corresponding marginal change in the power balanee relation at that bus. In other 
words, this Lagrange multiplier represents the marginal value of balancing power at that 
bus, which, under marginal pricing, becomes the priee of electricity [3]. 
Under marginal pricing of electricity, eadi generator at a given bus earns a revenue 
equa.l to its generation level times the prevailing bus margina.l priee, while consumers pay 
an amount equal to their consumption times the priee of electricity at that bus. Thus, 
generators have a profit margin from the difference between the bus priee and their mar-
ginal cost of production, while correspondingly the loads obtain a benefit rnargin from the 
difference between their marginal utility and the bus priee. As mentioned ab ove , however, 
the existence of marginal priees t11at allow consunwl' utility and generator profit maximiza-
tion, while balancing supply and demand, is only guaranteed un der restrictive convexity 
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conditions of the production technologiesJ As shown in [127129], this condition is not 
satisfied in general for electricity generation technologies. As a result, for given marginal 
priees, generators may have profit-based ineentives to deviate from their schedule fOlllld 
by the eentralized market-clearing problem. If these deviations were to materialize, the 
security of the power system could be challenged as supply may not equal demalld any-
more. This is why remuneration by marginal pricing often has to be complemented with 
some out-of-market monetary transfers (generally operated from consumers to generators) 
known as uplifts [127-129]. This issue lies outside of the current dissertation; we refer the 
interested reader to [127-129J. 
3.1.2 Pay-as-bid pricing 
Unlike marginal pricing, the pay-as-bid pricing regime avoids the need for any kind of out-
of-market monetary transfers in the form of uplifts. Under pay-as-bid pricing, generators 
at a bus are not remunerated at a uniform rate, rather they are compensated according 
to their cost-based bids. 2 This remuneration seheme thus pre-supposes that the generator 
oHms are already marked up to assure a given level of profit, which is independent of the 
marginal value of electricity. 
One criticism of pay-as-bid pricing is that it may give perverse ineentives to generators to 
greatly overstate their generation co st oHers with the objective of reaping higher profits and 
consequently hiking the corresponding consumer payrnents. However, several authors, for 
example Ren and Galiana [130,131], showed that pay-as-bid pricing does not necessarily--
at least in theory----lead to significantly higher consumer payments. In particular, these 
authors demonstrated that as the number of generators gets large, the consumers end up 
paying as much as under marginal pricing. In addition, these authors also showed that 
pay-as-bid pricing can potentially reduce the volatility of the consumer payments. 
Notwithstanding these apparent advantages, pay-as-bid pricing has not received wide-
spread industry interest so far. To this day, the only practical implementation of pay-as-bid 
pricing has been in the United Kingdom, where, under the New Electricity Trading Agree-
ments, it is used to remunerate generators in the daily balancillg market [132]. At the time 
of writing, cllergy regulatory authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran are contemplating 
the use of pay-as-bid pricing for their developing electricity market [1331. 
IThe concavity assumption of demand-side utility functions is usually satisfied. 
2The more semantically-correct terrn here would be "offers". 
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3.1.3 Locational marginal pricing 
Nowadays in North America, a11 FERC-approved IS0s have to value electricity based 
on locational (nodal) marginal priees [3], obtained as byproducts of network-constrainecl 
market-clearing. Network-constrained market-clearing and locational marginal pricing, un-
like single-no de or zonal-basecl pricing models, recognize the complicating aspects that the 
transmission network introduces in the market-basecl trading of electricity. These compli-
cations inclucle (i) most commonly line congestion problems [9,11,13,68,134,135]; and, 
(ii) possibly transmission losses [9,11,68]. Genera11y, two main criticisms stem out of 
the explicit consideration of the transmission grid as part of the market-clearing solution 
and pricing processes. The first criticism is the obvious increase in the computational 
burden of the market-clearing and pricing procedures, while the second concerns the dubi-
ous transparency of these procedures in light of the augmented complexity. Nevertheless, 
studies have shown th1'1t the improvements in economic efficiency brought about by the 
more complex network-constrained market-clearing and locational marginal pricing can be 
quite significant, a result that contradicts the arguments in favor of the simpler market 
models [110,1361. 
3.1.4 On pricing of security 
Reeently, in response to the blackouts that affected several large grids in the vVestern 
world [15-19], good parts of the industry, government regulators and 1'esearchers have 1'e-
sbifted their attention to the security aspects of power system operation. This change in 
focus had to be made at the expense of the marketing and profit motives that bad concen-
trated attention since the beginnings ofthe industry restructuring efforts. Nevertheless, the 
current shift in attention occurs with the basic assumption that market-based operation of 
power systems is here to stay and that any proposed innovations should attempt to better 
recondle the market and the sec ure operation objectives. The proposed methods in this 
dissertation are certainly following that philosophy. 
Now that the focus of the power system operation community has shifted from netwoT-k-
constrained to secv,r'ity-constrained market-clearing, corresponding shifts must be operated 
with respect to the pridng aspects of security. The current industry practice in North 
America assigns different prices to a number of "security-enhancing" ancillary services [lU, 
23,24,26-28,30,31,35,58-60,63], which include the different reserve services described in 
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previous chapters and the supply of reactive power, for example. 
This pricing philosophy is somewhat Hawed as it fails to recognize that power system 
security is maintained through the coordinated scheduling and deployment of all these 
security-enhancing ancillary services. Therefore, one can argue in favor of valuing the 
ancillary services at the marginal pricc of sectlrity. In order to do so, it is required to define 
rigorously the concept of power system security. We adopt the definition put forward by 
Arroyo and Galiana in [64], which is elaborated further with Bouffard and Restrepo in [34]. 
Definition 3.1 (Power system security). Power system sectlrity is the ability of the system 
to balance power at every bus while satisfying a11 operationallimits associated with given 
regulation intervals (primary, secondary and tertiary)3 in the aftermath of any credible 
contingency. 
A direct consequence of this definition is that there should be no distinction between 
the means taken to enforce power system security. In fact, instead of pre-specifying sorne 
levels of reserves fo11owing sorne rule-of-thumb, it is the set of pre- and post-contingency 
power balances that determines the reqnirements for the varions ancillary services, thns 
rendering the power system operator indifferent with respect to the means used to meet the 
security objective. Rence, constraints in the market-clearing formulation requiring minimal 
amounts of the various ancillary services are no longer needed, as seen in Chapter 2; this 
means that one cannot calculate individual marginal prices for the ancillary services from 
these constraints. 
Therefore, under this proposaI, the ancillary services are to be valued at the bus mar-
ginal prices of security, for which the llecessary theoretical framework behind their compu-
tation is fmmd in [:34,64]. For quick reference, the basis of this proposaI is summarized in 
Appendix G. 
Furthermore, under security-constrained market-clearing, the corresponding nodal mar-
ginal prices of energy becOIne tightly bounel to the bus marginal prices of security. Arroyo 
and Galiana demonstrated that the priee of energy embeds that of security [64]. This fact 
makes perfect sense, as un der security-constrained market-clearing, one does not simply 
buy a mere megawatt-hour of energy, but buys a 8cC'ure megawatt-hour of energy. 
ln this chapter, we specialize the propositions and results of 164] to pricing of energy and 
:'ln this dissertation, we only concern ourselves with the tertiary reglliation interval. 'vVe refer the 
intcrested rcader to [34,3G] for the treatrncnt of the other reglliation intervals. 
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security in the context of electrieity market-clearing with stochastic security. We derive a 
numher of results outlining the couplings existing between th(~ value of lost load, involuntary 
load shedding actions and the probabilities of occurrence of contingencies. These results are 
of importance hecause they provide essential information as to why or why not involuntary 
load shedding is to be used after sorne contingencies. 'liVe discuss results for general nonlinear 
and linear market-clearing models, and we look at a simple numerical exarnple illustrating 
the theoretical results Just derived. 
3.2 Marginal Pricing Under Market-Clearing With Stochastic 
Security 
The market-clearing problem formulation with a stochastic seeurity eriterion, as the one 
developed in this dissertation, is a specifie instance of the general security-eonstrained 
market-clearing problem found in (G.1)--(G.4) of Appendix G. In what follows, vve examine 
the relationships existing between the various Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
constraints of the market-clearing problem, the presence of load shedding, the value of 
lost load as weIl as the probabilities of the contingeneies. 'YVithout loss of generality hcrc, 
vve will only refer to the concept of contingency without explicitly differentiating bctween 
contingencies in the classical sense (as in Chapter 2) and contingeneies in the sense of 
forecasting crrors (as in Chapter 4). Moreover, to simplify the exposition here, we do not 
explicitly consider the time dimension. We note, however, that the results apply integrally 
with the time dimension added. 
First, let us partition the veetor of continuous decision variables x 
x = [x(O) 1 x(l)· .. x(K) 11(1)·· .1(K)]T, (:3.1 ) 
where: (i) x(O) is the sub-vector of generation, demand and network variables associ-
ated with the pre-contingency state; (ii) x(l), ... ,x(K) are the sub-vectors of generation, 
demand and network variables associated with the operation of the system under the pre-
selected contingency scenarios; and, (iii) 1(1), ... ,1(K) are the sub-vectors of involuntary 
load shedding also associated with the operation UIlCier the contingencies. A similar parti-
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tion of the discrete variable vector is also defined 
u = [u(O) 1 u(l)'" u(K)f· (3.2) 
Here, the objective function is a linear combinat ion of the expected social costs asso-
ciated with (i) the operation in the pre-contingency state; (ii) the operation following the 
occurrence of the credible contingencies; and, (iii) the post-contingency involuntary load 
shedding. Vve point out that each of the expected social cost components depends only on 
variables associated with its corresponding state. This permits re-expressing the generic 
objective (C.1) in the decornposed form 
K 
W(u, x) = p(O)vV(u(O), x(O), 0) + LP(k)[VV(u(k), x(k), k) + vTI(k)], (3.3) 
k=l 
where p(O)Hl(u(O), x(O), 0) is the expected social cost component under the non-contingent 
state, p(k)~V(u(k), x(k), k) is the expectecl social cost of operation un der contingency sce-
nario k, and v is the vector of the values of lost load. Likewise, we recall that the power 
balance conditions of the generic problem, (C.2) and (C.3), depend ollly on the variables 
associated with their respective contingency scenarios 
H(u(O), x(O), 0, 0) = 0, 
H(u(k), x(k), l(k), k) = 0; k = 1, ... , K. 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
For notational compactness, we will use the notation H(k) - H(u(k), x(k), l(k), k) and 
TV(k) == TV(u(k), x(k), k) for k = 0, 1, ... , K, as weIl as G = G(u, x). 
3.2.1 Fundamental results 
Load shed ding and Lagrange multipliers 
Proposition 3.1 (Relations between load shedding and Lagrange multipliers). Load shed-
ding is appl'ied at b'us ri/, ajteT the occuTrence of contingency k ~f and only if the Lagmnge 
multiplier' a880ciated with the bus power balance undeT that contingency ({Lm (k)) i8 gTeateT 
than or equal to the quantity p( k )vm . 
Prooj. The optimal solution of the market-clearing (u*, x*) must satisfy the first-order 
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Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) necessary optimality condition [126] with respect to aIl the 
continuous variable sub-vectors. In order to perform that assessment, consider the La-
grangian function of the rnathematical program (G.l)--(G.4), with its objective given by 
(3.3), evaluated for the optimal value of tbe discrete variables, u*: 
J{ 
k=l 
K 
- JLT(O)H(O) - LJLT(k)H(k) -lTTG, (:3.6) 
k=l 
where JL = [JL(O) JL(I) ... JL(K)]'T'. :F'or the load shedding variables l(k) associated with the 
h; = 1, ... , K contingencies, the corresponding first-order KKT conditions are 
OL (OH(k))T ( oG )T 8l(k) = p(k)v - 8l(k) JL(k) - 8l(k) lT = O. ( ~).7) 
In the post-contingency power balance relations (3.5), the load shedding sub-vectOl's appear 
linearly [as seen in (2.8)]. Thus, for each of the contingencies h; = 1, ... , K, we cau write 
H(k) = H'(k) + l(k) = 0, (3.8) 
where we assume tha.t H'(k) does not depend on any of the load shedding variables. This 
implies that for k = 1, ... , K 
oH(k) 
8l(k) =1, (3.9) 
where 1 is an Ai x NI identity matrix. Moreover, we recall from (2.9) that the only bounds 
on the load shedding variables are (assuming t11at there are no upper bounds imposed on 
the ELNS) 
O:::;l(k):::;d(k); k=I, ... ,K. (3.10) 
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As a result, we have for k = 1, ... ,K 
8G 
8l(k) 
1 for the lower bound on l(k), 
-1 for the upper bound on l(k), 
o otherwise. 
Thus, with the aid of (3.9) and (3.11), we can rewrite (3.7) as 
76 
(3.11) 
(:3.12) 
where (J'lb(k) and (J'l1b(k) correspond respectively to the Lagrange multiplier vectors associ-
ated with the lower bounds and the upper bounds on l(k). 
In addition to the first-order KKT condition (3.7), the optimal solution to the market-
clearing problem and the Lagrange multipliers associated with the inequality constraints 
must satisfy the complementary slackness condition 
(3.1:3) 
and the non-negativity of the multipliers associated with the inequality constraints 
0' 2: O. (3.14) 
N ow, we consider the following two cases: 
1. There is load shed at sorne bus rn due to contingency k, that is IrrJk) > O. Cornple-
mentary slackness (3.13) and the sign restriction (3.14) therefo1'e 1'equire that 
o-~(k) = 0, 
o-;~1b(k) 2: O. 
Thus, under these conditions, (3.12) becomes 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
In other words, when the expected marginal social co st at bus 'ln associated with 
3 Pricing Under Market-Clearing With Stochastic 77 
operation un der contingency k (jLm (k)) is greater than or equal to the expected 
marginal social cost obtained through the use of load shed ding (p( k )vm ), then load 
shedding is applied at that bus in response to that contingency. 
2. On the other hand, if there is no load shed at bus m following contingency k, that 
is lm(k) = 0, we have 
(5lb (k) > 0 Tn -, 
(5~b(k) = O. 
Then, (3.12) becomes 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
Renee, if the expected marginal social cost at bus m associated with operation 
under contil1gency k ({Lm (k )) is less than or equal to the expected marginal social 
cost obtained if load shedding were applied (p(k)vm ), then this contingency has to 
be fully covered by scheduling and deploying the appropriate reserve services. 
o 
The above result is fundamental in the sense that it provides a marginal pricing in-
terpretatioll of why iTlvoluntary Joad shedding decisions are made. In addition, since the 
Lagrange multipliers p,(k) are what make up the priees of energy and security (see Appen-
dix G), the quantities p(k)vm play a significant l'ole in determining how these priees are set. 
Said sim ply, load shedding should be applied at a bus for a given contingency if and only if 
the marginal expected social cost increment associated with applying load shedding is less 
than or equal to the marginal expectecl co st gain obtained through the full scheduling and 
cleployment of reserves. 
Clearly, if a contingency is very likely, then its impact on the cxpectcd social cost may be 
more important than unlikely ones thus making the likelihood that this contingency is fully 
covered with appropriate reserves even more plausible. Likewise, if the value of lost load 
at a particular bus is higher than at others, then the threshold for which the Incrementai 
social cost gain obtained from using load shed ding has to be correspondingly higher, making 
load shedding a less likely response to the spectrum of credible contil1gencies. It is worth 
noting here that this result is in line with the conclusions of the earlier works of Siddiqi 
and Baughman on pricing for differentiated reliability purposes [86,87]. 
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Expected marginal social costs 
Proposition 3.2 (Expected marginal social costs un der post-contingency operation). The 
el;pected Tnœrginal social cast" of security and eneT'9Y cOT'responding to OpcTutùm undeT con-
tingcncy k are given rcspcctively by 
(k)8VV(k) = (1 _ 81(k))'1' (k) p 8S 8S J-L , (3.21) 
and 
, (k)mV(k) = (1 _ 81(k))'1' (k) 
p" 8E 8E J-L, . (3.22) 
Pro of. Für cOl1tingency k, the first-order KKT optimality condition with respect to the 
variable sllb-vector associated with operation under that contingency, that is x( k), is 
DvV(k) (8H(k))T ( DG )'1' , 
p(k) 8x(k) - 8x(k) J-L(k) - 8x(k) (j' = O. (3.23) 
Next, following the reasoning of [64], we perturb the right hand si de of the power balance 
relations under contingency k by the infinitesimal parameter vectol'S dE + dS. Here the 
parametür vector dE corresponds to an incl'emental perturbation of both the pre- and the 
post-contingency power balance equalities, while the parameter vector dS is a supplement al 
perturbation applied to the post-contingency power balance constraints only. 
Sueh infinitesimal perturbations, UIHier smoothness assumptions of the functions VV (k), 
H(k) and G, generate infinitesimal perturbations of the continuous optimization variables, 
dx( k) and dl( k). Since under these perturbations the feasibility of the post-contingency 
power balance relations must be maintained, we therefore find 
dE + dS = (8H(k))T dx(k) + (8H(k))T dl(k) 
8x(k) 81(k) 
( 8H'(k)) T = dx(k) + Idl(k) 8x(k) 
= dH'(k) + dl(k), (3.24) 
where we made use of the results of (3.8) and (3.9). With the help of (3.23) and (3.24), 
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the quantity p( k )d~V (k) is re-expressed 
T 8H'(k) l' 8G p(k)d~V(k) = fL' (k) , dx(k) + (j' -- dx(k) 8x(k) 8x(k) 
= fLT(k)dH'(k) + (j'l'dG 
= fLT(k)(dE + dS - dl(k)), (3.25) 
where we macle use of the complementary slackness condition to find that (j'l'dG = O. 
Rearranging (3.25), we obtain 
p(k) 8V~~k) = (1 _ 81~)) l' fL(k), 
, (k)8W(k) = (1 _ 8l(k))T (k) 
p, 8E 8E fL . 
(3.26) 
(3.27) 
D 
In (3.26), the elements of the vector p(k)8ToV(k)j8S are interpreted as the sensitivi-
ties of the expected social cost of operation under contingency k to perturbations in the 
post-contingency power balance relations only. The elements of the matrix 8l( k) j 8S cor-
respond to the sensitivities of the load shedding variables to these perturbations in the 
post-contingency power balance relations. Likewise, in (3.27), the vector p(k)8T/V(k)j8E 
represents the sensitivity of the post-contingency social cost following contingency k due 
to perturbations of the pre- and post-contingency power balance, while 8l( k) j 8E is the 
matrix of load shed ding sensitivities to simultaneous perturbations in the pre- and post-
contingency power balance. 
The most important feature of these relationships, however, is the demonstration of the 
direct dependance of the post-contingency expected marginal social co st on the sensitivities 
of the load sheclcling variables. For instance, it is reaclily seen that the marginal social cost 
under contingency k at bus rn clue to a perturbation of the post-contingency power balance 
at that bus is given by 
8vV(k) III 8ln (k) p(k) 8S = IIm(k) - I>Ln(k) 8S . 
m, '11=1 rn 
(3.28) 
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Shuffiing terms, assuming that 1 - fJl,n~(k)jfJS.m =1- 0, we obtain 
(3.29) 
That is, the dual variable associated with the power balance constraillt bus at m followillg 
cOlltingency k (P'm (k)) is equal to the local expected social cost sensitivity p( k )fJW (k) j fJSrn 
adjusted by the marginal effects of load shedding happening locally and at remote buses. 
In the special case when the perturbation dSm does not change any of the load shed ding 
variables----that is fJln(k)jfJSm = 0 for aIl n = 1, ... , N[--, then the marginal expected 
social co st boils down to its more "traditional" interpretation 
fJvV(k) 
l"rn( k) = p(k) fJS
m
. ' (3.30) 
which is simply the marginal expected social cost at bus nl. associated with the scheduling 
and deployment of reserves corresponding to contingency k. 
'vVe also note here that the above comments apply equally to the marginal expected 
social costs derived from perturbations (dE) of both the pre- and the post-contingency 
power balance relations. In faet, the results in (3.29) and (3.30) could have been derived 
equally using the expression for the marginal expected social eost expression assoeiated 
with the perturbations of the both the pre- and post-eontingency power balance equalities 
(3.27). 
Next, we derive a result similar to that of Proposition 3.2 where, this time, we determine 
the expected marginal social cost of operation und el' the pre-contingency state. 
Proposition 3.3 (Expected marginal social eost undel' pre-contingellcy operation). The 
e:cpected TnaTginal 8oc'ial co"t cOTTesponding to opemtion undcT the pTc-contingency state is 
given by 
fJTV(O) 
M(O) = p(O) 3 . 
cE 
(3.31) 
P1'Oof. For the pre-contingency state, the first-order KKT optimality condition with respect 
to the variable sub-vector x(O) is 
8VV(0) (8H(O)) T ( 8G ) T 
p(O) 8x(O) - 8x(O) M(O) - 8x(O) (J' = o. (3.32) 
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vVe now perturb the right hand side of the power balance relations in the pre-contingency 
state by the infrnitesimal parameter vector dE. Sueh infrnitesimal perturbation, under 
smoothness assumptions, generate infinitesimal perturbations of the variables x(O) ollly, 
while the feasibility of the power balance relations must be maintained un der such pertur-
bation; therefore, we find that 
dE = (JH(O)) T dx(O) 
Jx(O) 
= dH(O). 
vVe can therefore rewrite p(O)dlV(O) as 
, ) l'() _ T· JH(O) () T JG () p(O dH 0 - J.L (0) Jx(O) dx 0 + (j' Jx(O) dx 0 
= J.LT(O)dH(O) + (j'TdG 
= J.LT(O)dE, (3.34) 
where we have made use again of the complementarity condition to find that (j'TdG = O. 
Rearranging (3.34), we obtain (3.31). 0 
It is interesting to note the complete decoupling of the pre- and post-contingency states 
in the computation of the incremental expected social costs under either the pre-contingency 
or the post-contingency states. 
Combining the results of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 and the pricing principles enounced 
in Appendix G, wc state the following conclusion as a corollary. 
Corollary 3.1 (Priees of energy and security). UndeT maTginal pTicing of elecb"icity {S, 
125j, and following the pTinciples of (64j fo'und in Appendix G, the vectoTs of pTices of 
eneryy, ÀE, and sec'uTity, À 8 , aTe Tespecti'uely given by 
À E = JvV = ()JvV(O) ~ (k) [(1 _ Jl(k))T]-l aW(k) 
JE p 0 JE + L.t P JE aE ' 
k=l 
(3.35) 
and 
À 8 = aHI = ~, (/') [(1 _ Jl(k)) T]-l avV(k) 
as L.t P " as as ' 
k=l 
(3.36) 
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if the matr'lx inverses of (1 - ()~~)) T and (1 - ()1~)) T exist for all k = 1, ... , K. 
The main feature of Corollary 3.1 is its explicit depiction of the dependance of both 
of the prices on the sensitivities of the load shedding variables. It is readily seen that 
if the load shedding sensitivity matrices are zero matrices (meaning that no more load 
shedding would be applied for the given schedule), then both price vectors correspond to 
their traditional interpretation of iIlcremental expected social costs. Otherwise, when the 
load shed ding sensitivity matrices are nonzero (meaning that sorne perturbations of the 
power balance relation would lead to changes in the optimalload shedding variables), then 
the incremental expected social cost components, p(k)éHV(k)j3E and p(k)alV(k)j3S, are 
adjusted by the marginal impacts of involuntary load shedding. 
Special case: linear formulation 
In cases vvhere the formulation of the market-clearing with stochastic security is linear--as 
in aIl parts of this dissertation-, the results of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 as well as those 
of Corollary 3.1 ean be adapted to the specifie features of sueh a formulation. Before 
deriving these adaptations, we need to consider the following two lemmas. We recall here 
that discrete variables are assumed fixed at their optimal values as found by the MILP 
sol ver. Thus, the following results are derived from the final linear programs solved with 
the discrete variables fixed at u*. 
Lemma 3.1 (Sensitivity of optimization variables to perturbations in the right-hand side 
eonstraint vector of a linear program). Consider the linear progmm (LP) 
s'ub)ect to 
mineT x 
x~O 
Ax=b, 
where any ineq'Ualdies have bœn tmnsformed into eq1.wlities with the addit'ion of extm slack 
variables embedded in the va-r'iable vector x. We ass'Ume that all red'Undant constmints have 
bœn removed s'Uch that the matT'lX A has f'Ull row mnk. In addition, let 11,S aS811,me that this 
problem has a sol11,tion x* whose cost, cTx*, is bo'wnded. 
The sensdivdy matr'i:r; of the optimal 80l'ution x* to smalt en01.lgh pertm'bations db of 
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the right-Jw,nd side vector b is gÙJen by 
[ 
,~ * 1 oXB 
ax* = ab 
ab ax';y 
ab 
(3.37) 
where B, xÈ and x:N are respedively the LP optimal bas'is matrix and the optimal1Jectors 
of basic and non-basic var'jables. 
Proof. The optimal solution to the LP problem is found from the solution of the linear 
system of equations BXB = b. Since this linear system has full row and column rank, it is 
thus invertible such that 
(3.38) 
and x'Fv = o. 
If a small enough perturbation of the right-hand side vector db is applied to this LP----
such that the basis matrix and the set of basic variables remain identical-----, from (3.38) we 
see that the basic variables undergo a change dXB = B-1db while the non-basic variables 
stay at their optimal value of zero. Dividing both sides by db, we obtain (3.37). D 
Lemma 3.2 (Post-contingency actions' merit-order un der LP market-clearing with sto-
chastic security). F'oT an LP fO'f'mv'zatù)'f), of the eledT'icity ma:rket-clea:ring with stochastic 
sec'urity, involuntary load shedding at bm m following contingency k is the last recourse to 
be used by the ,grid operator to restore the poweT balance. 
Proof. Let us assume that there are available Xl (k), X2(k), ... , xN(k) bounded reserve re-
sources (0 :::; 1:j(k) :::; ;Y.;j(k) for an j = 1, ... , N) available to the grid operator to respond to 
contingency k at bus Tn; these may include generator- and demand-side resources available 
locally and/or remotely.4 These reserve services have marginal social costs which, without 
loss of generality, satisfy (31(k) < ,(J2(k) < ... < f3N (k). In addition, the grid operator can 
use involuntary load shedding (bounded between 0 :::; lm(k) :::; dm) at the rate givell by the 
-value of 10st load Vrn' 
Let us assume now the following with respect to the marginal social costs of load 
shed ding and reserves: f31(k) < ... < (3J(k) < V rn < (J(J+1)(k) < ... < (3N(k). We recognize 
4 As seen in Chapter 2 and Appendices Band C, reserve scheduling and deploymellt actions are bounded 
by line flow, ramping, capacity and reserve offer lirnits. 
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here that for any given bus m the worst case effect of a contingency is the loss of aIl its 
pre-contingency power input equal to dm. Given that the reserve resources are scheduled 
economically and that the first j = 1; ... , .I cheaper reSOUl'ces were insufficient to coyer 
the power deficit, that is Lj~J xj(k) < dm, illvoluntary load shedding is the last necessary 
recourse to close the remaining gap in the power balance since lm (k) is bounded above by 
dm· 
Therefore, in this situation we would have xj(k) = xj(k) for j = 1, ... , J, xj(k) = 0 for 
j = .I + 1, ... , N and lm(k) = dm - L<J xj(k). We should note that, as a second conse-J_ 
quence in this case, the load shedding variable lm (k) is a basic variable of the underlying 
LP. 
Otherwise, if L.i~.J xj(k) ~ dm then no involuntary load shedding needs to be applied 
al. bus m following contingency k. Lastly, in such cases, the load shedding variable lm (k) 
is a non-basic variable of the LP and therefore is equal to zero. o 
The above two lem mas lead to the following coro11ary. 
Corollary 3.2 (Complementarity and sensitivity of reserve deployment and load shed ding 
underLP market-clearing with stochastic security). Assmning that the electricity market-
clear'ing has a solution 'Which entails that the social cost o~jective is bonnded, at bus rrî 
'u,nder contingency k, we have the following reinterpretation of (3.24), where we find thai 
post-coni'ingency T'eseT've deployment and load shedding constittde complementary actions 
'if lm(k) > 0 and n = '(rI, 
other'Wise. 
(3.39) 
As a resnlt., the sensitivitù~s of load shedd-ing at bu,.') 'In follo'Wing contingency k w'ith 
respect to pre- and post-contingency power balance distnrbances dE and dS Q,1'e given by 
if lm(k) > 0 and n = ln, (3.40) 
otheT'wise. 
PTOOf. As a consequence of Lemma 3.2, we have that whenever load shedding is applied 
at bus 'In follmving contingency k, any small enough perturbation of the power balance at 
that bus will have to be covered by a corresponding change in load sheddillg there, dlm (k ). 
Otherwise, in the case oflocal perturbations (with n = m), other more economical recourses 
are still available, meaning that. the perturbation will have to be covered by corresponding 
increments in reserve deployment actions, dH:n (k). In the case wh en the perturbations are 
applied at buses TI, i rn, the result is established by inspection of the second line of (3.24) 
where it is seen that the local scnsitivity of load shedding to remote perturbations is nil 
(the vector increment of load shedding is multiplied by the identity matrix). 
The sensitivity result in (3.40) fo11ows from the above explanation and from Lemma ~).1 
as 
if lm(k) > 0, (3.41) 
otherwise, 
where Bl-I(I') is the row of the sensitivity matrix B-I corresponding to the basic variable 
1n rI; 
lrn(k). From (3.:39), it is seen that the elements of the row vector Bî~\kl are aH zero except 
for the m th clement whose value has to be equal to 1. 0 
We now make use of the above results to restate Proposition 3.2 for the LP formulation 
of the electricity market-clearing problem. 
Theorem 3.1 (Marginal expected social co st at bus m un der contingency k). The La-
grange rrmltiplier associated with the post-contingency poweT balance at b'/J,s m, follo'UJ'ing 
contingency k, Pm (k;)" assumes the following values depending on the optimal value of the 
invol'IJ,ntary load shedding vaTiable lm (k) 
ILm(k) = p(k)'um 
2p(k)vm 
if 0 < l~Jk) < dm, 
otheTwise, when l.~" (k) = dm. 
(3.42) 
PTOol Recalling the results of Proposition 3.2, summarized in (3.26) and (3.27), and that 
of the load shed ding sensitivity results of Corollary 3.2, when there is no load shedding 
applied at bus m under contingency k, we obtain the first case shown in (3.42). Next, the 
second and thirci cases are established from Proposition 3.1. o 
VOl' most practical purposes, the third case in Theorem 3.1 should never be encoulltered. 
This case essentially me ans that under contingency k, the only recourse used to balance 
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the power would be load shedding. Thus, any extra increment in the power demand at 
that bus (be it pre- or post-contingency) would have to be covered by more expensive 
reserve deployment if available (with value f3(.J+l)(k) > Vm , violating the assumptions of 
Lemma 3.2), or would otherwise le ad to infeasibility of the LP. Moreover, in this case, the 
perturbations of the power balance relations would end up modifying the optimal basis of 
the market-clearing LP because another resource would need to enter the basis so as to 
balance the load, a situation that was rejected by the assumptions of the above proofs and 
thus violating again the assumptions of Lemma 3.2. Therefore, it is reasonable to state 
that 
{
P(k) a~Y(k) = p(k) aW(k) 
I1m(k) = aEm aSm 
p(k)vm 
if l:n(k) = 0, 
if 0 < l:n(k) :; dm) 
(3.43) 
for all contingencies k = 1, ... , J( and buses ln = 1, ... ,jl;[. Finally, we restate Corollary 3.1 
as the following theorem. 
Theorern 3.2 (Prices of energy and security under LP market-clearing with stochastic 
security). Denot'ing the s'ubset of contingencies for which there is load shedding at bus ln 
as ICM the marginal priccs of energy, À;t' and SCCt/'rüy, À.~~) at that bt/,s (l'te 
E mV(O) avV(k) 
Àm = p(O) aE + L p(k) aE + L p(k)vm , 
m k~Km m kEKm 
(3.44) 
and 
8 aW(k) \n = L p(k) aS
m 
+ L p(k)vm . 
k~K'rn kEKm 
(3.45) 
PTOOf. The proof is carried out via direct substitution of the resu1ts of Theorem 3.1 into 
those of Corollary ~3.1. 0 
To illustrate sorne of the abstract results just derived, next we look at a simple numerica1 
example. 
3.2.2 Nurnerical exarnple 
Consider the two-bus, two-generator system in Fig. 3.1, whose two buses are linked by a 
transmission line with a maximal flow capacity of 0.5 per unit. The1'e are inelastic demands 
of 1 per unit located at both buses. The generators, which are assumed to have infinite 
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capacity and zero lower generation limits, offer to generate power at the rate of ai dollars 
pel' unit and to provide up- and down-spinning reserves at the rates q~LP and qtn dollars 
per unit respectively. These numbers are found in Table 3.1. Moreover, we assume there 
are no ramping limits affecting the generators, while the reserve offerings are not bounded 
from above. 
Bus 1 
1 p.u. 1 p.u. 
Fig. 3.1 Two-bus, two-generator system 
Table 3.1 Generation and reserve offers 
ai ($ p.u.) 
q~P ($ p.u.) 
qtn ($ p.u.) 
Generator i 
1 2 
10 
20 
20 
100 
15 
15 
Here, vve assume that the only credible contingency is the loss of the transmission line 
(k = 1) which has a probability p(l) = 0.1. As a result, under post-contingency conditions, 
the two buses become separate islands. 
Next, vve examine how the schedules and Lagrange multipliers are affected by the value 
of lost load (VOLL) at bus 2. For two different VOLL applied at bus 2 ($200 and $500 
per unit), we resolve the resulting linear market-clearing problem minimizing the expected 
social costs un der the assumption that the VOLL at bus 1 is $200 per unit. T~lble 3.2 
presents a comparison of the schedules, while Table 3.3 compares the resulting Lagrange 
multipliers associated with the pre- and post-contingency power balance relations. 
By inspection of Table 3.2, we distinguish that under a VOLL of $200 per unit at bus 2, 
the amount of involuntary load shedding applied is equal to the power that was originally 
transferred through the transmission line (0.5 per unit). This is unlike the case under which 
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Table 3.2 Generation, reserve and load shedding under different VOLL at 
bus 2 
V2 = $200 p.u. V2 = $500 p. u. 
Pre-contingency 
.91 (p.u.) 1.5 1.5 
1lp 
Tl (p.u.) 0.0 0.0 
Tdn 1 (p.u.) 0.5 0.5 
.92 (p.u.) Cl.5 0.5 
'1111 T2 (p.u.) 0.0 Cl.5 
'l'gn (p.u.) 0.0 O.Cl 
Post-contingency 
.91(1) (p.u.) 1.0 1.0 
h (1) (p.u.) 0.0 0.0 
.92(1) (p.u.) 0.5 1.0 
l2 (1) (p.u.) Cl.5 O.Cl 
Table 3.3 Lagrange multipliers associated with the pre- and post-
contingency power balances under clifferent VOLL at bus 2 
l-tl (1) 
IL2 (1) 
($ p.u.) 
($ p.u.) 
($p.u.) 
($ p.u.) 
V2 = $2ClO p.u. V2 = $500 p.u. 
Pre-contingency 
27.0 
80.Cl 
27.0 
76.5 
Post-contingency 
-17.0 
20.0 
-17.0 
23.5 
88 
3 Pricing U nder Market-Clearing With Stochastic Security 89 
the VOLL at bus 2 equals $500 pel' unit. In this case, all the power that came from bus 1 
through the line is covered by 0.5 pel' unit of up-spinning reserve provided by generator 2. 
The contents of Table 3.3 agree with the theoretical results derived in the previous 
section. For instance, it is readily seen under the case when '1)2 = $200 pel' unit that /L2(1) = 
p( 1 )V2 = $20 pel' unit, that is the marginal expected cost of load shedding at bus 2. On the 
other hand, in the case when V2 = $500 pel' unit, we have /L2(1) = $23.5 pel' unit, a value 
less than the marginal expected cost of load shedding p(1)v2 = $50 per unit. Here the value 
of the Lagrange multiplier IL2(1) is found to be equal to (1- p(l))q~P +p(1)a2, representing 
respectively the marginal expected cost of scheduling up-spinning reserve from generator 2 
summed with the marginal expected cost of deploying that reserve if the contingency were 
tu happen. Moreover, it is obvious that the sensitivity of the load shed ding variable at bus 
2 is equal to 1 pel' unit when 1)2 = $200 pel' unit and that it is nil when V2 = $500 pel' unit; 
that of bus 1 is zero in both VOLL cases. 
Finally, we see that under both values of VOLL at bus 2 the priees of energy at buses 
1 and 2 are respectively $10 and $100 per unit (equal to the respective marginal costs of 
generation at eaeh bus). The priee of security at bus 1 does not differ between the two cases 
at -$17 per unit. 5 At bus 2, however, the priee of security varies under the two distinct 
VOLL regimes. In the low VOLL case, the consumers are rewardecl with a lower expected 
priee of security ($20.0 versus $23.5 per unit in the high VOLL case), but run the risk of 
being eut if the line fails. In the high VOLL case, the consumers at bus 2 are benefiting 
from a priee of security lower than that of the expected social cost of load shedding (at the 
expeeted rate of $50.0 pel' unit) sinee it is cheaper to schedule and deploy reserves (at the 
expected rate of $2;3.5 per unit). 
3.3 Settlernent Issues 
In close relation with pricillg mechanisms, settlement issues are the object of continuing 
research and development efforts. In short, settlement schemes are the sets of rules defin-
ing how generators are remunerated for the energy they produee and the reserve services 
they provide whereas, for dernands, these rules define how consumers pay for the energy 
5The negative sign inclicates that by raising the demancl at bus 1, expected social costs can be reduced 
because an increase in consumption decreases the need for schecluling clown-spinning reserve to counter the 
line outage. 
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they consume and huw they are remunerated for the reserves they provide. Furthermore, 
seUlement rules are needed to determine who pays (generators only, demands only or both) 
and how one pays for the necessary reserve services. 
SeUlement rules for energy are generally straightforward: generators get paid the price 
of energy times the energy produced, and demands pay the price of ellergy times the energy 
consumed [3,9, 10,64,135]. In the case of reserve services or any ancillary service 
however, it is agreed in the electricity economics community that appropriate and fair 
seUlement rules for reserves are lacking. 
So far, the industry has used simple means to settle reserve services through uplift 
charges levied from the consumers l'Ta mta of their energy consumption. The generators 
and demands that provide reserve services are then remunerated either on a pay-as-bid 
or on a marginal pricing basis [58-60]. Such schemes are simple and clear; nevertheless, 
they oversimplify the technical and economic intricacies of reserve and ancillary service 
provision. 
Reserves (and the oUler ancillary services) possess the characteristic:s found in so-called 
'P'U,blù: goods [125] sinc:e, by providing reserves, all entitiesnot just c:onsumersconneded 
to the grid benefit from them in the form of "sec:urity" to sustain the trade of electric:ity. It 
was shown in this c:hapter that sec:urity can be pric:ed. However, one question remains: Who 
should pay for sec:urity? The natural and most simplistic answer is to have the c:onsumers 
pay the entire bill. 
Generally, however, there are entities (generators, demands and lines) that impose 
greater reserve burdens on the system as a whole bec:ause of a c:ombination of (i) their 
high probability of failure; and, (ii) their lumpiness. For example, it is clear that, from 
a fairness point of view, the U400 nuclear generators of the IEEE Reliability Test Sys-
tem [67], with their large capac:ity aud high OlItage probabilities, should have to bear a 
higher responsibility for the c:osts of security (by having to pay more for reserves) than 
the small and l'diable U50 hydro uuits in the same system. Several authors have come up 
with propositions aloug this Eue [61,62, 137]. Further treatment of this issue, however, lies 
outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we first summarized the state of afiairs in the area of pricing in electricity 
markets. This review did shedlight on the fact that current pricing schemes are not capable 
of correctly pricing power system security. Yet, we saw how the recent work in [64] provides 
the lleccssary framework to achieve this goal. 
Taking the Arroyo-Galiana pricing proposition as our starting point, next we specialized 
it to the problem of electricity market-clearing with stochastic security. We demonstrated 
a Humber of theoretical results on the Lagrange multipliers associated with pre- and post-
cOlltingency power balance relations, which end up becoming the constituents of the prices 
of energy and security. 1Vlost notably, we showed the economic couplings existing between 
the probabilities of contingencies, the value of lost load and the marginal social costs of 
reserve scheduling and deployment. The results were first derived for a general nonlinear 
market-clearing model and then for linear programming formulations like those founcl else-
where in this dissertation. For linear programming formulations, we clemonstratecl that, 
for a given contingency, load shedding is used whenever its expected marginal social cost 
is less than the marginal social cost of scheduling and deploying reserves. We illustrated 
this in a small numerical example. 
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Chapter 4 
Market-Clearing Under Demand and 
Wind Generation U ncertainty 
4.1 Introduction 
The wind flapp'd loose, the wind was still, 
Shaken out dead from tree and hill: 
1 had walk'd on at the wind's will, 
1 sat now, for the wind was still. 
The Woodsp'wrge 
Dante Gabriel Rossetti, 18f!8-1882 
In the last ten years, public environmental awareness to issues of air pollution and climate 
change has put pressure on governments all over the industrialized world to curb emissions 
coming especially from the energy and transportation sectors. Following the 1992 Earth 
Summit in Rio, rounds of international negotiations led to the drafting of the Kyoto proto col 
which specifies greenhouse gas reduction targets of its signing parties. The nature of the 
economy and geography of Canada exacerbates the scale of the actions needed to reach the 
national emission reduction tar'gets set by the Kyoto Proto col [138]. To illustrate the seale 
of the challenge that Canaclians face, it is noteworthy to underline that in 2001 Canada 
had peT capita carbon emissions of the order of 19 tons of CO2 equivalellt, comillg second 
alllong the C8 countries slightly below the United States at 20 tons of CO2 equivalent [139]. 
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In addition, in 2001 Canada had the largest peT' capita electricity consumption (at 16000 
kilowatt-hours) among the C8 countriüS, which averaged a peT' capita consumption of 9500 
kilowatt-hours [139]. 
From these statist.ics, it is not surprising that the greenhouse gas emissions eoming from 
the electricity sector in Canada are signifieant. In 2003, the Canadian electrieity generation 
seetor accounted for 134000 kilotons of CO 2 equivalent (18.1% of the country's total emis-
sions) just behind the road transportation sector with 140000 kilotons of CO2 equivalent 
(18.9% ofthe country's total emissions) [140]. Because of the prominence of the share of the 
global emissions from the electricity generation sector, there is sustained public and politi-
cal pressure for increasing the penetration of low carbon electricity generation technologies 
in Canada [138], technologies which comprise most notably generation installations based 
on renewable energy sources (wind, solar, biomass, etc.) [65]. 
In general, these electricit.y generation resources cannot be scheduled and dispatched 
in the classical sense because of their intrinsic dependence on constantly-varying weather 
conditions. We refer the interested reader to [65,66,141,142] for extensive bibliographical 
reviews and studies about the intermittence of wind power (\,yP) and to [65] for the case of 
solar power. YVithout loss of generality, here we concentrate on VIP as it is now the most 
prominent renewable resource being integrated into existing grids, and since it is probably 
the most mature renewable generation technology readily available on the market [65,66, 
138]. Other types ofnon-dispatchable resources may have different modeling particularities; 
however, the basic principles described below should remain essentially identical. 
Large, megawatt-range modern wind turbines generally have mechanisms that at.tempt 
to regulate theil' output as the wind speed varies [65,66]; however, these local control 
schemes are designed to extract the maximum power from the wind rather than to responcl 
to a grid operator's centralized dispatch instructions or to the system frequency excursions. 
As a result, WP generation needs to be backed up by classic hydrothermal generating units 
to perform the primary, secondary and tertiary regulation actions necessary to maintain 
reliable grid operation [32-34]. Obviously, in systems where the WP represents a significant 
proportion of the illstalled elassic hydrothermal generation eapacity, like in Denmark and 
Gennany, the regulation needs imposed by the winci power generators may be important 
and can have significant costs [66,143-147]. These regulation costs are either socialized 
among t.he consumers or they are assumed by the wind producers themselves thus reducing 
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the competitiveness of this energy source. 1 In fact, it is weIl recognized within the power 
systems operation community that increasing the level of W"P penetration requires a full 
reassessment of operating methodologies and standards, especially in setting operating 
reserve requirements governing the primary, secondary and tertiary regulation tasks [143-
158]. 
In addition to the reliability issues, the integration of \tVP in existing grids has to 
be made in accordance with the current electricity market structures [143,145,147,159, 
160]. Nowadays, \i\TP may be sold in hour-ahead or in real-time electricity markets [143]. 
Nonetheless, there is no clear agreement on how \i\TP generators should be offering energy 
in these markets. It is evident, however, that the quality of \tVP offerings is coupled to the 
dependability of short-term (24 to 1 hour ahead) wind forecasting techniques [158,161]. 
Good and dependable \VP prediction techniques are also crucial to grid operators as the 
WP predictions represent important guides towards scheduling appropriate levels and types 
of operating reserves needed to perform the different regulation tasks. 
ln this chapter, we outline how the electricity market-clearing with stochastic security 
framework developed in the previous chapt ers can be specialized to perfonn market-based 
scheduling of generation, load and tertiary reserve for power systems with uncertaill WP 
generation forecasts. The proposed market-clearing formulation is not restricted to the 
treatment of the uncertainty in \i\TP generation predictions, but it may also account for load 
prediction errors. In addition, the formulation includes an operational mode! for large-scale 
energy storage systems eonnected to the grid. These energy storage capabilities, which in-
clude mainly pumped-storage hydro, large battery-based and flywheel-based installations, 
offer interesting hour-to-hour economic arbitrage opportunities and can also facilitate the 
regulation tasks of the grid operator by buffering short-duration load and generation varia-
tions [155,162-165]. Moreover, the market-clearing model we develop goes beyond similar 
research and development efforts that deal only with the scheduling of small-scale isolated 
power systems containing wind and other non-dispatchable resources; see, for example, the 
work of Handschin et al. [166]. 
We point out that this proposaI diverges from previous works on scheduling of power 
systems with grid-illtegrated intermittent generation resources and the issues associated 
lThis econornic argument is often llsed by opponents of wind power. Moreover, the opponents daim 
that the CO2 abatements brought about by wind get waterecl clown by the need to have hydrothermal 
backup capacity online operating at lower thermal or hydraulic efficiencies. 
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with setting reserve needs. In a quest for computational tractability in addressing these 
scheduling problems, sorne authors make use of offline Monte Carlo simulations [153,155] 
while others use analytical work based on empirical data [143,145,148---152,156--158]. The 
unifying characteristic of the works of these authors is that they all attempt to establish 
a TJT'iOT'i system-wide levels of reserves to be provided by the hydrothermal generators to 
guarantee sorne desired level of reliability. 
Bere, however, reserve levels required to accommodate the variations in the WP gcn-
eration are rathel' cornputed oTdine based on the principles of electricity market-clearing 
with stochastic security. The market operator schedules the hydrothermal generators min-
imizing the expected social cost when the power system operates uncler (i) a most likely, 
error-free wind power generation/load scenario (alike the pre-contingency state defined in 
Chapter 2); and, (ii) a spectrum of wind and load scenarios representing the potential 
crrors made in their forecasts (alike contingency scenarios). Also, the proposed schedul-
ing mechanism considers the economic costs of any involuntary load shedding that may 
be required to balance power under the probable forecasting error scenarios. Lastly, an 
important assumption here is that in order for the proposed approach to be successful, we 
presuppose that the primary and secondary regulation tasks [32-34] are sufIicient to keep 
the power system from drifting into instability in the aftermath of disturbances caused by 
variations in the wind and in the demand. 
Case studies illustrating the functioning and the efI'ects of key parameters of the market-
clearing formulation then complement the chapter. Among parameters whose effects are 
of interest are the WP generation penetration level and the size of the energy st orage 
installations. 
4.2 Market-Clearing Model Formulation 
4.2.1 Demand prediction and uncertainty 
Short-terrn electricity demand prediction tools are numerous and have been the subject of 
extensive research and development [30,167], Bere, however, we do not assume the use 
of any particular technique, Rather, we assume that a prediction technique provides an 
hour-by-hour sequence of load forecasts (or any time step, as required by the scheduling 
horizon), cÎmt megawatts for t = 1, .. " T and demand entities m = 1, ... , M, We note that, 
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for simplicity of exposition here, we ignore transmission network effects. 
Sin ce the demand forecasts are generally inaccurate, we model the forecast errors as zero-
mean normally-distributed random variables (RV) (Jmt with (predicted) standard deviation 
Cfmt megawatts for t = 1, ... , T and m = 1, ... , l'II. The normality assumption of the 
demand forecast error is standard in the literature [46,152,167]. It is justified through 
the wide diversity of the electricity demand across geographical areas and consumer classes 
combined with an invocation of the central limit theorem [168]. In an electricity market 
setting, a number of caveats about demand forecasts and forecast error must be addressed. 
First, demand forecasts are performed by the load-serving entities m = l, ... ,l'vI, which 
then bid accordingly in the market on behaH of their consumers. As a result, the systern-
wide demand foreeast is obtained as a by-product of demand-side bidding in the forward 
(e.g. day-ahead) electricity marlœt.2 That is, the forecast sequences dmt for t = 1, ... ,T 
and m = l, ... , l'vI are determined through the benefit functions of demands, which reflect 
consumen,' price elasticities. Yet, we assume he1'e that the error in the demand forecast 
is independcnt of the consumer benefit functions. This assumptiol1 is justified because 
forecast errors are caused generally by uncontrollable factors exogenous to the demand 
agellts,weather being one of the prime examples [167]. 
4.2.2 Wind power prediction and uncertainty 
\Vith the increasing inte1'est for integrating wind into existing grids, WP generation predic-
tion is currently a subject of extensive ongoing research and development [66,147,158,161]. 
Nevertheless, here we assume---like in the case of the demand---that we already have 
a prediction tool that provides an hour-by-hour (or any time step, as required by the 
scheduling horizon) system aggregate \NP generation forecast sequence, 'IVt megawatts for 
t = l, ... ,T. We likewise mode! the fore cast errors as zero-mean normally-distributed RVs 
ewt with (predicted) standard deviation Cfwt megawatts for t = l, ... , T. 
Statistical models for wind speeds at specifie locations do not fit normal distributions 
but rather Rayleigh distributions 165,66]. In addition, this reality combined with the wind 
turbines' nonlinear "vinci speed-to-power output re!ationships result in that the probability 
distributions of the power output of individv,al wind generatol's are not normal. However, 
likc in the case of the demand, the large number and the geographical dispersion of the 
2Note, however, that genera.l1y gr id operators a1so perform demand forecasts for rc1iability l'casons. 
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wind turbines permit the invocation of the central limit theorem [168] to justify the nor-
mality assumption of the prediction error. Of course, there may be cases where the pOOl' 
geographical diversity of the wind-based generation capacity cannot justify making this 
assumption. The treatment of such complications, however, is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
4.2.3 Demand and wind power: the concept of net load 
From the demand and wind power generation forecasts, it is possible to define what is 
generally termed the net load forecast ht and its associated forecast error RV ent [65,66,146]. 
Given that both the dis crete time demand and WP generation 1'andom pro cesses have 
similar frequency spectra, during some time period t, we define the net load forecast 'hl; as 
the difIerence between the demand and the vVP generation forecasts 
M 
nt = L cÎmt - ûh· ( 4.1) 
'm=] 
Since it is generally assumed that forecast errors are uncorrelated normal RVs, then the 
standard deviation of the forecast e1'ro1' associated with the net load (Tnt is calculated 
as [66,146,158,168] 
M 
CT nt =, L CT;!t + CT,~t, (4.2) 
'm=l 
for t = 1, ... ,T. 
In the remaining parts of this chapter, to simplify the notation we will use the net load 
concept in formulating the electricity market-clearing problem with VVP generation and 
demand uncertainty. In doing so, the net load forecast fI,t will be used with its zero-mean 
normally-distributed error RV ent , which has a standard deviation CTnt. 
4.2.4 General formulation 
Continuous forecast uncertainty model 
lJnder the continuous normally-distributed net load forecast model, the scheduling p1'oblem 
at hand is a stochastic optimal control problem [169,170] minimizing a function measuring 
the expected social cost of operating unde1' the possible range of realizations of the net 
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load error RV ()ni E IR, over the discrete time intervals t = 1, ... , T. Mathematically, this 
translates to 
subject to 
H(Ut(8,nt) , Xt(()nt), ()nt) = 0; 
G(Ut;(()nt) , Xt;(8,nt) , ()n/;) 2:: 0; 
t = 1, ... ,T, 
t = 1, ... ,T, 
( 4.3) 
(4.4) 
( 4.5) 
where U/; (-) and Xt (-) are control decision vectors defined respectively 1Il the space of 
functions Ut : IR -----+ msl" and Xt : IR -----+ IRQ for t = 1, ... , T. AIso, the scalar function 
liV : msl" x IRQ -----+ IR measures the social cost----that includes hydrothermal generation opera-
tion and reserve costs less the demand-side benefits-, and dF(()nt) denotes the clifferential 
of the cumulative probability distribution function of the net load error RV during period 
t. We also note that as the time horizon of the electricity market-clearing problem is short 
here (i.e. up to 24 hours), the objective function does not inclucle a discounting ternI. The 
feasible set of the scheduling problem is described abstractly by the vector equality (4.4) 
a.nd the vector inequality (4.5) constraints, both of which are parameterized by the real-
izations of the net load error RV ()nt for t = 1, ... ,T. An optimal solution3 of (4.3)-(4.5), 
(u*(On), x*(On)), is a functional map of the net load that minimizes the expected social 
cost and that respects aH equality and inequa.lity constraints of the scheduling problem. 
Formulating and solving the discrete-time stochastic optimal control problem (4.3)--
(4.5) are very difficult tasks given the computing power available today and probably in 
the future [170]. Therefore, it is more reasollable to consider an approximation of (4.3)-
(4.5) whereby the continuous probability distribution ofthe net load error RV is discretized 
in a number of representative "slices" [85,170]. 
Diserete foreeast uneertainty model 
Fig. 4.1 shows an example of such a cliscretization of the continuous probability distribution 
function of the net load forecast error wherc there are seven intervals centered on the mean 
and where each ofthe intervals are one net load forecast error standard deviation (O"nt)-wicle. 
3This assumes that at least one solution exists. 
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Obviously, other slicing designs can be adopted with more intervals to improve the quality 
of the approximation at the expense of a larger problem size. Likewise, uneven slicillg 
patterns can be used whereby more intervals are clustered closer to the me an and fewer 
are used to model the tails of the distribution. Advanced techniques for approximating the 
distributions of continuous RVs with discrete ones have been developed and used especially 
in rnathernatical finance; see [171---174] for exarnple. 
Net load error (per unit) 
Fig. 4.1 Typical probability distribution of the net load fo1'ecast e1'ror 
Specifically, the slicing process yields a sequence of pa.irs (OntU), VtU)) for j = 1, ... , J 
and t = 1, ... , T. For each j, Ont (j) is defined at the center of its respective interval while its 
corresponding probability is evaluated using standard techniques. For example, in Fig. 4.1 
the dis crete realizations of the net load error RV are Ont(l) = -0.3 per unit, Ont(2) = -0.2 
per unit and so on. Their corresponding interval probabilities Vt(j) are caleulated from 
first principles as shown in Appendix H.l. 
Net load scenarios 
In the stochastic optimal control problem (4.3)-(4.5), the optimization pro cess is conducted 
over the infinite number of discrete-tirne trajectories of the net load error RV. Given now 
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the assumption that the net load foreeast e1'ror can only adopt a finite number of values 
during eaeh time period, the above optimization problem will therefore be conducted over 
a finite number of sneh trajectories. This observation leads to the fo11owing definitions. 
Definition 4.1 (Node). Anode .7, where j E {1, ... , J}, represents one of the possible 
diserete realizations of the net load error RV. 
Definition 4.2 (Net load foreeast error scenario). A net load forecast error scenario k E 
{l, ... ,K}, denoted as Sk, is an ordered sequence of nodes Ukl' jk2, ... ,jkT} defining a 
trajectory of discrete realizations of the net load error RV over the scheduling horizon. 
Definition 4.3 (Error-free scenario). The error-free scenario Sk = {jk1,jk2"" ,jkT} is 
the scenario for which the realization of the net load error RV is equal to zero for a11 
t = 1, ... ,T. The concept of the error-free scenario parallels that of the pre-eontingency 
scenario defined in Chapter 2. 
Definition 4.4 (Scenario tree). A scenario tree T is a collection of net load forecast e1'ror 
scenarios, that is T = {SI, S2, ... , SK}. A scenario tree must always contain Cl.t least the 
error-free scenario, Sk' 
Associated with each scenario Sk, there is a time-indexed sequence of probabilities Pt (k), 
which is calculated as shown in Appendix H.2. Moreover, associated with each scenario 
Sk, there is a pre-calculated sequence of realizations of the net load e1'1'o1' RV ent (k).4 From 
these sequences, the discrete-time stochastic optimal control problem (4.3)-(4.5) can be 
reformulated as 
subject to 
T K 
min L LPt(k) vV(Ut(k), Xt(k)) 
u,x t=1 k=l 
H(Ut(k), xt(k), (}nt(k)) = 0; 
G (Ut (k ), Xt (k ), ent (k )) 2: 0; 
t = 1, ... ,T, k = 1, ... , K, 
t = 1, ... , T, k = 1, ... , K, 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
where t.he ma,ppings defined previously retained thei1' respective domain and range spaces. 
This time, an optimal solution5 to the problem (4.6)-(4.8), (u*(k),x*(k)), is no longer a 
4To avoid overloading the notation here, we let ent(k) == eniCikt). It is understood that un der scenario 
Sb the realization jkt of the net load error RV occurs during period t. 
5This assumes that at least one solution exists. 
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set of functional maps defined over the realline; it is rather a set of functional maps defined 
over the finite number of realizations of the net load error random variable. 
As mentioned before, this simplification is a necessary condition for this problem to be 
computationally tractable. Any arbitrary level of accuracy could be attained by shrinking 
the width of the slices of the net load foreeast error probability distribution and letting the 
number of slices approach infinity. Nevertheless, this has to be done at the expense of a 
loss in computational tractability. 
Statistical studies of inter-hour \vind gelleration variations in Seandinavia [141, 146] 
point out that, most of the time, these variations remain within ±5~ 10% of the instal1ed 
wind capacity. Likewise, inter-hour demand deviations from the load forecast are usually 
relatively well bounded. As a result, in formulating the schedllling problem (4.6}--(4.8), it 
may be conceivable-and, in fact, necessary-to optimize over a scenario tree which is made 
up of those scenarios that do not contain very "unlikely" inter-period transitions. Such sim-
plifications should render the problem more computational1y tractable, given that the total 
number of nodes and the number of scenarios in a scenario tree both grow exponentially 
with the cluration of the schecluling horizon as ,F.6 In simplifying the scenario tree, sorne 
ad hoc scenario rejection techniques based on empirical eviclence could be usecl. The other 
systematic techniques applicable to generic stochastic optimization problems mentioned in 
Chapter 2 [105, 121~123, 175] should be investigated as well. 
Fig. 4.2 shows an example for a case with J = 3 defining "Low", "As preclictecl" and 
"Righ" net load forecast error slices evolving over T = 2 time periods. In Fig. 4.2, aU 
transitions are allowed, leading to a nine-scenario scenario tree. Moreover, here the error-
free scenario is easily identified as the sequence {As predicted, As predicted}. 
Now that the scheduling problern rnay be speeified for a scenario tree T that rnay not 
contain all possible scenarios, (4.6)-(4.8) is rewritten using shorthancl notation 
min L pt(k) vV(Ut(k), Xt(k)) 
\l,X (k,t)ET 
( 4.9) 
6The scenario tree corresponding to the seven-interval net load forecast error probability distribution 
ShOWll in Fig. 4.1 that l'uns over a scheduling horizon of 24 hours contains over 1.9 x 1020 scenarios if ail 
possible inter-hour interval-to-intel'val transitions are allowed. 
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subject to 
Righ 
As pcedieled 
Low 
High 
As predieled 
As predieled 
t = 0 
Low Low 
Righ 
As pcedieled 
Low 
t = 2 
Fig. 4.2 Net load forecast error scenario tree example 
H(Ut(k), Xt(k), ent(k)) = 0; 
G(ut(k), Xt(k), ent(k)) 2: 0; 
V (k, t) ET, 
V (k, t) ET. 
( 4.10) 
(4.11) 
In the following subseetions, details specifie to the ab ove stoehastic optimization prob-
lem are addressed. Namely, the characterization of its social co st objective, found above in 
(4.9), as well as that of its feasible set, described abstraetly in (4.10) and (4.11). Among 
specifie aspects, we examine those related to the inclusion of energy storage, wind energy 
spillage, involuntary load shed ding and the particularities of reserve determination. 
4.2.5 Meeting the power balance: energy storage, wind power spillage and 
involuntary load shedding 
It was rnentioned in the Introduction of this chapter that the use of energy storage technolo-
gies is a promising means to help balancing power by smoothing outWP generation and 
load variations as well as by providing inter-period economic arbitrage capabilities. Berc 
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the storage installations considered are of the ccntralized type, connected at the trans-
mission level of the g1'id. These are "macro" energy storage equipment capable of storing 
energy in the range of a few megawatt-hours. These types of installations contrast with 
the "micro" energy stOl'age systems directly coupled to individual WP generators or wind 
farms [162]. The miero energy storage solutions are attractive as they cau improve the 
minute-by-minute regulation of the output of auy single or collection of wind turbines. 
They are also advantageous in tenns of reliability because the loss of one or several small 
st orage systems of a few kilowatt-hours each may not be as critical as the out age of a 
single large storage facility. Yet massive, ccntralized energy st orage installations (e.g. large 
pumped-storage hydro stations) have the advantage, from the point of view of the grid 
operator, of being fully dispatehable like any hydrothermal unit and, most importantly, 
they can provide the hour-to-hour energy and economic arbitrage opportunities unlike the 
small local st orage systems only capable of buffering variations with short tirne constants. 
In this section, we formulate two (one lossless, one lossy) generic centralized energy 
st orage models. By generic here, it is meant that there are no a pTioTi assumptions made 
about the storage technology being modeled. The parameters characterizing the generic 
storage technology are, for both lossless and lossy models, [155]: 
• Maximum storage capa.city, ell1ax megawatt-hours; 
• Maximum charging/discharging rate, Z1l18X megawatts; 
• Maximum sten'age ramping rate, zll1ax megawatts pel' hour. 
For the lossy model, two more parameters need to be considered: 
• Charging efficiency, T( E (0, 1) pel' unit; 
• Discharging efficiellcy, T}d E (0, 1) pel' unit. 
In cases wh en realizations of the net load error RV assume extreme values-whether high 
or low, although with low probabilities-, the deployment of the available energy storage 
capabilities, that of the hydrotherrnal generation reserves and of the voluntary demand-side 
adjustments may not be sufficient or economically justified to meet the power balance. As 
a result, for sorne net load scenarios it rnay be justified to either (i) "spill" of l wind power 
generation at no cost when the net load is low; or otherwise, (ii) perform involuntary load 
shedding at a cost, given by the value of lost load, wh en the net load is high. Note that, for 
the sake of completcness, it should be mentioned that in cases whürü the1'e are no energy 
storage installations connected to the grid, the power balance models defined below do not 
include any of the variables associated with energy storage. 
Market-clearing model with lossless energy st orage 
Power- balance 
For a11 (k, t) E T, the power balance is given by 
1 M M 
Lgit(k) + L lmt(k) + Zt(k) - 8t(k) = L dmt(k) - uJt + Bnt(k). (4.12) 
i=l rn=l rn=l 
Here we reca11 that the variables git (k) represent the power output of generator i during 
periocl t under scenario Sk of the net load error RV. 
Voluntary and involuntœry load shedding 
In (4.12), the variables imt (k) correspond to involuntary load shed ding that could be applied, 
\vhere of necessity we impose 
NI 
0:::; lmt(k) :::; Lldmt(k) + Bmt(k)]; k i- k, (4.13) 
m=l 
where Omt (k) is the forecast error associated with demand rn during period t under scenario 
Sk. Again, (4.13) is defined for all time intervals and realizations of the net load RV 
forming the scenario tree T, except for the error-free scenario Sk for which we require that 
lrn/k) = O. This is just like in Chapter 2, where we imposed that the involuntary load 
shed ding should be nil under the pre-contingency scenario. 
In (4.12) and (4.13), the demand-side variables dmt are augmented with the scenario 
index k to model the demand-side adjustments that may be commanded by the gl'id opera-
tOI' as part of their voluntary response to errors in the combined wind power and demand 
forecasts. VVe point out that in the case of the error-free scenario, the demand variables 
are given by dmt(k) = drnt , where dmt is the forecasted demand. Here the forecasted wind 
power generation lÛt is not indexed by k since, unlike the demand, it may not be controlled 
directly through voluntary adjustments. 
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Rate of chaTge/d'ischa:rge 
Next in (4.12), the variable zt(k) represents the rate of energy discharge coming from the 
aggregatecl energy stora,ge installations over the power system, during interval t and under 
scenario Sk. This variable is a continuous variable satisfying, for aIl (k, t) E T 
(4.14) 
where zmélX > 0.7 Thus, when Zt(k) > () the energy storage installations are collectively 
releasing energy into grid; otherwise, when zt(k) < () energy is taken out of the grid and 
being stored. 0 bviously, when Zt (k) = 0 no energy is being stored into nor released from 
the energy storage installations. 
Sorne ramping limitations may be imposed on the charging/ discharging rate so as to 
model possible time-based restrictions in changing the operating state of the storage in-
stallations. Thus, for aIl (k, t) E T 
'Y (k) < 'Y (k) + ;;:max Nt _ ""(t-l)' N , 
'Y (k) > 'Y (k) ;;:IIlax 
""/; _ N(t-l) , - "" , 
(4.15) 
(4.1G) 
where zmax > O. These restrictions apply especially to pumped-hydro storage facilities that 
canIlot go through very fast operating mode changes-that is, from pumping to generating 
and vice versa. 
In addition, we point out here that there is no need to explicitly distinguish between 
the charging and discharging modes of operation of the energy st orage installations with an 
extra state variable. vVe will see in a following subsection that under a lossy storage model, 
it is necessary to distinguish between the modes of operation of the storage installations.8 
This saving clearly represents a fair computational advantage of the lossless storage model 
over the lOBBy one, aB will be seen later. 
7We note that the upper and lower limits on the rate of charging/ discharging of the storage installations 
need not be iclentical. 
8Even though their storage model is lossless, the authoI's of [176] do distinguish between the modes of 
operation of a storage system. This distinction is rendered necessary by the specifie storage technology, 
namely baUery storage, and the level of IIlodeling detail used by the authors. 
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Spillage of wind power- genemtion 
Further in (4.12), the variable sf;(k) models the rate at which wind power generation is 
curtailed or "spilled" during period t under scenario Sk' 11uch like the involuntary load 
shedding terrn, the \iVP generation spillage is bounded from below by zero and from above 
by the actual \VP generation 
( 4.17) 
for a11 (k, t) E T. Here, we recall that ewt(k) is the forecast error associated with the WP 
generatioll during period t under scenario Sk. \iVe also note that unlike the demand, we 
allow for \VP to be curtailed under the error-free scenario. 
The use of spillage may seem counterintuitive since the WP power input iuto the grid 
is costless. However, under extreme---aud for the most part very improbable-----sitllations 
under which the WP generation is very high and the demand is very low, the expected 
social cost may be lower if the wind energy is sim ply spilled. In such cases, the expected 
costs of the required down-spinning reserve services coming from hydrothermal units and 
dernands can easily outweigh the benefits of the free, but improbable, high wind. We note 
that the wind energy spillage is generally obtained throllgh active and passive mechanical 
controls of the wind turbines' hlade pitch angle and nacelle yaw angle [65]. 
Ener-gy stomge balance and capa city lirnits 
U nder scenario Sk, the energy stored at the end of tirne period t et (k) equals the initial 
energy stored at the beginning of the period e(t-l) (k) less any energy that is retllrned back 
to the grid, Zt(l.:) 6. Mathematically, this translates into 
(4.18) 
where we recall that the quantity 6 represents the length of the tirne interval between t 
and t + 1. Of course, this requirement applies to an pairs (k, t) forming the scenario tree 
T. 
In addition to the energy balance requirement, the energy storage can be charged only 
within its capacity limits 
( 4.19) 
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where, without loss of generality, we assume that the lower limit on the energy stored is 
nil and that emax > 0 for aIl (k, t) E T. 
Eneryy stoTQ,ge endpoird constmints 
At the beginlling of the scheduling horizon, t = 0, the energy storage installations are 
assumed to have sorne initial energy stored eo 2: 0 
(4.20) 
for aIl scenarios Sk. 
The initial energy stored eo is an exogenous parameter which has to be estirnated by 
the grid operator. One possible strategy here is to estimate eo from the expected value of 
the energy stored in the last period (t = T) of the previous scheduling horizon; that is 
eo = (>1' = I: PT(k) eT(k). 
k:(k,T)ET 
(4.21 ) 
This leads into addressing whether or not constraints on the energy stored at the end 
of the scheduling horizon should be imposed. Given that the market-clearing formulation 
minimizes the social eost over a finite-duration seheduling horizon, there is no e:Eplicü 
incentive to keep any energy stored at the end of a specifie horizon. This is because the 
operating cost during the last few periods of the scheduling horizon can be reduced by 
discharging the "free" available energy stored. This energy has the potential to back off 
sorne of the more expensive thermal generators, which ean therefore reduce operational 
costs. 
This result refiects the myopic nature of finite-horizon optimal control problems. Know-
ing that the market-clearing problem is to be solved again for the following scheduling 
horizon, the initial conditions used to compute the next schedule are based on the end-
state of the current schedule. Thus, one possibility here is to impose a lower bound on the 
amount of ellergy stored at the end of each of the seheduling horizons. An obvious way to 
achieve this goal is to limit from below the expected value of the energy stored at t = T, 
as calculated in (4.21). 
An alternative to the imposition of a lower bounel on the expected value of the energy 
stored at t = T is to assign a monetary value to this energy, and to lump it into the social 
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cost objective function. Likewise, it is also possible to combine both approaches using a 
lower bound and the value of the energy stored. 
Market-clearing model with lossy energy storage 
Realistic energy storage systems incur losses during their charging and discharging pro cesses 
[155]. Moreover, the chargillg and discharging pro cesses may have distinct efficienci<c:s. If 
storage los ses are to be accounted for, these characteristics therefore require a reformulation 
of the energy st orage and power balance models developed above. 
Tt will be shown below that the lossy energy storage model is computationally more 
demanding compared to its lossless counterpart. In fact, one could argue that including 
losses associated with the energy storage installations is simply not warranted. First, 
sinee the charging/ discharging rates of energy storage installations are generally small with 
respect to the combined installed hydrothermal and wind power capacity, their assoeiated 
losses should be proportionally small. In addition, sinee transmission losses-which in 
reality should be much more important than those associated with the energy storage 
installations are ignored in the market-clearing model, it ean be argued that storage 
losses should be ignored as weIl. Notwithstanding its eomplexity, but rather for the sake 
of modeling completeness, the lossy energy storage is described next. 
Pot4Jer balance 
For aH (k, t) E T, the power balance under lossy st orage is given by 
J M M 
L.%(k) + L lmt(k) + ''7 d 4(k) - z~(k) - Bt(k) = L dmt(k) - 'IÎJt + ent(k), ( 4.22) 
i=l 77t=l m=l 
where, specifieally here, we distinguish between the discharging, zt(k), and the charging, 
zf( k), rates of the energy storage installations. We note as weIl that the energy taken out 
of the st orage installations is converted back into electricity at an efficiency TJd. 
Voluniary and involuntary load shedding and spillage 
The bounds developed previously in the lossless model for the involuntary load shedding 
and for the spillage variables, (4.13) and (4.17) respectively, apply equaIly here. 
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Rate of charge/di8chaTge 
The discharging and charging rates 4(1.;) and zf(k) are also bounded for aH (k, t) ET 
o ~ zf(k) ~ zmax, 
o ~ z~(k) ~ zmax, 
(4.23) 
( 4.24) 
where, for simplicity here, we assume that both upper bounds on the discharging and 
charging rates are identical and positive. In addition, since the charging and discharging 
operating modes are mutuaUy exclusive, that is zt(k) zf(k) = 0 for aU (k, t) E T, it is 
required to modify (4.23) and (4.24) such that 
o ~zf(k) ~ (1 - Yt(k)) zmax, 
o ~z~(k) ~ Yt(k) zmax, 
where the variable Yt(k) E lB and satisfies for aH (k, t) E T 
Yt(k) = {1 
o 
if charging, 
otherwise. 
( 4.25) 
( 4.2G) 
( 4.27) 
By requiring an additiollal binary variable per time period and per scenario, the lossy 
energy storage model puts a further computational burden on the solution pro cess of the 
electricity market-clearing problem. Clearly here, the formulation of a succinct scenario 
tree is paramount to the good performance of the solution pro cess by a mixed-integer 
linear programming solver. 
Lastly, extra constraints, similar to (4.15) and (4.16), are needed to constrain the inter-
period changes in both the charging and the discharging rate variables. 
Ener~IJY 8tOTage balance and capacity limits 
80 far, we have included only the discharging losses in the model via the pO\ver balance 
equation (4.22). The modeling of the charging losses is captured by the energy storage 
balance. In a way similar to (4.18), the energy stored Ct(k) at the end of time period t 
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under scenario Sk is given by 
( 4.28) 
The power taken away from the grid, zHk), is stored at an efficiency '1(. The energy 
stored in the lossy model is also bounded as shown in (4.19). Lastly here, as always these 
constraints apply for ail (k, t) E T. 
Energy stomge endpoint constmints 
The previous discussions of endpoint effects on the energy stored at times t = 0 and t = T 
for the lossless model apply equally here. 
4.2.6 Reserve determination eonstraints 
Like in the case of market-clearing with equipment contingencies described in Chapter 2, 
the notion of reserve used here is different from what is the current industry definition. 
In the way exposed in Appendix C, the levels of generation-side reserve (up-spinning and 
down-spinning)9 assigned to particular hydrothermal generators satisfy 
and 
() < Hp < .. UP max, . _rit _ 1 it Uit, 
o <rdn < J'dT! lIl<1XU ' . 
- ,t/, - ,t/, tt, 
T'U,P >q. (k) - (1. (k)' it -, tt ,1Û' 
i = 1, ... ,1, 1; = 1, ... , T, 
i = 1, ... , 1, t; = 1, ... , T, 
i = 1, ... ,1, 'V (k, 1;) E T, 
i = 1, ... ,1, 'V (k, t) E T, 
( 4.29) 
(4.:30) 
(4.31) 
( 4.32) 
where the variables 9û(k) represent the generation levels under the error-free net load 
scenario. However, unlike in Appendix C, here the lower bounds (4.31) and (4.32) are 
not applied for ail credible contingency k occurring during period T, but rather for ail 
realizations of the net load forecast error scenarios SI.; and time periods t forming the 
9Without A 10ss of generality, we do not consider non-spinning reserve services here. This rneans that. 
1.lit(k) = 1.lit(k) for al! (k, t) ET. Thus, for notation al simplicit.y, the binary unit commit ment variables are 
not overloaded with the extra argument (k). 
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scenario tree T. 
The levels of dernand-side reserves assigned to the dernand entities are defined along 
the sarne lines 
and 
o <'rdn < 'r dn max. 
- mt - mt , 
'r~;~ '2dmt(k) - dmt(k); 
'r.~;;:; 2 dmt ( k) - dmt ( k ); 
m = 1, ... , A1, t = 1, ... , T, 
m = l, ... ,l'vI, t = 1, ... , T, 
m = 1, ... ,AI, V (k, t) E T, 
m=l, ... ,lV!, V(k,t)ET. 
(4.33) 
( 4.34) 
(4.35) 
( 4.3G) 
Like for the generation, the variables dmt (k) correspond to the dernand levels associated 
with the error-free scenario. Here dernands that oHer reserves rnay be called in by the grid 
operator to modify their consumption so to respond to specific realizations of the net load 
error ralldom variable. 
4.2.7 Hydrothermal generation- and demand-side operational eonstraints 
Appendix B thoroughly details the feasible operational regiolls applying to both the hy-
drothermal generators and the demands. In the current context, sorne modifications of the 
ramping limitations of the hydrothermal generators must be made to aceount for the diHer-
ent uncertainty model used here; likewise, sorne modifications must be made with respect 
to the demand-side elasticity limits. 
Generation-side eonstraints 
Unlike in Chapter 2, where the uncertainty is revealed only once wh en contingency k 
happens during period T, here the uncertainty in the net load is revealed at each time 
period of the scheduling horizon. As a result, the inter-temporal constraints aHecting the 
hydrothermal generators must be modified accordingly to refiect this different uncertainty 
structure. 
Sinee we assume that the unit eornrnitment variables V'it are set independently of the 
realizations of the net load error RV, then the minimum up- and down-time constraints 
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applying to the hydrothermal generators are identical to those given in Appendix B. T'he 
up- and down-going ramping limitations, however, must account for the fact that the 
realization of the net load forecast error RV differs from one time period to the next 
according to the scenario followed. 
Rence, for aIl scenarios Sk, during interval t the upper bounds on git(k) are given by 
git(k) ::; gi(t-l)(k) + R~PUi(t--l) + Rr'CUit - 'lJ,i(t-l») + g;né1x(I-1lit ); 
git(k) ::; giO + R~tPUiO + R:1t (v"it - UiO) + gJnax(1 - Uit); 
t = 2, ... ,'T, 
t = 1, 
(4.37) 
(4.38) 
for aU hydrothermal generators 'i = 1, ... ,1 and pairs (k, t) E T. Likewise, lower bounds 
on gît ( k) are expressed as 
g.i/;(k) 2: gi(t-l)(k) - R~ln'Uit - R:d(Ui(t_l) - Uit) - gfné1x(1 - 'Ui(t-l)); t = 2, ... , T, (4.39) 
g'it(k) 2: giO - R1nUit - R:d(lliO - 'U'it) - gflax(1 - lliO); t = 1, (4..10) 
for aH hydrothennal genemtors i = 1, ... ,1 and pairs (k, t) E T. 
Demand-side constraints 
The demand-side limits defined in Appendix B have to be modified here to account for 
the fact that only demand levels associated with the error-free scenario (dmt (k) = dmt ) are 
bounded by elasticity limits. That is, for Tn = 1, ... , ]1.;[ and t = 1, ... , T 
(4..11) 
4.2.8 Objective function 
As already described in previous chapters, the goal of the electricity market-clearing prob-
lem here is also to minimize a measure of the expected social cost. Rowever, given the 
different structure of the llncertainty factors here, it is possible to distinguish between two 
components of the expected social cost function: 
• There are those components that materialize with a probability of one, which are: 
The sched uling costs of reserve services (up- and down-spinning, both generation-
and demand-side), Cr(rUP , rdn ); and, 
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The fixed running and startup costs of the hydrothermal generators that depend 
on the binary unit commitment variables, Cg(u). 
• Those components that materialize with a probability Pt (k) during period t and under 
scenario Sk, which a.re: 
The demand-side benefits, Bd (dt (k)); 
The generation-side running costs, Cg (gt (k)); 
The operating costs of the energy storage installations, Cs(zf(k), zf(k)); and, 
The costs of involuntary load shedding, v{lt(k)~. 
The reason why here there are components of the expected social cost function that are 
assigned a probability of one is that their associated sets of decisions variables (i. e. unit 
commitment and reserve scheduling decisions) have to be taken prior to the revelation of 
the uncertainty. On the other hand, the components of the expected social cost function 
which are assigned probabilities Pt (k) are those which only materialize once the ullccrtainty 
is revealed. These components measure the expected social cost associated with the reserve 
deployment patterns needed to keep the power system balanced during the full length of 
the scheduling horizon and for aIl the considered scenarios. 
In cases where there are sorne energy storage installations connected to the grid, an 
extra tenn may be added to the expected social cost function to \veigh in the economic 
value of energy stored nt the end of the scheduling horizon. 
In the expected social co st function, we do not assign an operating cost component as-
sociated with the WP generators. It is probably not realistic at the present moment for \VP 
generators to submit nonzero running costs offers given their relative incapacity to regulate 
effectively their output. Revisions of the cnrrent "must-take" operational regimelO for \,yp 
will be warranted only when it is possible to properly control the output of wind turbines. 
Here, we do assume that this regime still applies. Clearly, the development of techniques 
aimed at the formulation of effective market offering strategies for WP generators warrants 
further investigation, which is, however, outside of the scope of this dissertation. As men-
tioned in the Introduction of the cnrrent chapter, the development of these techniques are 
tightly coupled with the development of dependable wind forecasting techniques. 
lOUnder this regime, gr id operators must take in the VVP generation as it is produced in real time 
regardless of its level and variations. Thus, here the grid operators balance their respeetive systems 
using extra amounts of seeondary and tertiary reserves. Moreover, the WP generators are rcmunerat.ed 
at a fixed and regulated rate (often subsidized), whieh does not necessarily reflect the market value of 
electrieity [143,145,146,159]. These extra eosts are soeialized and then levied through an uplift eharge. 
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The expected social cost objective function includes an operating cost term associated 
with the energy storage installations. Besides fixed capital as weIl as relatively constant 
operations and maintenance expenses, the energy storage installations do not have signifi-
cant variable cost components. Of course, a higher number and faster transitions between 
charging and clischarging cycles should increase the wear and tear of the storage devices, 
which, as a result, coulcl increase the maintenance costs [177,178]. 80 here the variable cost 
of operation could be assumed to be proportional to the charging and discharging rates 
[zf(k), zf(k)]. 
The lost opportunities caused by the power losses constitute another noteworthy oper-
ating cost of ellergy storage installations. Consider the example where one megawatt-hour 
is bought at ),f dollars per megawatt-hour and is stored with efficiency Tt and is later re-
leased durillg period t' at an efficiency of 17d whe11 the price of electricity is ),f > ),f dollars 
pel' megawatt-hour. This means that the storage operator incurs a marginal opportunity 
co st (marginal profit loss) equal to (1 - 1t17d) X (),{f - ),f) dollars per megawatt-hour. 
It remains, however, that the formulation of rigorous operation costing models for en-
ergy storage installationswhich are probably very technology-dependent----should be the 
subject of further investigation. 
Mathematically, the objective of the electricity market-clearing problem with net load 
uncertainty boils down to 
minCg(u) + Cr (r"P, rdn ) - ~/èT - L pt(k)[Bd(dt(k)) - Cg(gt(k)) 
(k,t)ET 
- vZ\(k)6 - Cs(z~(k), zf(k))], (4.42) 
where the term -~lêT corresponds to the economic value of the expected energy stored at 
the end of the scheduling horizon. 
4.2.9 Incorporating hydrothermal generation contingencies 
The analysis of the electricity market-clearing formulation with demand and WP genera-
tion uncertainty would be incomplete without the inclusion of a discussion of the impacts 
of equipment contingencies (i. e. hydrothermal generator and centralized energy storage in-
stallations out ages) . From the point of view of the mathematical programming formulation, 
modeling generator contingencies is straightforward as it boils down to the mere generation 
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of extra scenarios. The scenarios' probabilities are found by calculating the convolution 
of the (assumed independent) probability distributions of the net load forecast error with 
those of the generation contingencies [46]. 
From a computational point of view, however, the addition of hydrothermal generator 
contingencies would render the solution process of the market-clearing problem much more 
challenging. In fact, the addition of a single generator cOlltingency, considering its possible 
times of failure, would multiply the number of scenarios by the number of periods of the 
scheduling horizon. Vve must recall that with each extra scenario COTYleS the corresponding 
extra variables and constraints. As a result, realistically-sized problems may be very hard 
to hancHe with CUITent computing tools. 
Yet, some simplifications could be considered. One possibility would be to have a hy-
brid solution whereby a deterministic reserve criterion (e.g. N - 1 criterion or schedule 
sorne proportion of the demand) that covers the hydrothermal gelleration contingencies 
and have the probabilistic method developed here to take care of scheduling reserves for 
the ViP and dernand uncertainty. A second solution path would make use of the scenario 
reduction techniques rnentioned before [105,121---123,175]. Finally, not to be lleglected, the 
decompositioll techniques evoked previously [31,82,85,112,115,116,118-120] are prornising 
because they can exploit the intrinsic decornposable structure of the problern-whereby 
each scenario is optimized individually under the command of a master coordinating prob-
lem. These aspects are outside of the scope of the current dissertation, but should be 
subject of extensive future research and development efforts. 
4.3 Case Studies 
This section outlines the results of case studies of the electricity market-clearing with 
stochastic security under demand and WP generation uncertainty. The case studies aim at 
demonstrating that: 
• When planning operations un der uncertain load and wind forecasts, voluntary and/or 
involuntary load shedciing can be va.luable scheduling options for the system operator; 
• Under stochastic market-clearing, the acceptable level of winci power penetration can 
be more important than under operating schemes based on deterministic security 
criteria founded on worst case scenario situations; and, 
• Energy storage installations can bring about improved operational flexibility and 
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economic savings. 
These case studies are based on System A described in Appendix E.l with the following 
modifications: 
• The demand-side spinning reserve services offers are worth $50 per megawatt-hour 
(in lieu of $20 per rnegawatt-hour) ; 
• The transmission network is ignored; and, 
• "N on-spinning reserve services are not considered. 
4.3.1 Base case 
No wind power without demand uncertainty 
Under a perfect demand prediction-where the prediction follows the demand schedule 
in Table E.l-and no installed wind power capacity, the minimum expected social cost 
of operation is $6300.00. Obviously, under this uncertainty-free regime of operation no 
spinning reserve services are scheduled, while the associated expected marginal costs of 
security p,t") are nil for aU time periods t = 1, ... ,4. 
The corresponding generation schedule is found in Table 4.1, and the expected marginal 
costs of energy (.\f) are reported in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.1 Uncertainty-free generation schedule 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
911; (IVIW) 0.0 30.0 60.0 0.0 
92t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
93t (MW) 30.0 50.0 50.0 40.0 
Table 4.2 Uncertainty-free rnarginal social costs of energy 
\E 
/\t 
1 
($jMWh) 20.00 
Time t (h) 
2 3 4 
:30.00 30.00 20.00 
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No wind power with demand uncertainty 
Next, we consider the same scheduling problem as above, but this time with demalld 
uncertainty. Here the standard deviation of the demand forecast error is assumed to equal 
2% of the hourly demand prediction found in Table E.l. The demand prediction error 
probability distribution is approximated by a discrete distribution made up of seven one-
standard deviation-wide slices as shown in Fig. 4.1. This slicing arrangement gives ri se to 
a 2401-scenario scenario tree for the four hour-long scheduling horizon. 
The minimum expected cost umier stochastic market-clearing is $6478.52 (a 2.83% 
increase over the uncertainty-free case reported above). The expected cost breakdowIl for 
schedules based OIl the determiIlistic-~--vlhich does Ilot allow the use of involuntary load 
shedding-and the stochastic market-clearing are in ShOWll in Table 4.3. By inspection, 
the components corresponding to the error-free scenario (that include generator startup 
costs) and the reserve deployment operations represent the bulk of the total expected cost 
under both deterministic and stochastic formulations. As one would expect, in light of 
the conclusions of Chapter 2, the stochastic scheduling method does bring in expected 
savings [value of the stochastic solution (VSS)] of $2.69, which correspond to 0.04% of the 
expected co st under the deterministic security criterioll. We note that this improvement 
is quite sm aIl. This is explained by the small demand forecast uncertainty associated with 
this particular case. 
The generation schedules correspondillg to the error-free scenario, for both the deter-
ministic and stochastic cases, follow the one found in the uncertainty-free case shown in 
1~j,ble 4.1. The generation- and demand-side spinning reserve schedules correspollding to 
the stochastic case are found in Table 4.4. In addition, the last row of Table 4.4 lists the 
amount of expected load not served during each of the four hours of the scheduling horizon, 
where the ELNS is calculated as 
lt = I: pt(k)lt(k)/J.. ( 4.43) 
k:(k.t)ET 
During periods 1; = 1 and t = 4 the up-going spinning reserve provided is 110t sufficient 
to coyer the most extreme cases of high demand under-prediction-both corresponding to 
scenarios where the forecast is off by three loacl forecast error standard deviations. On 
the other hand, the down-going spinning reserve has to coyer the who le range of under-
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Table 4.3 Comparison of expected social costs under demand uncertainty 
detenninistic versus stochastic 
Deterministic ($) 
Stochastic ($) 
Difference ($) 
Total 
6481.20 
6478.52 
2.69 
Ulncludes startup costs. 
Reserve 
scheel uling 
181.20 
170.00 
Il.20 
Error-free 
scenario a 
882.77 
882.77 
0.00 
Reserve 
eleployment 
5417.23 
5417.05 
(U8 
Loss-of-load 
0.00 
8.69 
-8.69 
Table 4.4 Reserves and ELNS Hneler demand uncertainty 
Tirne t (h) 
1 2 :3 4 
1LP Tlt (MW) 0.0 4.8 6.6 0.0 
Tdn 1t (MW) Cl.O 4.8 6.6 0.0 
vp 
r2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tdn 2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
rVP 3t (MW) 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.6 
r dn 3t (MW) 1.8 0.0 0.0 2.4 
r 1lP dt (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
r.dn dt (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
lt (kWh) 3.7 O.Cl 0.0 5.0 
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prediction errors sinee "negative" load shedding (generation spillage) is not modeled here; 
that expla.ins why the values of T;{f are less than those of Tg~ during f; = 1 and 4. 
Finally he1'8, Table 4.5 lists the expected marginal costs of energy and security corre-
sponding to the stochastic schedule. These marginal costs were calculated from the prin-
ciples outlined in Appendix Gand extended in Chapter 3, taking the error-free scenario 
as the pre-contingency state. 1~lble 4.5 illustrates well that the expected marginal costs of 
security represent an important proportion of the expected marginal costs of energy. This 
does indeed refiect the fact that even small forecasting errors have significant impact on 
the marginal costs of energy and security. 
Table 4.5 Expected marginal socia.l costs of energy and security under de-
rnand uncertainty 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
ÀE t ($jMWh) 20.00 30.00 :30.00 20.00 
À8 t ($jMWh) 12.34 25.60 28.32 19.57 
4.3.2 Wind penetration level and wind prediction uncertainty 
In this section, wc demonstrate how the stochastic market-clearing formulation can ac-
commodate better the VVP generation and the demand forecast errors than deterministic-
based security-constrained market-clearing. As the WP generation penetrationll level is 
increased, for sorne arbitrary VVP and dernand predictions, the stochastic market-clearing 
is solved and its outcomes are analyzed against the outcomes of a corresponding deter-
ministïc market-clearing formulation. Here the deterministic market-clearing formulation 
is one which schedules reserves so as to counter all possible realizations of the net load 
forecast error scenarios without involuntary load shedding or wind energy spillage. As 
clone in Chapter 2 and ab ove , under demand uncertainty only, comparisons between the 
deterministic and the stochastic-based market-clearing solutions are made by examining 
the diHerences betwccn the respective expected values of a number of quantities. 
11 VVP penetration is defilled î1S the rî1tio of the WP installed generation capacity to the total hydrotherrnal 
capacity, which is 250 M'V here. 
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Here, the WP forecast error model is taken from Fabbri et al. [147], under which the 
ôtandard deviation of a WP forecast error is estimated from a function of the normalized 
predicted pmver. Assuming that the \VP prediction was made 24 hours prior to the first 
hour of the schedule and for a region size of 140 kilometers, the standard deviation of the 
\VP forecast error is approximated by 
(Jwt = 0.02 + 0.2 'IÎlt, (4.44) 
where (Jwt and Wt are m per unit of the insta11ed wind capacity for t = 1, ... ,4. The 
per-unitized WP generation forecast tÛt that will be used is found in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Hourly wind power generatiol1 forecast 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
11lt (p.u.) 0.55 0.35 0.10 0.25 
Fig. 4.3 shows the evolution of the expected social cost of the schedule for both the 
deterministic and stochastic market-clearing approaches as the WP generation penetration 
level is increased. The expected cost under stochastic market-clearing undergoes a steady 
decrease as the amount of WP generation increases. This contrasts with the deterministic-
based cost which decreases until the 8% penetration mark where it starts increasing until 
no feasible scheclules exist, when the penetration level reaches 10%. The observecl behavior 
of the deterministic-based expected scheduling co st reflects that at one point the need for 
reserves to cuver a11 uncertainty scenarios overwhelms the expected savings brought about 
by the increasing level of free, but uncertain, WP generation. It is a1so interesting to note 
here that the "free" wind power cOIllpensates for its extra reserve needs starting at a fairly 
low penetration level. It only takes a penetration 1evel of about 3% for the expected costs 
(stochastic and deterministic) to be 1ess than the schedu1e co st under the base case with a 
perfect demand forecast and no wind, which we found in Section 4.3.1 ($6300). 
The size of the gap between the two curves represents the value of the stochastic solution 
(VSS), which is plotted in pel' unit of the deterrninistic expected cost in Fig. 4.4. 'vVe observe 
the slow increase in the VSS until the 8% penetration level. The faster increase in between 
8 and 9% is explained by the expensive dernand-side reserves (at $50 pel' rnegawatt-hour) 
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Fig. 4.3 Total expected social costs of scheduling as a function of the WP 
penetration 
needed to balance power for all the uncertainty scenarios under the deterministic case-even 
those with very low probabilities. 
The behavior of the expected costs and the VSS can be further investigated by inspecting 
Fig. 4.5 that shows the progression of the reserve costs as the WP penetration varies. There 
is nothing more to say about the case of the deterministic-based market-elearing; it is elear 
that the reserve costs increase sharply with the level of WP penetration. On the other hand, 
the cost of reserves under stochastic market-elearing follows a difl'erellt pattern: (i) between 
o and 2% of WP penetration, the cost of reserves decreases because, on average, it is less 
expensive to spill wind and involuntarily shed load than schedule more reserves given the 
smal1 size of the ViP capacity; (ii) between 2 and 15% of WP penetration, more reserves are 
required since the cost of load shedding and the opportunity cost of spilling wind increase 
faster than the cost of reserves; and, (iii) for 15% of vVP onward, the cost of reserves 
is stcady as more reserves cannot further decrease the global scheduling costs. These 
phenomena are refleeted in the amounts of involuntary load shedding and wind energy 
spillage shown in Fig. 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. The faster increase in the wind energy 
spillage occurring for WP penetration levels above 15% is refiected in the fiat part of the 
cost of reserves curve (Fig. 4.5) as, under these penetration levels, wind energy spillage, 
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Fig. 4.4 Value of the stochastic solution as a function of the WP penetration 
which is free, is used in lieu of down-spinning reserve. 
One of the peculiarities of the demand and wind forecasts in this case study is the 
occurrence of a low demand period during t = 1, which is also a high wind period. This 
has serious implications as can be seen in Table 4.7 for the particular case when the WP 
penetration level equals 15%. During the first period, generator 3 is constrained by its 
minimum output level (10 megawatts), impeding down-going regulation actions. As a 
result, plenty of wind energy is spilled---an average of 2306.3 kWh during this period. This 
constraint on down-going actions is reflected in the lower value of the expected marginal 
costs of energy and security during that hour shown in Table 4.8 (with respect to those in 
Table 4 .. 5 where only demand uncertainty is affecting the schedule). These lower marginal 
expected costs are clear economic signaIs indicating that, by increasing their load during 
that period, consumers could benefit from the plentiful supply of free wind. 
4.3.3 Energy storage 
In light of the expected amounts of spilled wind energy found in the above example, it is 
of intercst to invcstigate how a large-scale (megawatt-hour-range) energy storage facility 
could lm.ver the overall expected costs and make better use of the installed wind capacity. 
4 Market-Clearing Under Demand and Wind Generation Uncertainty 123 
450i------,,-------,-------r----r:=:::=:::;::===::=ïl 
400 
350 
~ 300 
~ 
~ 
'0 8 250 
200 
100~-------~--------J----------L--------~--------~ 
o 10 15 20 25 
Wind power penetration (%) 
Fig. 4.5 Cast of reserves as a function of the \tVP penetration 
80,---------,----------,---------,----------,---------, 
70 
60 
50 
30 
20 
O~--------~---------L--------~--------~--------~ 
o 10 15 20 25 
Wind power penetration (%) 
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Fig. 4.7 Expected wind energy spilled as a function of the wind povver pe-
netration 
Table 4.7 Error-free generation, reserves, ELNS and expected wind energy 
spillage for 15% WP penetration 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
.9lt (k) (M\V) 0.0 16.9 56.3 0.0 
rUP 1t (MW) 0.0 11.2 8.0 0.0 
rdn 1t (MW) 0.0 3.7 2.7 0.0 
.92t(k) (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
T UP 2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 o.() 
rdn 2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
.9:31 (k) (MW) 10.0 50.0 50.0 30.6 
up 
1'3t (MW) 9.2 0.0 0.0 5.5 
rdn 3t (MvV) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
up 
'l'dt (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
r-dn dt (MW) 0.0 O.Cl 0.0 0.0 
it (kWh) 30.5 0.0 0.0 17.0 
SI; (kWh) 2306.:3 272.7 194.4 1047.1 
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Table 4.8 Expected marginal social costs of energy and security for 15% 
WP penetration 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
).E 
t ($jMWh) 14.17 ;·moo 30.00 20.00 
)...5 
t ($jMWh) 14.17 25.60 28.32 20.00 
Here the goal is to show how the energy storage capacity eTIlax (in megawatt-hours) relative 
to the insta,lled VVP generation capacity (in megawatts) affects: (i) the expected scheduling 
cost; (ii) the cost of reserves; (iii) the expected load not served; and, (iv) the expected 
value of the spilled wind energy. 
For conciseness herc, we consider only the effects of lossless energy storage applied wh en 
theWP generatioll penetration equals 10% (25 megawatts) in System A UIHler stochastic 
market-clearing. Moreover, we assume that: 
• The WP generatioll and demand forecasts and their corresponding uncertainties are 
as in Section 4.:3.2; 
• The operating costs of the energy storage facility are neglected; 
• The maximum rate of charge and dis charge zTIlax is set equal to eTIlax / ,0., where ,0. = 
1 hour; 
• The storage ramping rate zlTIax is assumed to be larger than twice zlTIax, which implies 
that the storage facility can switch from fully charging to fully discharging---and vice 
versa---within a single time period; 
• The initial energy stored fO is set equal to half of the st orage capacity, Co = emax /2; 
• There is no lower bound on the expected value of the energy stored in the last time 
period. Instead, we value the energy stored in the last period at the marginal rate", 
which is set equal to $10 per megavvatt-hour. 
Fig. 4.8 shows the near-linear decrease in the expected value of the scheduling cost with 
the increasing proportion of storage capacity to the iustalled WP generatioll. This expected 
cost curve is clea,r of the term measurillg the expected value of the energy stored at the end 
of the scheduling horizon, "éT , appearing in (4.42). It can be seen that under the current 
level of WP penetration (10%), the incremental reduction in the expected scheduling GOst 
is roughly $20 per megawatt-hour of added storage capacity. It should be noted as well 
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that the bu1k of the expected cost decrease seen here is due to the steady 1'eductions in 
the 1'eserve dep10yment costs with the increase in the storage to WP capacity ratio. The 
1'eserve deployment component is reduced because the st orage installations essentially are 
replacing the use of classical reserve services. 
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Fig.4.8 Expected social cost of scheduling as a function of the relative energy 
storage capacity at 10% yVP penetration 
An allied observation is that, as seen in Fig. 4.9, the cost of 1'eserves scheduling de-
creases with the increase in the proportion of the installed st orage to the WP generation 
capacity. This a1so indicates that the energy storage is dearly a substitute for dassical l'e-
serve services here. However, the decrease becomes quasi ni1 as the st orage to WP capacity 
ratio reaches 0.6 MWh/MW. This change in behavior is explained by the fact that when 
the storage capacity is large enough, it is no longer used just to buffer the variations in 
the net load. More fundamentally here, the reason why the cost of reserve schedu1ing is no 
longer dec1'easing cornes from the econornie arbitrage opportunities offered by the st orage 
installations. 
For instance, when the storage to vVP generation capacity ratio is set to 1.0 MWh/MW, 
during pcriod t = 1 under the error-free scenario, genemtor 3 is scheduled to gene1'ate power 
(at $20 pel' rnegawatt-hour) rnuch ove1' the predicted net 10ad of 11.25 rnegawatts, as can 
be seen in Tùb1e 4.9. In this case, the surplus generation is stored to be released later 
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Fig. 4.9 Costs of reserves as a function of the relative energy stOl'age capacity 
at 10% WP penetration 
in periods 2 and 3 durillg which the predicted net load is higher and the more expensive 
generator 1 (generating at $:30 pel' megawatt-hour) is lleeded to balance power. 
In a nutshell, with sufficiently large storage, the reserve scheduling, load shedding and 
wind spillage savings are no longer the dominant factors in the market-clearing decision 
process. This is reflected further in the behavior of the ELNS and the expeded value of 
spilled wind energy as shown in Fig. 4.10 and 4.11 respectively. 
Not to be neglected here, there are other key parameters which could have significant 
effeds on the beha,vior of the market-clearing problem in the presence of energy storage. 
Clearly, rarnping and charging/ discharging cycling restrictions of the energy st orage facili-
ties are the ones that could affect greatly the performance of the market as a whole. 
4.3.4 Computational eomplexity 
The dimensions of the simple market-clearing problems Just studied are not trivial; they are 
reported in Table 4.10. As mentioned before, the large dimensions are a consequence ofthe 
fad that no scenario reduction techniques were applied to the formulation. Moreover, the 
number of net load forecast error probability distribution slices (seven) is a factor directly 
influencing the size of the problerns. Obviously, fewer slices would reduce the problem size 
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Table 4.9 Enor-free gelleration, reserves, ELNS, expected wind energy 
spillage and storage for 10% WP penetration with 1.0 MWh/MW storage to 
WP capacity ratio 
Time t (h) 
1 2 3 4 
glt(k) (MW) 0.0 13.0 40.8 0.0 
r11.P 
1t (MW) 0.0 0.0 1:3.3 0.0 
rdn lt (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
g2t(k) (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1LP r2t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 Cl.O 
rdn 2t (MW) Cl.O O.Cl 0.0 O.Cl 
g:3t(k) (MW) 28.7 50.0 50.0 35.7 
'/Lp T3t (MW) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 
rdn :3t (MW) llO 0.0 0.0 0.0 
'r'll,p 
(l/; (MW) 0.0 O.Cl 0.0 0.0 
r dn dt (MW) Cl.Cl O.Cl 0.0 Cl.O 
lt (kWh) 0.0 0.0 7.6 8.8 
St (kvVh) 1261.0 O.Cl O.Cl 0.0 
êt (MWh) 23.7 15.5 0.9 2.9 
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Fig. 4.10 ELNS as a function of the relative energy storage capacity at 10% 
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Fig. 4.11 Expected wind energy spilled as a function of the energy storage 
capacity at 10% WP penetration 
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but at the expense of modeling accuracy. 
Table 4.10 Dimensions of stochastic market-clearing problems under de-
mand and VVP uncertainty----with and without energy stOl·age 
Constraints 
Variables 
Binaries 
vVithout st orage \Vith storage 
9:3660 
33657 
12 
107660 
39257 
12 
The market-clearing problems were solved with Paco using version 9.0.2 of CPLEX 
(see Appendix F). As seen in Chapter 2, the mixed-integer linear programming solver 
pre-processing engine is generally capable of reducing significantly the size of the market-
clearing problems. For the above cases, the reduced problems have the dimensions given in 
T'able 4.11. For example, the solution times were of 39.0 seconds and 89.5 seconds for the 
10% WP generation penetration cases respectively without st orage and with 0.4 MWh/MW 
of lossless storage. Besides their larger number of variables, cases with st orage are longer 
to solve because they involve more of the complicating inter-temporal constraints of the 
form found in (4.15), (4.16), (4.18) or (4.28). 
Table 4.11 Dimensions of stochastic market-clearing problems under de-
I113nd and WP uncertainty-with and without energy storage---with CPLEX 
pre-processing applied 
Constraints 
Variables 
Binaries 
Without storage "Vith storage 
:39209 
14000 
12 
:39209 
16800 
12 
Again, reiterating v,rhat has already been mentioned regarding the computational com-
plexity of the proposed formulations, any practical implementation of the proposed fornlU-
lations would require further investigation of scenario reduction techniques applied specifi-
cally to the CUITent problem. Moreover, in conjunction with research on scenario reduction 
tedmiques, the application of decomposition methods should equally be the subject of 
future research eHorts. 
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4.4 Summary 
Current electricity market~clearing schemes cannot fully integrate the most essential feature 
of demand and non-dispatchable generation technologies like solar and wind power. This 
limitation of market-clearing schemes is becoming an issue for grid operators as there is more 
and more public and political pressure to increase the penetration of renewable gcneration 
technologies, which depend on ever-evolving weather conditions. 
Using the stochastic security framework developed earlier in the dissertation, this chap-
ter proposecl an electricity market-clearing formulation that can aecount explicitly for those 
uncertainties. Using wind power generation as a typical non-dispatchable generation tech-
nology, wc formulated a stochastic market-elearing problem wherein the uncertainty in the 
demand and the wind power are approximated by a joint discrete probability distribution. 
In addition, we extended the basic market-elearing formulation to permit the participat.ion 
in the market of large-seale energy storage installations. 
Case studies showed how the proposed formulation can effectively reduce expected oper-
ating costs and cau extend the feasible wind power gencration penetration level in cornpari-
son to "worst-case" scenarios deterministie operational planning techniques. In addition, we 
showed that the addition of large-seale energy storage facilities can improve the economic 
efficiency of the market. 
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Chapter 5 
U mbrella Contingencies in 
Security-Constrained Market-Clearing 
5.1 Introduction 
Cover my defenceless head 
With the shadow of thy wing. 
In Ternptation 
Charles Wesley, 1708-1788 
'vVe have seen throughout the previous chapters of this dissertation that integrating security 
constraints in an electricity market-clearing formulation (be it deterministic or stochastic) 
poses important computational challenges. On top of the underlying computational explo-
sion, lies the tight time limits faced by grid and market operators as they resolve day-ahead 
and hour-ahead electricity scheduling problems. As a result, research efforts aiming at re-
ducing the dimensions of the security-constrained market-clearing problems are paramount 
to render these tools more practical for the industry. 
'vVe enumerated before a number of possible techniques which may be used to improve 
the computational tractability of such tools. Techniques based on decomposition methods 
[27,31,82,85,112,115,116,118-120] are applicable to both determillistic and stochastic 
versions of security-constrailled market-clearing formulations. Only applicable to stochastic 
instances of the security-constrained market-clearing problem, the use and development 
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of scena,rio reduction techniques [121-123] also represent significant steps in the desired 
direction. 
In the more general context of power system operation, past and CUITent practices 
approached the large number of contingencies to be analyzed through the proeess of COIl-
tingency ranking [179-184]. These ranking procedures are usually based on simplified load 
fiow or transiellt stability analyses for each of the credible contingencies relative to a given 
operating point previously found by an economic dispatch or a unit commitment. Under 
such a ranking paradigm, only those highly ranked eontingeneies are analyzed in detail, 
from which any neeessary preventive security control actions are then defined and imple-
mented [41,185,186]. 
Contingency ranking is closely tied to the notion of umbrella contingencies. vVe say 
that a contingency ko is an umbrella contingency of the set of contingencies {k l , ... , kn } 
if the condition that the system is secme with respect to ko only implies that the system 
is also secure with respect to {k ll ... , krJ. Thus, it is readily seen that evaluating the 
system security with respect to ko only is equivalent to evaluating the system secmity with 
respect to the set {ko, ... , kn }. \Ve can say then that the set of umbrella contingencies is 
the redueed collection of contingencies comprising only those sufficient to coyer the entire 
set of credible contingencies. The notion of umbrella contingencies is therefore much more 
powerful than that of a ranked list of contingencies sinee the latter does not eliminate a 
contingency from further consideration. Umbrella contingencies are used extensively by 
system operators to limit the number of credible contingencies to be analyzed. The basis 
for the identification of umbrella contingencies is based mostly on empirical evidence and 
experienee [186], although sorne related set-theoretic results based on security regions have 
been developed during the 1970's and 1980's [187-190]. 
In this chapter, we investigate a rule for the identification of umbrella contingencies for 
security-constrained electricity market-clearing problems based on optimal power fiow [191]. 
Specifically, the goal here is to predict, in terms of the anticipated system conditions, re-
dueed numbers of equivalent credible umbrella contingencies and variables for which the 
resolution of the corresponding relaxed security-constrained optimal power flow results in 
the same or nearly the same market-clearing schedule as with the full set of contingencies. 
It is readily seen that having to resolve a security-constrained market-clearing problem 
constrained only by its set of umbrella contingencies should be much simpler and compu-
tationally cheaper than having to resolve a similar problem, but, this time, constrained by 
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all credible contingencies. 
In this chapter, we propose that the members of the set of umbrella contingencies 
can be systematically found from the Lagrange multipliers of the underlying full security-
cOl1strainecl power fiow (SCOPF) problem. In the deterministic version of the market-
clearing problem, we show how to identify a set of umbrella contingencies that yields 
precisely the same market-clearing solution as that of the full SCOPF. On the other hand, 
in the stochastic case, a smaller set of umbrella contingencies can be obtained such that 
the sensitivity of the optimum solution to the neglected eontingencies is less than sorne 
pre-determinecl threshold. 
vor the deterministic case, we present a numerical study illustrating how the system 
demand can affect the membership of the urnbrella set. In the stochastic case, we examine 
the heuristic threshold rule defining membership in the umbrella set as well as its impact 
on the market-clearing solution. 
5.2 Umbrella Contingencies 
5.2.1 Seeurity-eonstrained market-clearing 
Consider the security-constrained optimal power fiow problem optimizing r/V(u, x), which 
represents a measure of the social cost over the pre- and post-contingency operating states, 
where the latter are defined by a set of credible contingencies K 
min vV(u, x), (5.1) 
u,X 
subject to the nodal pre-contingency power balance conditions 
H(u(O), x(O), 0) = 0 (J.L(O)), (5.2) 
the nodal power balance conditions for each of the contingencies k E K 
H(u(k), x(k), k) = 0 (J.L(k)), (5.3) 
and all illoqualities applying to all pre- and post-contingency variables 
G(u, x) ~ 0 (0"). (5.4) 
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Here the vector u represents the entire set of discrete variables of the SCOPF such as 
on/ off generator status and transformer tap settings, while x represents the continuous 
generation, demand and reserve levels, bus voltages and, possibly, load shedding. We point 
out that the vectors H and x include both pre- and post-colltingency variables. 
Associated with their respective constraints, (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4), we define the La-
grange multiplier vectors j.L(0), j.L(k); V k E JC, and CF. 
In the case where the market-clearing problem is based on a deterministic SCOPF (like 
in Section 2.2), the objective function ~V(u, x) ignores the probability of occurrence of the 
contingencies. Moreover, it does not optimize the assoeiated loss of welfare due to reserve 
deployment following the occurrence of any credible contingency as in [64]. 
This is unlike the stochashc case where the objective function is the expected value of 
the social cost that considers the probabilities of occurrence of the credible contingencies 
and the expected associated extra incurred costs due to reserve deployment (as proposed in 
Section 2.4). For example, if the contingencies k E JC have probabilities p(k) and the pre-
contingency state has a probability p(O), the objective function of the stochastic SCOPF 
is written as 
W(u, x) = p(O)W(u(O), x(O), 0) + LP(k)lIV(u(k), x(k), k), (5.5) 
kEJ( 
where VV (', 0) and lIV (" k) express respectively the pre- and post-contingency social co st 
functions. 
Unlike its deterministic counterpart, by accounting for the post-contingency expected 
social welfare, the stochastic SCOPF is well suited to balance the relative benefits and costs 
of reserve scheduling and deployment versus those of load shedding, as seen in Chapter 2. 
5.2.2 Identifying umbrella contingendes 
Let us consider a subset of the set of credible contingencies, U C JC. vVe can define a 
relaxation of the full SCOPF, (5.1)(5.4), replacing (5.3) by 
H(u(k),x(k),k) =0; VkEU. (5.6) 
Let us denote the solution to the full SCOPF by the triplet (1IV, H, x) = (lV*, u*, x*) 
and that of the relaxed SCOPF [defined by (5.1), (5.2), (5.4) and (5.6)] by the triplet 
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(tV,u,x) = (vVt,ut,xt). VvTe should note here that the solution vectors (ut,xt ) of the 
relaxed SCOPF problem are of lovver dimension than their full SCOPF counterparts since 
the relaxed SCOPF does not need to optimize over the omitted contingencies and their 
corresponding variables. 
Consider the following alternate definition of the notion of the set of umbrella contin-
gellcies, which is a reinterpretation of the Olle previously made in the Introduction of the 
present chapter. 
Definition 5.1 (Set of umbrella contingencies). The subset U is a set of umbrella contin-
gencies of the full SCOPF if the optimal value of the relaxed SCOPF, W--t, is the same or 
very close to that of the full SCOPF, VV*. 
In other words, if, by ignoring a contingency k, the optimal social co st of the SCOPF 
changes significantly-meallillg that this contingency is determinant in setting the optimal 
solution of the SCOPF----, then this contingency k should be part of the set of umbrella 
contingencies U. On the other hand, if the corresponding optimal cost of the relaxed 
SCOPF, fOlmd without that contingency, is the sarne or very close to that of the SCOPF 
including that contingency, then k tf:- U. 
Using the above definition as our starting point, we propose next a technique to identify 
the set of urnbrella contingencies of a SCOPF problem formulation from its J-L(k) vectors, 
the Lagrange multipliers of the post-contingency power balance relations. 
Proposition 5.1 (Identificaüon rule for urnbrella contingencies). The elements of the set 
of 'umbTella contingencies of the full SCOPF corn~spond ta those cont'ingencies whose as-
sociated Lagrange rmûtipher vedors satisfy Il J-L( k) IIp ?: E, for· some pr·e-speC'ified threshold 
f> o. 
The validity of Proposition 5.1 bases itself on the following reasoning. Similar arguments 
to those round in Chapter 3 and in [192] can be invoked to demonstrate that the sensitivity 
of the full SCOPF objective function to an infinitesimal perturbation dS(k) of the right-
hand side of the power balance relation under contingency k is 
8VV 
8S(k) = J-L(k). (5.7) 
Then, if the sensitivity of the objective function to a perturbation of the power balance 
rela.tions following contingency k is small, i.e. 11J-L(k)llp < E, then the power balance under 
5 Umbrella Contingencies in Security-Constrained Market-Clearing 137 
~_~ __ ~,_""_o~,~,~ ___ ,= __ ,~ __ ~=,,~~~~, __ ~_---._~W 
contingency k can be perturbed without affecting significantly the optimal objeetive value 
of the full SCOPF, 11/*. This implies that if IlfL(k) IIp < E, then ignoring contingency k in the 
relaxed SCOPF will likewise not significantly affect the corresponding optimum objective 
function value (TV t ) compared to that of the full SCOPF (TiV*). 
Put differently, for a small enough perturbation of the post-contingency power balance 
relations associated with contingency k, dS(k), we have dvV = liV* - vvt = fLT(k) dS(k) so 
that 
IdHll:::; IlfL(k)llp IldS(k)llp 
:::; élldS(k)llp, (5.8) 
where we made use of Schwarz's inequality. The above result thus indicates that only those 
contingencies, whose upper bound on the marginal effect on t.he optimal SCOPF co st lS 
greater than E dollars per megawatt-hour, will be admitted in the set of umbrella contingen-
cies. As a result, finding the set of urnbrella contingencies simply boils down to identifying 
those failures t.hat affect most significantly the optimal value of the objective function, 
while those contingencies having no or little efIect on the objective can be disregarded, in 
accordance with Definition 5.l. 
\Vhereas the above conclusion is theoretically sound when comparing the objective 
functions of the full and relaxed SCOPFs, additional numerical tests are still needed to 
assess the validity of the optimal optimization variables obtained with the relaxed SCOPF 
subject to the set of umbrella contingencies only. The results of the numerical studies, 
shown in Section 5.4 of the current chapter, suggest that the identification of umbrella 
contingencies based on the Lagrange multipliers is valid. 
5.3 Discussion 
The vector norm of the Lagrange multipliers used in Proposition 5.1 could be interpreted 
as a severity index which can be used to rank the contingencies as already do ne by power 
system operators. Here, these severity indices represent some measures of the marginal 
social costs associated with the different contingencies, which refiect the corresponding 
marginal social costs of scheduling and deploying reserves. The severity index concept cau 
le ad to proposing an alternative to the specification of a cutoff threshold E, as one could 
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define the set of the umbrella contingencies by retaining only a pre-specified number of the 
most highly-ranked contingencies. 
In addition, the choiee of the vector norm type (p = 1,2,00, etc.) should have an 
effect on the selection of the umbrella contingencies. The one and two norms average out 
the Lagrange multiplier vectors over the entire network, while the infinity norm seeks the 
extreme values only. }()l' instance, consider a case under which contingency k leads to 
line congestion that isolates a demand bus m from the rest of the network. Thus, this 
contingency could cause a large gap between the elements of the vector J-t(k)-very high 
ILn (k) for n = Tn and low Pn (k) for n -1 m. One can readily see that the ranking rule based 
on the infillity Ilorm would probably give higher weight to this contingency than under the 
one or the two norm. Renee, as a general rule we could say here that the one and two 
norms should favor the contingencies with important network-wide effects, while, on the 
other hand, the infinity norm should favor the contingeneies having important but more 
Iocalized effects. 
It is somewhat obvious that the set of umbrella contingencies for a given SCOPF is 
strongly dependent on the parameters of the SCOPF (loading, network configuration, unit 
commit ment , etc.). Renee, as the parametrization of the problem changes, the members of 
the set of umbrella contingencies should aiso vary. Nevertheless, for most practical situa-
tions, the set of umbrella contingencies generally stays constant in a neighborhood of a given 
parametrization. :Moreover, an interesting associated problem here is the determination of 
contingencies which rernain urnbrella contingencies independentIy of the value of a given 
system parameter of subset of parameters. Identifying these "super-urnbrella" contingencies 
is of clear interest because of their intrinsic insensitivity to parameter uncertainties. 
The intended use of the pl'Oposed umbrella contingency identification scheme is as an 
ofHine market operations planning tool whose l'ole would be to specify a set of umbrella con-
tingencies associated with particular (predicted) operating conditions. For instanee, simu-
lations based on predicted operating conditions as well as past post-contingency Lagrange 
multiplier data could be used to pre-specify a relaxed set of contingencies to constrain 
an actual market-clearing SCOPF, for which the computational complexity must be kept 
withill reasonable limits. Likewise, the post-contingency Lagrange multiplier data could be 
of use to system planne1's when justifying reliability reinforeements. Clearly, an equipment 
failure having large associated Lagrange multiplier norms on average over sorne time hori-
zon could indicate that aclding a redundant component in parallel could well reduee the 
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ecollomic impact of that failure. 
5.4 Case Studies 
In this section, we study the proposed umbrella contingency identification mIe on a modified 
version of System A described in Appendix KI. For simplieity here, we consider only cases 
without time-dynamic effects, a network model based on the de load fiow, and we neglect 
unit commit ment and thus assume that aU three generators are online. 
SpecificaIly, the generator data, given in Table E.2, assumes that generator i: (i) pro-
duces energy at the rate of gi megawatts in the range [0, gyHlx F for an incremental cost of 
ai dollars per megawatt-hour; (ii) provides up-spinning reserve, r~P, and down-spinning re-
serve, r~in, at the rates of q;tp and qrn dollars per megawatt-hour respectively; and, (iii) has 
a forced-outage rate given by Ui . 
On the 10ad side, we assume that the consumer at bus 3 is inelastic and offers to reduce 
or increase its consumption in the form of up- (r~P) or down- (Tân ) spinning reserve up to 
10% of its scheduled consumption at rates q:?, = $20 per megawatt-hour and (ân = $20 
per megawatt-hour respectively. The inelasticity assumption on the demand-side implies 
that the objective function of the market-clearing SCOPF minimizes the cost of scheduling 
generation and reserve services only. 
Here, the set of credible contingeneies K includes aIl single generator and line outages. 
Contingencies k = 1,2,3 correspond to the failure of generators l, 2 and 3 respectively, 
while contingencies k = 4, 5, 6 correspond respectively to the failure of lines l, 2 and 3. 
5.4.1 Deterministie security-constrained market-clearing 
This first example examines how Proposition 5.1 works for the deterministic SCOPF. Here, 
we investigate how the membership of the set of umbrella contingencies is subject to demand 
variations. We fonnulate a linear objective function for the market-clearing SCOPF in the 
following manner 
(5.9) 
INote here that the lower generation limits are assumed to he equal to zero for al! three generators, 
unlike what is indicated in T~'lhle E.2. 
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Table 5.1 reports the Lagrange multipliers of the post-colltingency bus power balance 
equality constraillts as a function of the load at bus 3. For each of the load ranges, it is 
clear that the umbre11a cOlltillgencies are those for which 11J.t(k)lIp > 0, regardless of the 
norm type used. 
Table 5.1 Lagrange multiplicrs of the post-contingency power balance rela-
tions as a function of the load 
p,(k) ($jMWh) 
Load range (MW) Bus 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 0 0 5 0 0 0 
[0,50] 2 () () 5 0 0 0 
3 0 0 5 0 0 0 
1 2 () 5 () 0 0 
(50,100] 2 2 0 5 0 0 0 
3 2 0 5 0 () () 
1 7 5 0 () 0 0 
(100,105] 2 7 5 0 0 0 0 
3 7 5 () 0 0 () 
1 7 0 () -3 () -2 
(105,116.6) 2 7 0 0 0 0 -2 
:3 7 0 () Cl 0 13 
By inspection, in the range of demand from 0 to 50 megawatts, the vector J.t(k) is 
nonzero for k = ::~ only. This me ans that the set of umbre11a contingencies is composed 
of the cOlltingellcy corresponding to the failure of generator 3 only. In this range, a11 the 
energy is generated by generator 3, which is the cheapest illcrementa11y as seen in Table E.2. 
Therefore, t6 meet the loss of that generator, an equal amount of up-spinning reserve is 
provided by generator l, the cheapest pl'ovider of up-spinning resel've. The Lagrange 
multipliers at the three buses are a11 equal to $5 pel' megawatt-hour, which is the ofIered 
marginal co st of up-spinning reserve of generator 1. 
Next, in the demand range between 50 and 100 megawatts, J.t(k) is nonzero for k = 1 
and k = 3. These are the contingencies corresponding to the failures of generators 1 and 3 
respectively. Here, generator 3 pro duces at its maximum of 50 megawatts, while generatol' 
1 supplies the remaining demand. To coyer the loss of generator 3, generators 1 and 2 
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provide together at least 50 megawatts of up-spinning reserve with generator 2 supplying 
enough up-spinning reserve to cover the loss of generator 1. For instance, wh en the load 
is 70 megawatts, generator 1 pro duces 20 megawatts while it provides 50 megawatts of 
up-spinuing reserve to coyer for the loss of generator 3. Concurrently, generator 2 provides 
the 20 megawatts of reserve required to eover for the 10ss of generator 1. 
ln the following demand range running between 100 and 105 megawatts, the failure of 
generator ~~ leaves the set of umbrella contingencies while that of generator 2 enters. Here, 
generator 3 sti1l pro duces at its maximum eapacity, while generator 1 pieks up the residual 
load. Now, generator 2 provides aIl the up-spinning reserve required to replace either 
generators 1 or 3, but it generates no energy. Beeause the pre-eontingeney generation level 
of generator 1 exceeds that of generator 3, the reserve provision of generator 2 is therefore 
set by generator 1. This explains why generator 3 has exited the umbrella set. ln addition, 
the nonzero Lagrange multiplier vector associated with the failure of generator 2 indicates 
that if gellerator 2 were to have to generate sorne nonzero level of energy (if, for instance, 
g2lÎn > 0), then generator 1 would neecl to pl'ovide that corresponding level of power as 
up-spinning reserve at the rate of $5 pel' megawatt-hour. 
ln the last range of loacl for whieh there exists a feasible schedule (for a demand in 
excess of 116.6 megawatts there is no feasible solution to this SCOPF problem), generator 
1 Iœeps being a member of the umbrella set while the failures of line 1 (1.: = 4) and line 3 
(1.: = 6) enter the umbrella set. Generators 1 and 3 are still the only producers of energy in 
the pre-contingency state, while generator 2 provides 55 megawatts of up-spinning reserve 
to counter the failures of generators 1 and 3, independently of the load. ln the eUiTent case, 
demand-side Up-spillning reserve has to be scheduled to coyer the loss of generator 1 and 
the losses of lines 1 and 3. Furthermore, generator 1 needs to supply some down-spinning 
reserve so as to make it possible to meet the line fiow limitations following any of the credible 
line failures. We note, mol'eover, that the umbrella set here is not unique as the failure of 
line 2 (1.: = 5) pro duces an identical efIect as that of the loss of line 3. As a result, we see 
that as long as one of these two contingencies is induded in the umbrella set, the social 
eost of the relaxed SCOPF will be identical to that of the initial full SCOPF. We point out 
aiso that in the case of the line failures here, the associated Lagrange multipliel's are not 
aU equal over an buses; this indicates the presenee of line congestion in the corresponding 
post-contingency states. The negative signs of sorne of the multipliers associated with the 
fa.ilures of the lines refiect that to relieve the line congestion in the post-eontingeney states, 
5 Umbrella Contingencies in Security-Constrained Market-Clearing 142 
it would be economica11y favorable if there were sorne loads located at buses 1 and 2. 
vVe can also see From Table 5.1 that there is no "super-umbrella" contingency, whose 
mernbership in the set of umbrella contingencies is unaffected by load variations. 
Fina11y, we see that there are generally only a few umbre11a contingencies. In the current 
example, when the grid can be reduced to a single node for the pre- and a11 the credible 
post-contingency states (that is, within the load range [0, 105] megawatts when there is 
no pre- or post-contingency congestion), there are at most two umbrella contingencies that 
correspond to the losses of one of the two generators producing the largest aggregated 
amounts of power and up-spinning reserve. This observation is not exception al to the 
current example wherein two generators are providing the up-spinning reserve dedicated 
to coyer the failure of one another. T'his observation is the general theoretical basis for 
setting the up-spinning reserve requirement equal to the capacity of the largest generator 
in network-free deterministic reserve-constrained market-clearing formulations. 
5.4.2 Stochastic security-constrained market-clearing 
The second simulation example studies how the membership of the set of umbre11a contin-
gencies is affected by varying the norm type for ranking and cutting-off contingencies in 
stochastic-based SCOPF problems. The formulation of the SCOPF is the same as that of 
Section 5.4.1 except for: (i) the objective function now measures the expected social cost 
in both the pre- and post-contingency states 
rninp(O) [aTg + (q1Lpf rU]) + (qdn)T r dn + (q~Pf r~P + (q~nf r~n] 
+ LP(k)[aT g(k) + yTl(k)], (5.10) 
kEK 
where y is the vector of the nodal value of lost load-equal to $500 per megawatt-hour 
for a11 buses; (ii) the post-contingency bus power balance conditions now take into account 
possible load shedding l( k) 
H(g(k), d(k), t5(k), l(k), k) = 0; Vk E lC, (5.11) 
where the vector variables g( k) and d( k) correspond to the re-dispatch of generation and 
demand through reserve deployment, respectively, and t5 (k) are the post-contingency bus 
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voltage angles; and, (iii) associated limits on the load shedding variables 
o ~ l(k) ~ d(k); Vk E lC. (5.12) 
ln addition, the contingency state probabilities p( 0) and p( k) are calculated (aecording to 
the principles found in Appendix A.1) from the forced-outage rates given in Appendix E.1, 
assuming that the six random contingencies occur independently. The calculated probabi-
lities are given in Table 5.2. We notice that the probabilities reported in Table 5.2 do not 
sum up to one since we did not consider the failure modes involving multiple-equipment 
contingencies. 
Table 5.2 Contingency probabilities 
k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
p(k) (10- 4 ) 8()45 455 176 651 4 4 4 
For a demand of 110 megawatts at bus 3, the corresponding optimal schedule is reported 
in Table 5.:3. Also, the expected values of the involuntary load shedding actions associated 
with each of the contingencies are found in T'able 5.4. :FI'om Table 5.3, we see that the 60 
megawatts of up-spinning reserve supplied by generator 2 can cover the failures of both 
generators 1 and 3, and the 5 megawatts of down-spinning reserve provided by generator 
1 is required to meet the steady-state line flow limits if any one of the transmission lines 
fails. 
Table 5.3 Pre-contillgency generation, demand and reserve schedule for the 
full SCOPF 
Generator 'i gi (MW) T~P (MW) T dn ~ (MW) 
l 60 0 5 
2 0 60 0 
3 50 0 0 
Demand ri (MW) T~P (MW) T~n (MW) 
110 0 0 
The optimal value of the expected social cost is $3265.73. vVe notice that the much 
cheaper involuntary load shedding actions are used in place of demand-side reserve when 
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Table 5.4 Expected involuntary load shed at bus :3 following contingencies 
k 12345G 
p(k)l(k) (kWh) 0 0 0 0 2 2 
either line 2 or i) is lost. Indeed, we note here that the corresponding expected cost of 
involuntary load shedding is quite sruall (4x 10··:3MvVh x $500/lVlvVh = $2.00) in comparison 
to that of scheduling and deploying demand-side reserve (0.8645 x 5 MvVh x $20/MvVh = 
$86.45). 
Next, the first th1'ee rows of Table 5.5 report the Lagrange multiplier vectors corre-
sponding to the power balance relations under the six credible contingencies. The last 
three rows show respectively the one, two and infinity norrns of these vectors. 
Table 5.5 Lagrange multipliers of the post-contingency power balance rela-
tions and their corresponding nonns 
JL(k) ($jMWh) 
Bus 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 7.87 4.85 1.95 -4.31 0.01 0.01 
2 7.87 4.85 2.60 0.02 0.02 0.01 
3 7.87 4.85 3.25 0.02 0.22 0.22 
Il . III 23.61 14.55 7.80 4.35 0.25 0.24 
Il . 112 1:3.G3 8.40 4.GO 4.:31 0.22 0.22 
Il . Iloc) 7.87 4.85 :3.25 4.31 0.22 0.22 
Ta,ble 5.5 demonstrates that the various vector norms lead to different rankings of the 
contingencies. For the one and two norrns, the ordering is {l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} \vhereas in the case 
of the infinity norm it is {l, 2, 4, 3, 5, 6}. For aH three norms considered, however, the li ne 
outage contingencies k; = 5 and 6 (corresponding to the failures of lin es 2 and 3 respectively) 
are seen to have very little impact on the solution of the SCOPF. In fact, omitting these 
two cOlltingencies and solving the corresponding relaxation of the SCOPF, we find that 
the optimal pre-contingency schedule is identical to that in Table 5.3. As anticipated, the 
expected social co st has diminished slightly to $3264.54--a difference of $1.19 or 0.04% 
from the expected social cost associated with the full SOOPF. We explain this from the 
absence of the expected costs of reserve deployment and involuntary load shedding actions 
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corresponding to these contingencies in the objective function of the relaxed problem. Thus, 
there is a clear indication here that these two contingencies are not umbrella contingencies. 
Now, wc investigate the scheduling results obtained if the stochastic SCOPF is relaxed 
even more. For instance, if the cutoff rule of Proposition 5.1 uses the one norm and some 
é > $4.35 pel' megawatt-hour, the umbrella set would be U = {1, 2, :3}. On the other 
hand, if wc were to use the ranking based on the infinity norm with some é > $:3.25 pel' 
megawatt-hom, the 11mbrella set would then be different with U = {1, 2, 4}. 
If wc let the set of umbrella contingencies be U = {1, 2, 4}, the pre-contingency schedule 
obtained for the relaxed SCOPF is the same as the one found with the full set of contingen-
cies in Table 5.3. Here, however, we remark that for this relaxed SCOPF no involuntary 
load shedding aetions are required. vVe recall from Table 5.4 that involuntary load shedding 
was expeeted for the full SCOPF solution for contingencies k = 5 (loss of line 2) and 6 (loss 
of line 3), which were omitted he1'e. As a result of the omissions of contingencies k = 3,5 
and 6, the expected cost has gone down to $3240.60-a difference of $25.13 or 0.77% from 
the expeeted social co st corresponding to the full SCOPF. 
In the alternative where we use the umbrella set U = {1, 2, 3}, we get the different 
pre-contingency schedule shown in Table 5.6. As with the case with the umbrella set 
U = {l, 2, 4}, we find that there is no schedllied involllntary load shedding here. Notwith-
standing the fact that the pre-contingency schedule obtained with the srnaller set of con-
tingencies differs from that of the full SCOPF (unlike with U = {1, 2, 4}), the change in 
the expected social cost is less--1:he expected co st now equals $3263.90, a decrease of $1.8:3 
or 0.06% l'rom the expeeted social cost of the full SCOPF. 
Table 5.6 Pre-contingency generatioll, demancl and reserve scheclule with 
the umbrella set U = {l, 2, :3} 
Generator 'Ï 9i (MW) r? (MW) rfn (MW) 
1 57.5 0 0 
2 2.5 55 () 
3 50.0 0 0 
Demand d (MW) r~P (MW) rân (MW) 
110 2.5 0 
Tt cOllld be arglled that the "quality" of the 11mbrella set U = {l, 2, 4} is superior to that 
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of U = {l, 2, 3} because it has the ability to coyer a wider range of credible contingencies. 
\Ve me an that, by including contingency k = 4, the SCOPF solution schedules the necessary 
down-spillning reserve at bus 1 required to li mit the post-contingency congestion afler any 
one of the line failures. Still, given the relative values of the forced-outage rates of the 
equipments, we remark that generator failures are clearly more likely than line failures. 
One can therefore argue in favor of the alternate umbrella set, U = {I, 2, 3}, because its 
members have higher probabilities of occurrence, and also have a lesser impact on the 
optimal value of the objective function, as required by Definition 5.1. 
Lastly, given that the contingency ranking is based on the infinity norm, the contingency 
k = 4 is saiel to have a high impact on the solution of the SCOPF even though its impact 
is substantial at bus 1 only. Yet, contingency k = 3 is found to be more important by 
the one and two norms. In this case, we clearly see the network-wide "averaging" function 
performed by the one and two vector norms already alluded to in Section 5.3. This l'an king 
behavior requires from the user of the identification scheme to be aware of which type of 
contingency the umbrella set should consist of: either contingencies imposing network-wide 
effects or contingencies for which the localized effects are the most important. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we defined with rigor the notion of the set of umbrella contingencies for 
security-constrained optimal power fiow problems in both deterministic and probabilistic 
forms. We proposed an original method to identify the members of the set of umbrella 
contingencies from the Lagrange multipliers associated with the post-contingency power 
balance relations of the SCOPF problems. As part of this method, we suggested a heuris-
tic rule to rank the credible contingencies according to their marginal economic impact 
on the optimal solution of the SCOPF, based on the vector norms of the Lagrange multi-
plier vectors. Following the ranking step, it is then possible to eut off those lowly-ranked 
contingencies. 
A first numerical study lookecl at how the range of validity of the set of umbrella 
contingencies changes as the system clemand is varied in the case of a deterrninistic SCOPF. 
The main observations were that, generally, there are only a few urnbrella contingencies, 
especially in cases when the grid can be reduced to a single node-in which case there 
are at most two umbrella contingencies. Moreover, this study revealed that the set of 
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urnbrella contingencies rnay not be unique when sorne of the eontingeneies are umbrella to 
one another. 
The second case study exarnined the impacts of using ranking and cutoff sehernes to 
heuristieally determine the umbrella set for stochastie SCOPF problerns. In this study, 
we demonstrated that the pre-contingeney schedules of the SCOPF solved subject to a 
reduced set of umbrella contingeneies can be identical or very close to the pre-eontingency 
sehedule of the full SCOPF. In addition, this example illustrated how the type of the vector 
norm used in ranking the contingeneies may favor coutingencies with network-wide effects 
or those with important but more localized impacts. Such fiexibility may be welcome 
from the users' point of view because the method leaves him or her with sorne latitude in 
controlling the membership in the set of umbrella contingencies, while the proposed method 
still provides for increased rigor in the classification of the eontingencies. 
In the larger context of the present dissertation, the notion of umbrella contingeneies is 
clearly of interest sinee it provides yet another potential means to reduce the dimensions 
of seeurity-constrained electricity market-clearing problems. As presented in this ehapter, 
the proposed ranking and en1',off seheme is intended 1',0 provide eleetricity market opera-
tors with an a priori estimation of the set of umbre11a contingencies so to simplify the 
l'esolution of the market-clearing problems. As this estimation should generally be based 
on predicted network and economic information, the proposed method is bound to neglect 
sorne of the true umbrella contingencies and to retain contingencies that, at the moment 
when uncertainty is revealed, actually lie un der the umbre11a of other more severe con-
tingencies. Nevertheless, we believe that the specification of a reasonable set of umbrella 
contingencies should constitute a good compromise between having to consider too rnany 
or no contingencies at a11. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
6.1 Dissertation Overview 
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Aquf podernos, herrnano Sancho Panza, 
meter las manos hasta los codos en esto 
que llaman aventuras. 
Don Q'ltijote de la Mancha 1 
Miguel de CeT1Jantes, 154 "(--1616 
We proposed and formulated an electricity market-clearing system integrating a stochastic 
security criterion. We based this security criterion on a probabilistic measure of the ex-
pccted load not served consequent to the occurrence of pre-selected sets of generator and 
line ralldom fai1ures and 10ad disturbances. We demonstrated that the required 1evels of 
the different reserve services can be implicit1y determined by economically penalizing the 
operation of the market through the associated demand-side costs of involuntary load shed-
ding. Dncler this approach, the market-clearing problem has the flexibility to balance the 
respective expected costs of: pre-colltingency preventive security control actions including 
unit commitmellt, dispatch and reserve scheduling clecisiollS; post-contingency corrective 
actions based on reserve deployment measures that include further unit commitment deci-
si ons and load-generation re-dispatch; and, post-contingency involuntary load shedding. We 
furthermore addressed severa1 practical implementation issues particu1ar to the proposaI, 
which include: (i) multi-period unit commitment; (ii) the treatment of transmission COIl-
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gestion; (iii) the proposal's eategol'ization within the lar'gel' class of stochastic optimization 
problems; (iv) the formulation's computational complexity and possible relief measures; 
(v) the uncertainties in the equipment statistical failure data and eonsumers' value of lost 
load; and, (vi) the integration of the proposaI within the larger power system operations 
paradigm. We remarked that this proposaI contrasts the eurrent, essentially deterministic, 
industry operations planning philosophy and practices. Case studies showed, however, that 
by going against this traditional conservative philosophy, electricity market-clearing with 
stochastic secul'ity can lead to llon-negligible economic savings for society, while ensuring 
that consumers still enjoy a seeure supply of electricity in light of their valuation of load 
shedding. 
Next, we demonstrated a number of theoretical results pertaining to the prices of energy 
and security derived from the optimal solutions of market-clearing with stochastic security. 
We showed, among other things, that involuntary load shedding should be used in the 
aftermath of a contingency if and only if the expected marginal costs of scheduling l'eserves 
and dcploying them artel' t.hat cOlltingency are greater than the expected ma.rginal costs 
of load shedding. VVe also established that, in a linear market-clearing formulation, when 
load is shed it is the last of the post-contingency recourses used by the system operator to 
balance power at any gi,ren bus. 
vVe went on to extend the model of electricity market-clearing with stochastic seeu-
rit y to propose a day-aheacl electrieity market-clearing formulation capable of accounting 
for non-dispatchable intermittent power generation sources. Because of its promincnt im-
portance in currcnt and future electricity grids, we assumed that wincl pm,ver generators 
constituted the entire non-dispatchable generation capacity installed in the power system. 
The resulting electricity market-clearing model was shown to take into account uncertain-
ties in the next day wind power generation and demand predictions. Also, we demonstrated 
how the market-clearing formulation can integrate the scheduling of large-seale centralized 
energy storage equipments. Being able to handle sueh storage facilities is key to the COlll-
merci al success of wind and other intermittent, mostly renevvable, generation resources. 
As proposed in Chapter 2, the market-clearing formulation bere was shown to balance the 
expected costs associated with reserve scheduling and deployment against those of invol-
untary load shedding a.ctions given the probabilities of the different load-wind scenarios 
eonsidered. 
Lastly, we rigourously defined the concept of the set of umbrella contingeneies for 
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security-constrained optimal power fiow problems, a class of power system scheduling p1'Ob-
lems to which electricity market-clearing with stochastic security belongs. We derived an 
identification method to discover the members of the set of umbrella contingencies by mak-
ing use of the vector norms of the Lagrange multipliers associated with post-contingency 
power balance relations. 'VVe showed how this identification rnethod is applicable to both 
deterministic and stochastic security-constrained market-clearing problems. As an exten-
sion of this identification rnethod, we suggested a heuristic contingency ranking and cutoH 
rule based on the contingencies' Lagrange multiplier vector norms. We showed how these 
umbrella contingency identification and ranking methods could be of use to system opera-
tors when specifying reduced sets of eontingencies required to simplify security-eonstrained 
market-clearing problems. 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
Severa1 recommendations for further investigation were already made throughout the dis-
sertation. Vve summarize them here along with other promising researeh directions. 
1. The existing for'mal scenario reduction rnethods [121--123] for stochastic program-
ming problems should be investigated for the stochastic market-clearing problems 
defined in this dissertation. These techniques are without a doubt necessary in 
building and extracting those scenarios whieh can represent the widest spectrum of 
probable states of nature, while keeping their number within reasonable levels so as 
to limit eomputational efforts. In relation with this aspect, one can probably conjec-
ture interesting parallel concepts existing between those of umbrella contingeneies 
and reducible scenarios. We note here that this recommendation applies to market-
clearing models where equipment failures are the primary sources of uncertainty as 
much as to those where it is the uncertainty in the generation output that is the 
dominant factor. 
2. Decomposition methods should be investigated as possible solution strategies for 
electricity market-clearing with stochastie security. Benders' decomposition, which 
is often associated with the solution of large-seale stochastic optimization problems 
[85,116], as weIl as "branch-and-priee" decomposition, which is, on the other hand, 
mostly associated with the solution of large mixed-integer optimization problems 
[118-120], are surely the rnost likely candidates applicable to the problems found in 
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this dissertation. One advantage the decomposition methods have over the classic 
brallch-and-cut algorithms for mixed-integer linear programming is their ability to 
break apart large-dimension problems and resort to iterative solutions of sm aller 
sub-problems. This ability to breakdown problems into sm aller pieees can be critical 
in large-scale instances espeeially if there are computer memory limitations. Also, 
these methods have the added advantage that they can be implemented on parallel 
computers that simultaneously work out solutions to the decomposed sub-problems. 
This ean lead us to conjecture that the exploitation of the computational parallelisrn 
could generate scnne CPU time s~wings. In fact, the essential aspect that remains 
to be detennined is which of the two decomposition methods, Benders' or "branch-
and-price"or even sorne combination of the two--, is the most appropriate to 
solve quickly and efficiently realistically-sized security-constrained market-clearing 
problems. 
3. Investigating the inclusion of risk measures in a formulation of the electricity market-
clearing with stochastic security is of practical interest. For instance, it would be 
reasonable for market operators to minimize expected social costs while, at the same 
time, making sure that the variance of that cost or the variance of the associated co st 
of load shedding remains accordingly small. The classical way to aehieve this goal 
is through the addition of a term in the objective fun ct ion of the market-clearing 
proportional to the conditional value-at-risk of the quantity whose variance has to 
be kept small [193]. 
4. Investigative efforts are needed to develop generation-side ofIering and demand-side 
bidding strategies in the context of an electricity market whose schedules are found 
through market-clearing with stochastic security. The main challenge here stems 
from the fact that generators and demands, unlike the system operator, would gen-
erally have ineomplete information about the probabilities of the various uncertainty 
scenarios. 
5. OfIering and bidding strategies are obviously dependent on the financial settlement 
methods used to remunerate the different products and services traded in the market. 
In this dissertation, we did not speeify nor did we study the impacts sneh rules. The 
focus of this future hne of investigation should be on the various welfare properties 
induced by the settlement schemes. These properties include the expected generator 
profits and consumer payrnents as weIl as their variances. These settlement rules 
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could be based solely on expeded prices (as calculated in Chapters 2 and 3), or on 
the real-time priees that correspond to the realization of given scenarios. Likewise, 
another problem to be studied is whether settlements should be made using day-
ahead prices only, real-time prices only or a combination of the two. 
6. When scheduling a power system cOllsidering uncertain wind power gelleration, the 
llormality assumption of the probability distribution of the prediction error may not 
always be valid. This would be the case in situations wh en the wind power gellerators 
in a given system are not evenly-distributed geographically or when there are only a 
few large wind power generators. An investigation of effects of non-normal prediction 
error distributions on market-clearing results is thus warranted. 
7. The winci power generatioll scenarios cOllstructed in this dissertation assumed that 
the inter-period wind generation levels were fully uncorrelated. This assumption, 
however, is generally not true in practice. Research efforts should be devoted to 
study how the level of inter-period correlation can improve the economic efficiency 
and the reliability of the power system. The corresponding computational effort 
should be reassessed too because the consideration of inter-period correlations may 
no longer require the consideration of those scenarios containing very unlikely inter-
pe1'iod wind power generation transitions. 
8. The impacts on market-clearing results of prediction errors of other intermittent 
generation resources (like photovoltaic power, for instance) should be studied. Of 
course, as long as installed capacities of these alternative resources rcmain marginal, 
their corresponding impacts should also remain marginal. Nonetheless, building 
scenarios that model their joint random behavior with that of wind power represents 
probably the most important research challenge here. 
9. The investigation of end-of-period policies for energy st orage systems is yet auother 
interesting research opening. Tt remains unclear whether the best strategy is to 
assign a value---and in fact, the question is also "What value,?"---to the energy sto1'ed 
or to requi1'e sim ply that the expected value of the energy stored be within sorne, 
probably conservative, p1'e-defined range. 
10. Tt is to be seen whether the stochastic market-clearing formulation with wind power 
generation uncertainty, originally destined to conduct short-tenn generation and 
reserve scheduling, is expandable to conduct stochastic generation planning studies 
over medium- to long-terrn time horizons. Surely he1'e, some simplifications have to 
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be introduced; for instance, hydrothermal unit commit ment and ramping limitations 
do not need to be modelled explicitly over month-Iong planning studies. Likewise, 
some other longer-term factors like seasonality would have to be introduced. 
Il. Combining the notion of umbrella contingencies with statistical methods may gener-
ate interesting research directions. Given a large number of records of the prevailing 
operating conditions when some contingency was part of the set of umbrella contin-
gencies, one could derive a number of statistical indices related to that contingency. 
For instance, one such index could be the probability that a contingency is in the 
umbrella set conditional to the realization of a specifie set of operating conditions. 
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Appendix A 
Equipment Failure Probabilities 
This appendix provides the basie derivations of the failure probabilities of equipments 
used in this dissertation. Below, we divide the analysis into time-static and time-dynamic 
probability caleulations. 
A.l Time-Static Probabilities 
For time-static problems in this dissertation, we model the occurrence of the random failure 
of sorne cornponent (generator, transmission line, transformer, etc.) k as a Bernoulli random 
variable. Thus, if component k fails the random variable Çk equals 0; otherwise, it equals 1. 
The uneertainty in this state of nature is defined by the associated forced-outage rate [46] 
of that component, Uk . 1 We assume here that the foreed-outage rates of components in 
the network are known from historieal failure data collected by an independent monitoring 
ageney. In Canada, for example, the Canadian Electricity Association has been eompiling 
information about individualline and generator failures sinee 1977 [55,56]. 
Therefore, we have for each network component k = 1, ... , K 
(A.l) 
lThe expression "forced-outage rate" is somewhat a misnomer sinee it is not a rate. A more appropriate 
term could be "relative unavailability" as this dimensionless quantity measures the per unit time a given 
piece of equipment is out of service due to random failures. 
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Also, we can der ive the associated "relative availability," Ak' of components k = 1, ... ,K 
(A.2) 
Next, assuming that random failures happen inclependently, we can derive the proba-
bilities of random events involving the entire set of network components [46,168]. For 
example, we have: 
AIl components are available 
K 
])(0) = II Ak' (A.3) 
k=l 
Component k is out 
K 
p(k) = Uk II Az, (A.4) 
z=l 
zcpk 
and so on. 
A.2 Time-Dynamic Probabilities 
In classical reliability theory, the time of failure T of a given piece of equipment is modeled 
as an exponentially-distributed random variable [46,1681. In this section, we show basic 
probability calculations for contingencies which may include the simultaneous loss of several 
components, but exclude contingencies made up of sequential failures. For example, the 
random event "contingency k occv,r's 1JJithin the tirne 1:nte'rval T," denoted by X(k, T), has 
the probability [168] 
(A.ô) 
The parameter À.k represents the reciprocal of the mean time to the occurrence of contin-
gency k, a quantity estimated from historical data [55,56]. 
vVe moreover remark that sinee repair times are usually longer than the 24-hour schedul-
ing horizon of most day-ahead electricity markets considered in this dissertation, repairs are 
ignored so that once some equipment fails it is assumed to be unavailable for the remainder 
of the horizon. 
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In addition, the probability of the random event "cont'ingency k does not occ'u,T' dtwing 
the scheduling hOT'izon," denoted by Y (k), is 
(A.6) 
The probability p(O) that none ofthe pre-selected contingencies occur during the schedul-
ing horizon can now be calculated from the atomÏc random events Y ( k ) 
[( K 
p(O) = II P[Y(k) 1 = II e-ÀkT . (A.7) 
k=l k=l 
Likewise, p(k, T), the probability that contillgency k occurs during the interval T given that 
all other system components are available for the entire scheduling horizon, is 
K K 
p(k, T) = P[X(k, T) 1 II P[Y(z) 1 = e-ÀkT(eÀk - 1) II e-Àz'T'. (A.8) 
z=l 
Zofk z=l zofk 
We note that in deriving the above probabilities, the assumption is that the random oc-
currence of the pre-selected contingencies are statistically independent, and that since this 
set is not exhaustive, the probabilities ])(0) and p(k, T) do not sum up to one. 
Appendix B 
Feasible Operational Regions of 
Generators and Demands 
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This appendix is devoted to the thorough description of constraints bounding the feasible 
operating regions of generators and demands. 
In the main body of the dissertation, the feasible operating region of a generator i 
during period t is denoted compactly by the symbol (]it. This set restricts, for both the 
pre- and post-contingency states: 
• The on/off status of the generator, which is governed by its minimum up- and down-
time limits; 
• The power output ofthe generator, which is restricted by its minimum and maximum 
generation limits as weIl as inter-temporal ramping constraints; and, 
• The amounts of the different reserve services which can be provided by the generator. 
This appendix covers the first two items only. The third one is eovered fully in Appen-
dix C. 
Likewise, the feasible operating region of demand at bus TIL during period t is denoted 
compactly in the main body of the dissertation by the symbol Dmt. The set Dm!; limits, for 
both the pre- and post-contingency states: 
• The power consumption of the demand, which is limited by its elastieity limits; and, 
• The amounts of the different reserve services which ean be provided by the demand. 
Here we coyer the first item only. The second one is covered fully in Appendix C. 
Throughout this work, the basic generation constraints, those enforcing minimum up-
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and down-time as weIl as those constraining capacity and unit ramping, were those de-
veloped by Ruiz-Peinado in [79]. This formulation has proven to be far superior to other 
classical unit commitment formulations [45,G8-78,80] sinee it requires a much lower number 
of binary variables. 
In faet, the Ruiz-Peinado formulation only uses the regular on/off' variables 'Uü , whereas 
other formulations use, on top of the usual on/off' variables, binary variables to model 
the startup (generally denoted by the variable 'Yit, where 'Yit = 1 if unit i starts up at 
the beginning of period t or equals 0 otherwise) and shutdown (generally denoted by the 
variable Zif, where Zif = 1 if unit i shuts down at the beginning of period t or equals 0 
otherwise) of the generating units. Thus, for a system containing l generating units and 
for a scheduling horizon of T periods, the Ruiz-Peinado formulation uses one thircl of the 
binary variables, without the addition of any extra continuous variables or constraints [79]. 
This formulation represents a significant computational improvement, reducing significantly 
the core memory requirements of a given problem as weIl as redueing the upper bound on 
the size of the branch-and-cut tree that may be generated by the mixed-integer linear 
programming solve1' (see Appendix F for more details). 
Sections B,I and B,2 below outline respectively the details of the minimum up- and 
down-time constraints and those of the generator capacity and ramping limitations. Finally, 
Seetion B.3 gives the details of demand-sicle bidding elasticity limitations. 
B.l Generation Minimum Up- and Down-TÎlne Constraints 
The foIlowing parameters are required to define the generator minimum up- and down-time 
limitations: 
UiQ Commitment state of generator i during period O. 
UTiO Cumulative up-time of generator i at the beginning of period O. 
DTiO Cumulative down-time of generator i at the beginning of period O. 
MUTi Minimum up-time of generator i. 
MDli Minimum clown-time of generator i. 
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B.1.1 Minimum up-time 
For aIl generators i = 1, ... , l, we define the quantity I~ = min {T, (MUTi - UTio)v,w} 
specifying the number of homs that a unit must stay on from the beginning of the scheduling 
horizon. Thus, for a11 i = 1, ... ,1 the minimum up-time constraints are given from [79] 
Pi 
I)l - V,ij) = 0, 
j=l 
MUT, 
L V,ij - MUTi(v,'it - 'Uw) ~ 0; 
j=1 
HMUT;-l 
L 1Lij - MUTi(v'it - '/Li(t-l)) ~ 0; 
T 
T 
LCUij - '/Lit + v,w) ~ 0; 
j=1 
L(V,ij - V,it + Ui(t-l)) ~ 0; 
j=t 
B.1.2 Minimum down-time 
(B.l) 
t = 1, Pi = 0, (B.2) 
t f- l, Pi + 1 :::; t :::; T - MUTi + 1, (B.3) 
t = 1, T - MUTi + 2 = 1, (B.4) 
t f- 1, T - MUTi + 2:::; t :::; T. (B.5) 
l'or aIl generators i = 1, ... , l, wc define the quantity Qi = min{T, (MDli-DTw)(1-'uw)} 
specifying the number of homs that a unit must stay off from the beginning of the schedulillg 
horizon. Thus, for aIl 'i = l, ... ,1 the minimum down-time constraints are given from [79] 
(B.6) 
j=1 
IVIDTi 
L (1 - Uij) - IVIDTi('uiO - V,it) ~ 0; t = l, Qi = 0, (B.7) 
.i=l 
tt- 1\[ D'li --·1 
L (1 - nij) - MDTi (Ui(t--1) - V,it) ~ 0; t f- 1, Qi + 1 :::; t :::; T - MDTi + 1, (B.S) 
j=t 
T 
2::(1 - Uij - Uw + 'U'if) ;:::: 0; 
j=l 
t = 1, T - MDTi + 2 = 1, (B.9) 
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T L(1- Uij - 'Ui(t-l) + Uit) 2: 0; 
.i=t 
t =1 1, T - MDTi + 2 :S t :S T . 
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(B.1O) 
vVe note that the above set of constraints, (B.l)-(B.I0), applies equally to the post-
contingency unit commitment vad ables , v,it(k, T). 
B.2 Generation Ramping and Output Capacity Constraints 
The following parameters are required to define the generator capacity and ramping limi-
tations: 
v,iQ Commit ment state of generator i during period O. 
gw Power output of generator i during period O. 
gylin Minimum power output of generator i. 
glll[k"- Maximum power output of generator i. 
R1n Ramp-down limit of generator i. 
R~P Ramp-up lirnit of generator 'i. 
[(;i d Shutdown ramp limit of generator i. 
RtL Startup ramp limit of generator 'i. 
The bounds on the available power are, for all the generators i = 1, ... , I, [79] 
The up-ramping limitations are, for generators i = 1, ... ,I, 
t = 2, .. . ,T, 
t = 1. 
(B.11) 
(B.12) 
(B.13) 
Furthermore, down-ramping constraints are imposed on every generator i = 1, ... , l 
> Rdn ]"Jsd ( ) max ( 1 ) . gu _ gi(t-l) - 'i, 1Lit - Li V,i(t-l) - 1lit - gi - 1Li(t-l) , 
g:t > 9'0 - R~n'l.L·t - RSd(,u·() - tL't) - gmax(l - v,'o)' 1,,_.~ ~ L ! t t ~ ~ , 
t = 2, .. . ,T, 
t = 1. 
(B.14) 
(B.15) 
I\ote as weIl that the above set of constraints, (B.11)-(B.15), applies equally to the post-
contingency generator power output variables, gu(k, T). 
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B.3 Demand Elasticity Limits 
As they bid in the electricity market, the demands have the opportunity to specify lower 
and upper limits on their consumption. These bounds are often denoted as the "elasticity 
lirnits" [10]. In this dissertation, the demand elasticity limits apply only to their pre-
contingency power eonsumption. The post-contingency demand limits, on the other hand, 
are governed by the up- and down-going spinning reserve bounds described in Appendix C. 
Mathematically, the demand elasticity limits are expressed as, for m = l, ... ,1\;1 and 
t = 1, ... , T 
lmin < 1 < ,]flHlX (mt - (mt _ a'mt , (B.16) 
where 0 :::; d~~,~n :::; d~~~:X are parameters submitted as part of the demand-sicle bids. Note 
that in the case of inelastic demand, the two limits are set to be equal to each other, 
,lm in ,Imax d 
a'mt = a"mt = m.!:· 
162 
Appendix C 
Reserve Determination Constraints 
This appendix describes the constraints affecting the reserve services (spinning and non-
spinning as weIl as up- and down-going) offered by generators and demands. 
C.I Spinning Reserve 
C.l.l Generation-side 
The provision of generation-side up-spinning reserve is restricted as 
(C.1) 
f· Il t - 1 l d f' Il t' . l t 1 T Tlle par'ame-t"r's,' 1,',nt
p lllax 
-or a genera -ors, 'l = " .. , ,an 'Or a 'lme penoc s, = ,.,., . ,. _ _ __ 
are the upper limits on the up-spinning reserve offers imposed by each of the generators. 
Clearly, up-spinning reserve can be provided by generator i during period t only if it is on, 
that is, if Ua = 1. 
Bere, the up-spinning reserve provided by generator i during period t is the largest 
among aIl the pre-selected contingencies, k, and failure times, T, of the difference between 
its post- and pre-contingency generation levels. Mathematically, this condition translates 
into the linear inequalities for k = 1". "K and T = 1,.,., T 
(C.2) 
where gtax is the maximum power output of generator i. 
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To see how (C.l) and (C. 2) set the reserve levels in a consistent manner, we examine 
the possible cases which may arise. 
First, we assume that 11û = O. From (C.l), r~P should equal zero. To demonstrate 
that (C.2) is consistent with that condition, consider the case where the post-contingency 
commit ment variable, 'Uu(k, r) is equal to I-meaning that generator i has been turned 
on in response to a contingency. Then, (0.2) requires that r~t 2:: git(k, r) - gylaX, whose 
right-hand side is less than or equal to zero, and is consistent with the lower bound in 
(C.l). A similar argument applies ihLit(k, r) = O. 
vVhen 1Lit = l, the up-spinning reserve provided by generator i during period t lies 
Hl the range [0, T'~T max 1 as required by (C.l). The aetual level of reserve is set from 
(C.2), considering aU the contingellcies. The case wh en 'Uit(k, r) = 0 does not impose 
any constraint on the reserve; however, if 'Uit(k, r) = l, inequality (C.2) requires that 
<t 2:: g.it(k, r) - git for aU k and r. In other words, the up-spinning reserve provided by 
generator i has to be lm'ger than or equal to the largest of the post-contingency up-going 
power production deviation away from the pre-contingency dispatch, git. We point out that 
sinee the objective funetion of the eleetricity market-clearing is minimizing social costs--
which includes those of reserve provision----, then the most stringent case of the lower bound 
(C.2) is always binding. 
In a similar manner, the down-spinning reserve provided by generator i during period 
t is determined by the bounds 
o < T'dn < rdn max'U. 
- ,tt - 'I,t ü, (C.3) 
(C.4) 
for k = 1, . , . ,J{ and r = 1, ... ,T, and where the parameters rftn max represent the upper 
limits on the down-spinning reserve oHers imposed by each of the generators. Like with up-
spinning reserve, down-spinning reserve is set by the largest down-going post-contingency 
power produetion deviation away from the pre-contingency dispatch, git. 
C.1.2 Demand-side 
In the case of demand at bus ln, providing up-spinning reserve during period t boils down 
to voluntarily reducing its consumption from dmt to dmt(k, r), with (dmt , dmt(k, r)) E 'Dmt , 
given that m tf- Ck-that is, contingency k does not involve a demand disturbanee at bus 
C Reserve Determination Constraints 
'Tno This type of reserve provision must a1so satisfy the two sets of inequalities 
o < ",'IlP < 'T'up max 
- 'mt - mt , 
'T'~ft ~ dml; - dmt(k, T), 
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(Co5) 
(Co6) 
fo k 1 K l 1 l' i 'h 0 ,'up max 0 tl m("lX'lmUln t f r '= , 0 0 0 , ane T = '0 0 0' ,ane w er e 7 mt lS le. arnoun) 0 up-
spinning reserve demand at bus m is willing to provide during period l;, Similar bounds 
apply to down-going demand-side spinning reserves if m tj: Ck 
o < 'T'dn < 'T'dn max 
- mt - mt , (Co7) 
and for li; = 1, 0 0 0 , K and T = 1, 0 0 0 , T 
(CoS) 
where 'T',~~; max is the maximum down-spinning reserve amount that can be provided at bus 
m during period to 
C.2 Non-Spinning Reserve 
C.2.1 Generation-side 
The up-going non-spinning reserve contributions from the generators i = 1, 0 0 0 ,1 during 
time periods t = 1, 0 0 0 , Tare restricted by 
O < -up < ,,;up max (1 _ ,) 
_ 'T'it _ 'T it tLû , (Cog) 
and for T = 1, 0 0 0 , T and k = 1, 0 0 • , K 
:r'UP > g. ,(li; T) _ gmax,u· 
2t -', tt, 2 û, (Co10) 
where 'r;t max are offer-hased upper limits on up-going non-spinning reserveo The inequal-
ities (C.g) and (Co10) indicate that up non-spinning reserve can be provided only by gen-
erators not already online, which are those with 'U.it = 0 and which are capable of belng 
turned on during period to 
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The down-going non-spinning reserve supplies from the generators 'i = 1, ... , l and for 
t = 1, ... , Tare restricted by 
(C.ll) 
and for k = 1, ... , K, T = 1, ... , T 
(C.12) 
where f~n max are offer-based upper limits on down-going non-spinning reserve. The in-
equalities (C.ll) and (C.12) indicate that down non-spinning reserve can be provided only 
by the generators that are a.lready online, that is those with '/J'it = 1, which are capable of 
being shut down during period t. 
C.2.2 Demand-side 
Demands cannot offer non-spinning reserve servIces smce, under the model developed in 
this dissertation, they do not have associated binary variables (like '/.lit for the generators) 
modeling whether they are connected or disconnected from the grid. Here, they are syn-
chronized to the grid by default. 
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Appendix D 
Equivalence of Loss-of-Load Conditions 
In Chapter 1 and in [50], it was suggested to use binary variables, whkh we denote as 
1/Jmt(k, T) he1'e, to indieate whether loss-of-load events would oecur at bus 'ln during period 
t if contingency scenario (k, T) were to happen. These indicator variables take the value 1 if 
there is loss-of-Ioad, in other words if lmt(k, T) > 0, or they equal 0 otherwise. These vari-
ables and of their corresponding load shedding amounts are calculated for Tn = 1, ... , J'v!, 
t = 1, ... , T, k = 1, ... , K, and t ~ T using 
l~tt(k, T) = dmt(k, T) + L fR(8t (k, T), k, T) - L git(k, T), 
REB.,,,, iEAm 
R~Ck i~Ck 
l~nt(k, T) < '1/), (k T) < 1 + l;'nt(k, T) 
Z -, mt ,- Z' 
lmt(k, T) = 1j)rnt(k, T)l~il(k, T), 
where l~nt(k, T) is a dummy variable, Z is a large positive number andlj;mt(k, T) E Iffi. 
(D.l) 
(D.2) 
(D.3) 
Theorem D.1 (Equivalence ofloss-of-load conditions). The conditions on the load shedding 
vaT'iables (D.l)-(D.3) aT'e eq'Uivalent to those pTOposed in ChapteT' 2, which m'e (2.8) and 
(2.9) along 'I1Iith the pTOposed object'ive flLnctùm (2.11). 
Proof The conditions (D.l)-(D.3) entail (2.8) and (2.9) by inspection. 
Next, we show that together (2.8), (2.9) and the cost-minimizing action of (2.11) are 
sufficient to replace (D.l)-(D.3). "Ve let the optimal amount of load shed ding found using 
(D.l)-(D.3) equal l;tt(k, T) and the one found using (2.8), (2.9) and (2.11) be equal to 
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l~!t(k, T). 
As a first test, we assume that Z:nt(l;;, T) < l~!t(k, T). This assumption commands that 
l;nt(k, T) > 0 to satisfy (2.8) and (2.9). However, this constitutes a contradiction of the 
assumed optimality of Z~t(k, T) since Z~t(k, T) = Z:nt(k, T) is a1so feasible according to (2.8) 
and (2.9) and generates a 10wer value of the market-clearing objective. 
Next, we let l~û(k, T) > l;nt(k, T). This is also a contradiction of the assumed optimality 
of Z;nt(k, T) because having l;nJk, T) = IJnt(k, T) is feasib1e too according to (D.l)--(D.3). 
This 1esser amount of load shedding 1eads to a lower value of the objective function. There-
fore, l.~nt(k, T) = l~!t(k, T) must always be satisfied, proving that the two sets of loss-of-load 
conditions are equiva1ellt for any contingency scenario (k, T), bus m and time t. 0 
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Appendix E 
Test Systems 
This appendix lists the characteristics of the test systems used to e~lI'ry out the ease studies. 
Ulliess stated otherwise in the main text, the characteristics listed here apply integrally. 
E.l System A: Small-Scale System 
System A is the tluee-bus, three-line, three-generator power system shown in Fig. E.l. The 
three lossless lines have identical reactanees of 0.13 per unit on bases of 41 lVIVA and 120 kV, 
maximum power carrying capacities of 55 MVA, mean times to failure of 10 000 homs and 
forcecl-outage rates UR = 5 X 10-4 for e = 1,2, :3. 
Gl Line 1 G2 
Bus 1 Bus 2 
Line2 Line 3 
-1---+- Bus 3 
D3 
Fig. E.l Three-bus, threc-line, three-generator system-System A 
An inelastic demand is located at bus 3 and varies hour by ho ur aeeording to the pattern 
detailed in Table KI. In addition, the demand at bus 3 offers up to 10% of the hourly 
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load as spinning reserve at the rate of $20 pel' megawatt-hour for both up- and down-going 
services. We assume as well that this consumer has a value of lost load (VOLL), 'V3t, of 
$100() per megawatt-hour applicable during all four hours. 
Table E.l Roudy demand profile at bus 3-System A 
Time t (11) 
1 234 
d3t (MW) 30 80 no 40 
The generating unit data for this system are fOlmd in Table E.2. vVe assume here 
that the energy and reserve offers of the generators remain unchanged for all hours of the 
scheduling horizon. Moreover, the generators are assumed not to incur fixed running costs 
(i.e. there are no terms of the form UitC?t inside the market-clearing objective function), 
but they do incur constant-valued startup costs, cru .1 In this system the generation offering 
structure requires that each generator offers a single block of energy ranging between its 
technical minimum, gfin, and maximum, gfax, at the rate of ait dollars per megawatt-hour. 
Mo1'eover, the bounds on the arnounts of reserve services offered are set to be the largest 
possible, in other words, the upper bound on up- and down-spinning reserve is gJnax - gtin , 
and for llon-spinning reserves it is equal to giJa.x. The generation-side reserve services 
are offered at rates, in dollars pel' megawatt-hour, shown in Table E.2 as: q;t for up-going 
spinning reserve, qrtn for down-going spillning reserve, q~t for up-going non-spinning reserve 
and qI~n for down-going non-spinning reserve. Finally, the penultimate row of Table E.2 
lists the mean times to failure of each of the generators (..\;1), while the last row lists the 
steacly-state forced-outage rates of the generators (UJ 
Here, unless it is otherwise stated, the generator minimum up- and down-time cons-
traints are assumed to be inactive, and their ramping capabilities are set to gylaX megawatts 
pel' hour. Finally, we assume that an three generators are in the off state at time t = O. 
For the sake of completeness he1'e, we provide in (E.l) the concrete form of the market-
1 In classica! unit cornrnitment models, it is customary to mode! startup costs of thermal units as being 
functions of the uuits' dowlltirne; see [45, 6!:J-71 , 75, 77, 79, 80] for more details. Here, however, this is 
characteristic is not rnodeled. 
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Table E.2 Generator data--System A 
Generator i 
1 2 3 
g~in 
'/, (MW) 10.0 10.0 10.0 
max 
gi (MW) 100.0 100.0 50.0 
ait ($/MWh) 30.0 40.0 20.0 
eS1l 
'l, ($/h) 100.0 100.0 100.0 
'up 
qit ($/MWh) 5.0 7.0 8.0 
dn 
qit ($/MWh) 5.0 7.0 8.0 
-up 
qit ($/MWh) 4.5 5.5 7.0 
-dn qit ($/MWh) 4.5 5.5 7.0 
X:- 1 
'/, (h) 500.0 500.0 250.0 
Ui (Hj""-3 p.u.) 50.0 20.0 70.0 
clearing objective function (2.11) corresponding to this test system. 
1 T 
" (0) '" '" [-;SU up .UP dn ,dn -up,,,:up -dn,":dn] mmp . ~ ~ cit + o,it9it + qit r il + qit rit + qit; rit + qit rit 
i=l t=1 
MT KT 1 T 
+ p(O) L L [q~T~ + q~:~T~~] + L LP(k, r) L L [c~~(k, r) + o,it9it(k, r)] 
rn=1 t=1 k=l T=1 i=l t=1 
M T 
+ L L vrntÎrnt, (E.l) 
rn=l t=1 
where the quantities cf;l and èfll(k, r) are the startup costs ineurred by unit 'i during period 
t respeetively under the pre- and the different post-eontingency scenarios. Note that for 
generators i = 1, ... , l, the variables cf;Y satis(y the following constraints 
èSU > o· û - , 
è;;L ~ C;U(V'it - 'l1i(t-l)); 
C,,:SU > (oS'/J, ('II" - u' ) û - "'1 -"tt ,0 
t = 1, ... , T, 
t = 2, .. . ,T, 
t = 1. 
(E.2) 
(E.3) 
(EA) 
Likewise, the corresponding post-contingency variables, C71~(k, r), should satisfy the cons-
traints (E.2)--(EA) for aH k = 1, ... , J( and r = 1, ... ,T. A corresponding nonanticipation 
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requirernent is also needed for aIl k = 1, ... ,K, T = 1, ... , T, 'i = 1, ... , land t < T 
C";~U(k. T) = c";SU Û' 2t . 
E.2 Systelll B: IEEE Reliability Test System-1996 
111 
(E.5) 
System B is a Iargel'-scale system based on the single-area version of the IEEE Reliability 
Test Systern-1996 [67] shown in Fig. E.2. This is a 24-1)11s, 38-line and 32-generating unit 
system used to conduct studies over 24-hour long scheduling horizons. 
230 kV 
Bus 24 
Bus 3 
138 kV 
Bus4 
Bus 2 Bus 7 
Fig. E.2 Single-area IEEE reliability test system---System B 
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Here the generating units in the system submit offers to pro duce energy that cOllsist of 
four incremental blocks of electrical power output, in kilowatts, versus the unit heat rate, 
in BTU pel' kilowatt-hour (as shown in Table 9 of [67]). The assumption here is that the 
generation offers are identical throughout the scheduling horizon and that they are based 
on the fuel marginal costs (in dollars pel' million BTU) found in Table E.3 [194]. The upper 
limit of the first power output block is considered to be the minimum power output of the 
thermal generators. In addition, the startup costs are the "co Id" values given in Table 8 
of [67]. Ramp rates, minimum up- and down-times are as listed in Table 10 of [67]. The 
up, down, startup and shutdown ramps are assumed to be aIl equal for a given generating 
unit. The generator and line failure rate data are found respectively in Tables 6 and 12 
of [67]. We note that mean times to failure ofthe lines e = 1, ... ,38 are estimated from the 
permanent out age ra.tes and the permanent outage durations (respectively ÀpR and DurR in 
Table 12 of [67]). Thus, for any line e the mean time to failure, in hours, is calculated from 
(E.6) 
where we used the fact that there are 8760 hours in a year. 2 Lastly, we assume that the 
nuclear (U400) and hydro (U50) generators are must-run units. 
Table E.3 Fuel cost data 
Fuel type F06 F02 Coal Nuclear 
Cost ($jMBTU) 2.30 3.00 1.20 0.60 
In t.he tests conducted in this dissertation, the hourly demand data used corresponds to 
Tuesday of yVeek 45, Winter Week Day, for the system peak load of 2850 megawatts, while 
the spatial demand distribution corresponds to that of Table 5 of [67]. The consnmers are 
assumed to be inelastic. In this case, the value of lost load (VOLL) is equal to $3000 pel' 
mega.watt-hom for aIl buses dming peak hours-hours 8 to 20 inclusive-while it is equal 
to $2000 pel' mega.watt-hour dllring the remaining off-peak hours. The loacls offer spinning 
reserve, limiting their offers to 2% of their schecluled consumption for aIl hours and aIl 
buses. Both up and clown demand-side spinning reserve services are offered at the rate of 
2Since the permanent outage rates are generally small (order of 0.1 outage pel' year), it may be reasonable 
to simply use '\e- 1 ;::::: 8760/'\pf. 
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$50 pel' megawatt-hour during the entire scheduling horizon. 
vVe assume that the pre- and post-contingency generator on/off variables are set to be 
equal; therefore, non-spillning reserve services are not available. Moreover, we assume that 
the generators offer the maximum possible amount of up- and down-going spinning reserve, 
both at a rate equal 1.0 25% of their highest marginal cost of energy production. 
The objective functioll here is identical to that found in (E.1) except for the following 
aspects: (i) terms related with llon-spinning reserve and post-contingency startup costs are 
absent; and, (ii) pre- and post-contingency generation costs terms aecount for the multi-
block structure of the offers. 
Finally, the initial system conditions (at t = 0) are detailed in Table EA. 
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Table E.4 Initial operating conditions-System B 
Unit i Type 1J,iO giO (MW) U1io a (h) D1io b (h) 
1 U12 0 0.0 0 1 
2 U12 0 0.0 0 1 
3 U12 0 0.0 0 1 
4 U12 0 0.0 0 1 
5 U12 0 0.0 0 1 
6 U20 0 0.0 0 6 
7 U20 0 0.0 0 10 
8 U20 0 0.0 0 10 
9 U20 0 0.0 0 10 
10 U50 1 50.0 24 0 
11 U50 1 50.0 24 0 
12 U50 1 50.0 24 0 
13 U50 1 50.0 24 0 
14 U50 1 50.0 24 0 
15 U50 1 50.0 24 0 
16 U76 1 15.2 22 0 
17 U76 1 15.2 22 0 
18 U76 1 15.2 22 0 
19 U76 1 15.2 22 0 
20 UIOO 0 0.0 0 2 
21 U100 0 0.0 0 10 
22 U100 0 0.0 0 2 
23 U155 0 0.0 0 2 
24 U155 1 54.3 10 0 
25 U155 1 54.3 10 0 
26 U155 1 54.3 10 0 
27 U197 0 0.0 0 1 
28 U197 0 0.0 0 1 
29 U197 0 0.0 0 1 
30 U350 1 140.0 300 0 
31 U400 1 378.1 769 0 
32 U400 1 100.0 16 0 
°Up-time at t = O. 
bDown-tirne at t = O. 
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Appendix F 
Computing Tools 
F.1 Hardware 
Two machines (Paco and Ampère) were used in solving the electricity market-clearing 
problems studied in this dissertation. Below is a short description of both. 
Paco It is a personal computer equipped with a 1.80-GHz Pentium 4 processor, 
512 MB of random-access memory (RA:\1) and runs under the Microsoft 
Windows XP Professional operating system. 
Ampère It is a Linux-basesl computation servel' equipped with eight 1.60-GHz pro ces-
sors and 2 GB of RAM. It is physically located at the Escuela Técnica Su-
perior de Ingenieros Industriales of the Univel'sidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 
Ciudad Real, Spain. 
F.2 Software 
The optimization problems developed in this dissertation were coded and solved using the 
following software packages. 
GAMS GAMS, which stands for "General Aigebraic Modeling System," is a special-
ized software package dedicated to formulating mathematica.l programming 
problems and interfacing them with third party solution packages [195,196]. 
It is commercialized by the GAMS Development Corporation in Washington, 
OC. :Vlost notably, it provides a powerful high-levellanguage for representing 
succinctly large and complex systems modeled as optimization problems. The 
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GAMS language contains an the neeessary data constructs required to for-
mulate any kind of mathematical program: sets, variables (both continuous 
and discrete), parameters and equations (to set up constraints and objective 
functions) [84,195]. 
Among other things, GAMS permits the separation of a model from its input 
data, thus improving the portability of any given mode! and easing model 
data sensitivity analyses. Likewise, GAMS permits the complete separation 
of a moclel description from its solution algorithm. This feature can prove to 
be useful when determining computation time benchmarks. 
CPLEX CPLEX, a third party solution package being interfaeed by GAMS, is a high-
performance mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) solver commereial-
ized by ILOG Ine., based in Mountain View, CA [197]. Its mixed-integer so-
lution engine Ü, based on a branch-and-cut algoritlnn which is complemented 
with a number of heuristies [57,81,83,84,124,198]. CPLEX handles linear 
programming using either the revised simplex methocl or an interior-point 
algorithm [82], as chosen by the user. 1 
Moreover, CPLEX has a powerful pre-processing engine whose role is to 
eliminate redundancies in models before initiating the brandl-ancl-cut solu-
tion proeess. These reductions can decrease the core memory requirements 
for given problems, which often lead to corresponding reductions in solution 
times. 
1 Ali numerical examples reported in this dissertation used the revised simplex method for linear pro-
gramming. 
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Appendix G 
Marginal Prices of Energy and Security 
Consider the following security-constrained market-clearing problem, minimizing a me as ure 
of social cost lV ( u, x) 
subject to 
min H!(u, x) 
u,x 
H(u(O), x(O), 0) = 0 
H(u(k), x(k), k) = 0; k = 1, ... , J( 
G(u,x) 2:: 0 
(/-L(O)), 
(/-L(k)), 
(CT) , 
(G.1) 
(G.2) 
(G.3) 
(GA) 
where the vectors u and x represent respectively a11 discrete and continuous variables 
of the market-clearing problem. The vector constraint (G.2) represents the power balance 
under the pre-contingency (or error-free) scenario, while (G.3) represents the power balance 
conditions for each of the pre-selected k = 1, ... , K contingency (or net load uncertainty) 
scenarios. The vector inequality (GA) gathers a11 the remaining network and technological 
constraints. With respect to each of the constraints, (G.2)-(G.4), we define the Lagrange 
multiplier vectors /-L(O), /-L(k); k = 1, ... , K and CT. 
Theorem G.1 (Arroyo-Galiana Theorem on marginal costing of energy and security). 
Given an optimal solution (u*, x*) to the security-constrained market-clearing pTOblem 
(G.1)-(GA), under reasonable sTnoothness assumptions of the f1tnctions VV(-), HU and 
G (.) wdh respect to the contiTl,'uo'us vœriables x, and while we keep the dis crete vœriables 
fixed at u*, the Tnarginal cost" of eneTyy and secu,rity aS80ciated w'ith this stationary po'int 
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._-~- --~,-------------~~~~~-
are respectively 
aw K 
aE = J-L(O) + L J-L(k), (G.5) 
k=l 
and 
aH! K 
as = L J-L(k), 
k=l 
(G.G) 
1JJheT(~ dE n~JJresents an incTernental vector pertuTbation of the power balance r'Clatùms undeT 
the pTe-contingency (OT eTToT-free) scerwTio (G.2) and dS is an extm incTernental peTtuT-
bation of the p01JJeT balance Tdations in the failed (OT net load unceTtainty-rnodeling) states 
(G.3). 
PTOOf. See [M] for a formaI pro of. o 
Corollary G.1. UndeT marginal JJTicing /3, 125J, the marginal costs defined by (G.5) and 
(G.G) becorne Te8pectivdy the nodal priees of eneryy and sec'u,rity. 
Appendix H 
Discretization of the Net Load Error 
Probability Distribution 
H.I Net Load Error Probability Calculations 
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Fig. 4.1 shows an example of a possible discretization pattern of the net load error RV 
probability distribution function. Taking the midpoints of the intervals to represent the 
discrete realizations of the net load error RV Ont(j), their respective probabilities Vt(j), .i = 
1, ... ,J are the areas below the probability distribution function eva.luatecl between the 
enclpoints of the intervals. The intervals corresponding to the tails of the distribution, 
which are those with indices j = 1 and .i = J, must account for the remaining values of 
the net load e1'ror RV which extend to -00 and to +00 respectively. 
Given that an interval j has an upper endpoint O~~(j) and a lower endpoint O~~(j), the 
associated probability is calculated as 
(I-1.1) 
where erfC) is known as the "error function" [199] 
2 l' Z 2 erf(z) = r:;;: e-t dt. 
y1i 0 
(H.2) 
l'or example, in the case of Fig. 4.1, where (Jnt = 0.1 pel' unit, the probabilities of the 
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intervals are calculated as 
[ . (-0.25)] " 1 + eri (J'ntV2 = 0.0062, 
[erf (-0.1~) _ erf (-0.25)] = 0.0606, (J'ntV2 (J'ntV2 
I/t(7) = d,r f. oo e--Ç2 / 2U;"t d( = ~ [1 - erf ((J'~~~)] = 0.0062. 
27r (J'nt '/0.25 ~ 
The full set of probabilities is found in Table H.1. We note here that ~f=ll/t(j) = 1 is 
satisf1ed, as it should. 
Table H.1 Discrete net load error probabilities 
j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I/t(j) 0.0062 0.0606 0.2417 0.3829 0.2417 0.0606 0.0062 
H.2 Net Load Error Scenario Probability Calculations 
Given a net load error scenario Sk = {Ù;l1 jk21 ... ,jkT}, the associated sequence of node 
probabilities PI;(k) for t = 1, ... , T is calculated recursively from the product 
(H.3) 
where Po (k) = 1. It should be noted that for each time period t the condition ~i~l Pt (k) = 1 
is satisfied, as it should. 
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